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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate the continuing relevance of 
Wittgenstein’s approach to the problem of freedom of the will, primarily 
as expounded in his “Lectures on Freedom of the Will” (LFW). My 
overall aim is to show how Wittgenstein works to reconfigure the debates 
about freedom of the will so that it can be confronted as the kind of 
problem he thinks it ultimately is: an ethical and existential problem. Not 
published until 1989, the LFW have received scant critical attention. I 
argue that Wittgenstein’s approach is highly distinctive in a way that 
makes it significantly less vulnerable than its closest cousins to certain 
powerful lines of critical attack. Chapter One brings out the 
distinctiveness of the LFW, especially vis-à-vis a putatively 
Wittgensteinian form of compatibilism, exemplified by Kai Nielsen. 
Albeit in different ways, Wittgenstein and Nielsen are both concerned to 
show why being caused to act, e.g. by the laws of nature, does not equate 
to being compelled to act, e.g. against one’s will. Unlike Nielsen, 
however, Wittgenstein further recognises that showing the compatibility 
of freedom and natural laws establishes no more than the logical 
consistency of holding people responsible, given determinism, and so 
cannot itself constitute a defence of our practices. Chapter Two 
introduces, as a still closer comparison with Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson’s 
practice-based defence of interpersonal, ‘reactive’ attitudes (e.g. feelings 
of resentment, gratitude, etc.). I argue that the same correlation between a 
belief in freedom of the will and the primitive expression of ‘reactive’ 
attitudes/feelings is central also to the LFW. However, I further argue that 
certain major lines of criticism of Strawson’s practice-based defence of 
our current practices, familiar in the critical literature, do not in the same 
way threaten Wittgenstein’s defence of a broader practice-based approach, 
one that encompasses both reactive and non-reactive attitudes. Chapters 
Three and Four deal with the difficulties arising from the recognition that 
our most entrenched and ‘natural’ attitudes are non-reactive rather than 
reactive, including attitudes that are properly called ‘fatalistic’. Chapter 
Three develops a response to Galen Strawson’s criticism that if reactive 
and non-reactive attitudes are both equally expressive of human nature, 
then any merely descriptive approach to these attitudes will be incapable 
of resolving the fundamental question of which of these sorts of attitude 
we ought to adopt. Finally, Chapter Four examines Wittgenstein’s 
sustained interest in forms of life, especially religious forms of life, which 
appear to give equal weight to both reactive and non-reactive attitudes.  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Chapter I 
Compatibilism and Wittgenstein’s “Lectures 
on Freedom of the Will” 
———————— 
‘I feel discomfort and know the cause’ makes it sound as if there were two things 
going on in my soul—discomfort and knowing the cause. In these cases ‘cause’ is 
hardly ever used at all. You use ‘why?’ and ‘because’, but not ‘cause’. 
 —Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Lectures on Aesthetics” (notes taken by Rush 
Rhees). 
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Published in 1989 as a single lecture, and later republished as two, separate lectures 
in 1993, the extant record of Wittgenstein’s “Lectures on Freedom of the 
Will” (LFW) are an annotated set of typewritten notes by Yorick Smythies—a student 
and lifelong friend of Wittgenstein’s—who was granted special dispensation to take 
notes during Wittgenstein’s classes.  With regards the date of the lectures themselves, 1
there is some debate; although I see no reason to dispute the various arguments put 
forward by Klagge and Nordmann that the most likely inauguration date is late 1939.  2
Since their publication, scant critical attention has been paid to the LFW despite their 
being the only substantial source of information on Wittgenstein’s views concerning 
freedom of the will.  Where the LFW have been referred to, it is in order to shore up 3
pre-conceived notions of how Wittgenstein might putatively respond to the alleged 
incompatibility of human freedom and natural laws. As a result, commentators have 
tended to overlook more distinctive elements of the LFW.  Where some attention is 4
paid to the more distinctive elements of the LFW, moreover, this has not then been 
interpolated back into the wider debate concerning freedom of the will.  How, then, 5
 Wittgenstein, L. first published in 1989 “A Lecture on Freedom of the Will” in Philosophical 1
Investigations 12(2) pp. 85–100. Later reprinted in 1993 as two separate “Lectures on Freedom of the 
Will”, in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions, 1912-51, J. Klagge & A. Nordmann (eds.), 
Hackett Publishing, pp. 427-444. Notes by Y. Smithies. All page further references are from the 
reprinted edition.
 Klagge & Nordmann, pp. 427-8. Normal Malcolm’s coversheet to the lectures (compiled in 1967) 2
first gave the date of their inaugurations as “probably 1939” but this was later amended to 1945-6; this 
later date was then itself changed to 1946-7 when the lectures were published in 1989. In no particular 
order, the key arguments Klagge & Nordmann put forward for the earlier date are as follows; i) all 
those known to have been present at the lectures were in Cambridge in 1939, and several notable 
figures who were present in 1947 have no memory of the lectures; ii) as we shall see, some of the 
arguments in the LFW are summarised in LFM, known to have been given in 1939; iii) 1939 would 
have obvious significance to an Austrian Jew living in England, which is thought to be reflected, both 
in Wittgenstein’s letters from this time and in the LFW (e.g. his references to not being a hero).
 Beyond the brief summary of the LFW in LFM, Wittgenstein makes only one other reference to 'free 3
will' in a remark dated to 1947 (CV, p. 63); this perhaps explains the revised date of the LFW.
 E.g. Nielsen 1971, Shanker 1993, Dilman 1999.4
 E.g. Soulez 2000, Brenner 2001a.5
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are we to understand the bearing the LFW have on on-going debates about 
determinism, compatibilism and freedom of the will? 
 One natural way to interpret the LFW is as advancing a certain sort of 
compatibilist account of freedom of the will. Very roughly, ‘compatibilism’ is, in this 
context, the view that, even on the supposition that our decisions and actions are 
determined by the laws of nature, these can nevertheless be justifiably regarded as 
free and responsible. My aim in this chapter is to show that while, to this extent in 
common cause with the compatibilist, Wittgenstein denies that being caused to act 
entails being compelled to act, we will miss the distinctiveness of his approach to 
these issues, and their significance for on-going philosophical discussion, so long as 
we fail to recognise the sense in which the LFW resist characterisation as advancing a 
compatibilist approach to freedom of the will.  
 Wittgenstein opens the LFW by asking, ‘Could one say that the decision of a 
person was not free because it was determined by natural laws?’  A straightforwardly 6
compatibilist answer to this question would be that, solely on the basis of a person’s 
decision being determined by natural laws, we could not deny that the person’s 
decision was free. We should note that this answer generally arises in response to the 
incompatibilist argument that not only could we say that a person’s decision was not 
free, but that we should say so. In light of these differing responses, this opening 
question serves as an initial point of contact between compatibilists and 
incompatibilists; that is, both of these positions agree that this question is central to 
the philosophical problem of the will. The question itself is a variation of what we 
 LFW, p. 429.6
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might call the Compatibility Question, i.e. whether or not freedom and determination 
by natural laws are logically or conceptually compatible.  
 As we shall see in the first part of this chapter, Wittgenstein no doubt seems to 
favour the compatibilist’s answer to the Compatibility Question, i.e. the view that we 
may not say that a decision was lacking freedom simply because it was causally 
determined. However, against this must be weighed Wittgenstein’s stated intention 
neither to attack nor defend belief in the freedom of the will; an impartial stance that 
is no doubt reflected in his simultaneous criticism of compatibilism as a defence of 
such a belief.  In the second half of this chapter, I will demonstrate how 7
Wittgenstein’s opposition to incompatibilism (and any perceived defence of the 
conceptual compatibility of freedom of the will and determination by natural laws) 
can be conceived as distinct from a defence of belief in freedom of the will. In order 
to pursue this question, the second part of this chapter will be taken up with a contrast 
between the LFW and Kai Nielsen’s article, “The Compatibility of Freedom and 
Determinism”. As a philosopher who articulates a putatively Wittgensteinian 
compatibilism, and whose article predates the publication of the LFW, Nielsen’s 
paper is representative of a view that occludes the distinctiveness of the approach that 
stands to be illuminated by a retrospective analysis of Wittgenstein’s 1939 lectures.  
 In subsequent chapters, I will show that Wittgenstein’s intention neither to 
attack nor defend belief in the freedom of the will is a part of a wider methodology 
that seeks to promote an experience of the existential problem of moral agency; an 
experience that, he argues, is hampered by certain ways of framing the theoretical 
problem, e.g. in terms of compatibilism and incompatibilism. These ways of framing 
 LFW, p. 436; ‘All these arguments might look as if I wanted to argue for the freedom of the will or 7
against it. But I don’t want to.’
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the problem in theoretical terms influence, but more decisively are influenced by, 
certain imagistic uses of language that can come to have a grip on human beings. It is 
by loosening the grip of these images that we can come to experience, as a genuine 
ethical struggle, the question of whether and how we are responsible. It is this last 
which prevents Wittgenstein from either attacking or defending freedom of the will, 
and yet why it is that he is able to offer a strong critical perspective on both 
viewpoints. 
 First of all, however, I shall introduce the LFW with reference to a 
compressed but important passage from the Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics (LFM).  
The Lectures on the Foundation of Mathematics 
In 1939, the year that arguably Wittgenstein gave his two lectures on freedom of the 
will, he also gave a series of lectures on the nature of mathematics. In the course of 
the latter, Wittgenstein digresses from his main topic of mathematical necessity to 
discuss briefly the freedom of the will. Before we go on to examine the LFW, there 
are good reasons for beginning our analysis with this passage from the LFM. I shall 
argue that it serves to summarise ideas that are central to the LFW and is therefore 
useful, not only in dating the lectures, but in interpreting them as well. 
 In the context of the LFM, Wittgenstein's investigation is focused on a certain 
use of the term ‘necessarily’.  He envisages a mathematician who wants to say that 8
five times five necessarily equals twenty-five, but without giving us any clear sense 
of what sort of necessity he has in mind. Wittgenstein is evidently worried here about 
the danger that such a mathematician’s use of the term ‘necessity’ might amount to 
 LFM, p. 242.8
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nothing more than a pleonasm. Specifically, the worry is that saying five times five 
necessarily equals twenty-five might fail to say anything other or more than that 
twenty-five is the result of multiplying five by five. For our purposes here, however, 
the important point is the connection that Wittgenstein sees between this danger of 
pleonastic uses of the word ‘necessarily’ in mathematical contexts and a parallel 
danger, in philosophical contexts, surrounding the word ‘compulsion’: 
We have an idea of compulsion. If a policeman grabs me and shoves me 
through the door, we say I am compelled. But if I walk up and down here, 
we say I move freely. But it is objected: “If you knew all the laws of 
nature, and could observe all the particles etc., you would no longer say 
you were moving freely; you would see that a man just cannot do 
anything else.” –But in the first place, this is not how we use the 
expression “he can’t do anything else”.  9
Why, then, does Wittgenstein compare the mathematician’s use of the word 
‘necessarily’ with this use of the word ‘compulsion’?  He appears to think that 10
philosophers who hold that the laws of nature are incompatible with human freedom 
have a tendency to think that we might be ‘compelled’ in some undisclosed, and 
potentially pleonastic, sense; and that this may lead them to overlook our familiar use 
of the word ‘compulsion.’ In the case of the person bullied by the policeman, 
Wittgenstein observes that we have a very clear idea of what contributes to his being 
compelled, i.e. he is pushed. This use of the term ‘compulsion’ is capable of being 
 Ibid.9
 Ibid; the two ideas are related, as we shall see when it comes to the LFW, since, for Wittgenstein, 10
thinking either in terms of compulsion against one’s will or in terms of natural laws is not necessitated 
by any argument. One doesn’t say “I must look at it this way”; it is more correct to say “I look at it this 
way.” On this basis, both defenders of freedom of the will and their critics can fail to account for the 
depth and scope of each other’s positions.
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contrasted with the person walking freely into the room, without being pushed. To use 
the word ‘compulsion’ to refer to an action that is determined by natural laws is 
different, if for no other reason than that, in this case, we are ‘compelled’ whether or 
not we are pushed. 
 It remains to be shown that any such use of the word ‘compulsion’ is 
pleonastic. However, we need to consider the way in which our existing use of the 
term ‘compulsion’ is very clearly linked to our being considered free and responsible. 
We might say that the existing use of the term denotes compulsion against one’s will 
whereas any sense in which we might be compelled by the laws of nature is not 
straightforwardly connected with an interruption of one’s will. That is, even if the 
incompatibilist can supply an answer to the question “compelled as opposed to 
what?”, it is not clear that he will be able to appeal to a contrast with freedom of the 
will. This, I take it, is Wittgenstein’s point when he says ‘this is not how we use the 
expression “he can’t do anything else”.’  He is denying, in other words, that natural 11
laws threaten our freedom of the will in the same way that our being pushed does, i.e. 
such that we might say “he can’t do anything else” in both connections.  12
 Wittgenstein’s apparently straightforward opposition to compulsion by the 
laws of nature is immediately complicated, however, by a crucial qualification: 
Although it is conceivable that if we had a mechanism which would show 
all this [i.e. the laws of nature and all the particles etc.], we would change 
our terminology–and say, “He’s as much compelled as if a policeman 
 Ibid.11
 Cf. Dennett 1984, pp. 555-556; Dennett points out that Martin Luther said “Here I stand, I can do no 12
other” in such a way as to take full responsibility for his actions. See also Dennett 2003, p. 117.
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shoved him.” We’d give up this distinction then; and if we did, I would be 
very sorry.  13
Wittgenstein here suggests that the time may come when we are made fully aware of 
the causal history of our actions, prior to our having acted, and that this may lead us 
to abandon our familiar contrast between being free and being compelled. It is 
important to remember, both here and in the LFW, that Wittgenstein is far from 
saying that he thinks this eventuality is likely; in fact, he states in the LFW that he 
thinks it is very unlikely.  Even so, in the above passage, he commits himself to the 14
claim that such eventualities are ‘conceivable’ and therefore that the discovery of 
natural laws that describe human behaviour might result in our no longer 
distinguishing between the two cases, i.e. between the laws of nature and the 
policeman-bully. In this regard, Wittgenstein’s stance is puzzling and perhaps 
surprising. On the one hand, he appears to reject the central, incompatibilist claim 
that “If you knew all the laws of nature, and could observe all the particles etc., you 
would no longer say you were moving freely…” On the other hand, he appears to 
affirm the possibility that belief in determinism is capable of leading us to abandon 
our very distinction between being free and being compelled.  
 In the following examination of the LFW, I will attempt to square 
Wittgenstein’s opposition to the idea that we might be compelled by the laws of 
nature with his claim that it is ‘conceivable’ that we should ‘give up’ the distinction 
between freedom and compulsion against one’s will. To do so I believe we must pay 
careful attention to the fact that Wittgenstein wishes neither to defend nor deny 
 LFM, p. 242.13
 LFW, p. 432.14
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freedom of the will.  Wittgenstein’s express impartiality goes hand-in-hand with his 15
claim that the potential loss of the distinction between freedom and compulsion 
against one’s will need not, by itself, constitute a denial of freedom of the will. To 
begin with, the loss of the distinction would mean that any talk of compulsion might 
equally be ‘given up’, along with any talk of freedom of the will. Moreover, in 
recognising its conceivability, he does not grant that the loss of this distinction is a 
certainty or even justified in the face of the ‘threat’ posed by determination by natural 
laws. The crucial point Wittgenstein is making is that, whilst the contrast we currently 
employ between acting freely and compulsion against one’s will is entirely 
compatible with the discovery of nature laws, this does not rule out our giving up the 
contrast altogether, and that our doing so might have something to do with our 
discovery of the laws of nature. I believe that giving equal weight to the 
compatibilist’s and incompatibilist’s positions lies at the heart of the distinctiveness 
of Wittgenstein’s approach. But I also hope to show that any appearance of 
inconsistency in this regard is mere appearance.  
 One final point to note concerning the passage from LFM is that, on this 
occasion alone, Wittgenstein expresses his sorrow at the thought of our giving up the 
distinction between freedom and compulsion against one’s will. Not only is this a rare 
instance of Wittgenstein expressing his first-personal feelings concerning a 
philosophical problem, but also the remark raises further doubts concerning his 
avowed neutrality in the debate between opposing viewpoints. Given that he is 
making his feelings known without prejudice to his argument, we might say that the 
remarks are reminiscent of his closing words in “A Lecture on Ethics” wherein 
 LFW, p. 436.15
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Wittgenstein maintains that the ‘science’ of ethics tells us nothing about the world, 
but instead reflects a ‘tendency in the human mind’ that ‘[he] would not for [his] life 
ridicule’.  We should therefore not be too quick to conclude that Wittgenstein is 16
simply being charitable to the incompatibilist by taking seriously any threat natural 
laws might pose to our belief in freedom of the will. Rather, what we must grasp is 
the separation between i) Wittgenstein’s very clear rejection of the claim that we 
cannot be free if our decisions/actions are determined by natural laws and ii) his 
respect for a ‘tendency in the human mind’ to think that we cannot be free if we are 
determined. By expressing his sorrow, Wittgenstein is deliberately separating these 
two aspects of his approach, even if he does so in a way that appears ultimately to 
betray his own commitment to the existing distinction between freedom and 
compulsion. 
The “Lectures on Freedom of the Will” 
I shall now begin my two-part analysis of the LFW. In the first part I will set out 
Wittgenstein’s opposition to incompatibilism and consider the evidence in favour of a 
compatibilist interpretation of the LFW. As I have already indicated, I believe that the 
lectures take up two discrete, yet related, endeavours. The first comprises 
Wittgenstein’s opposition to incompatibilism, e.g. his arguments against the thesis 
that, if our decisions/actions are determined by natural laws, then our decisions/
actions cannot be free. The second seeks to demonstrate the limits of this first, 
negative argument for a defence of the belief in freedom of the will. I have 
accordingly separated my analysis into two distinct parts, which in turn are made up 
 LE, p. 12.16
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of six crucial arguments from the LFW. I shall deal with each argument in turn, 
following the ordering of the lectures:  
i) The idea of compulsion by the laws of nature is not built into the idea of the laws 
of nature. 
ii) The idea of compulsion by the laws of nature cannot be made intelligible in terms 
of the idea of one’s being compelled to act abnormally. 
iii) The idea of compulsion by the laws of nature cannot be made intelligible in terms 
of the idea of one’s being compelled to act normally. 
iv) Belief and disbelief in freedom of the will as rival ‘ways of acting’ 
v) The ways in which belief in freedom of the will can be undermined. 
and 
vi) The contrast and relationship between prediction and active deliberation. 
 Arguments under i) to iii) represent Wittgenstein’s critique of incompatibilism 
and therefore supply the strongest evidence in favour of the impression that 
Wittgenstein is some sort of compatibilist. Arguments under iv) to vi), on the other 
hand, significantly undermine this impression of Wittgenstein’s views and mark the 
limitations of any compatibilist interpretation of the LFW. An analysis of i) to iii) 
requires a straightforward examination of Wittgenstein’s arguments against 
incompatibilism. With respect to iv) to vi), however, it will be strategically useful to 
develop our analysis of the LFW alongside Kai Nielsen’s 1971 defence of 
compatibilism in Reason & Practice, one which is evidently inspired by Nielsen’s 
reading of Wittgenstein in general.  
!  of !17 240
Part One: Wittgenstein’s Opposition to 
Incompatibilism 
(i) The idea of compulsion by the laws of nature is not built into the idea of the laws 
of nature. 
The principal claim that Wittgenstein makes in the passage we have already 
introduced from LFM is that the incompatibilist is in danger of using the word 
“compulsion” in a pleonastic way. That said, nothing Wittgenstein says in LFM 
constitutes a formal argument against incompatibilism. At most, he recognises that we 
cannot take for granted that the incompatibilist use of the word “compulsion” is 
comparable to its everyday use, viz. compulsion against one's will. This is different in 
the LFW, where Wittgenstein expands on his critique of the incompatibilist’s use of 
the term “compulsion” in cases where a person’s actions are taken to be determined 
by the laws of nature. To begin with, Wittgenstein’s criticism is focused on a certain 
understanding of natural laws: 
What on earth would it mean that the natural law compels a thing to go as 
it goes. [sic.] The natural law is correct, and that’s all. Why should people 
think of natural laws at all as compelling events? If what I say is correct 
people would seem to have made a blunder.  17
By ‘people’, Wittgenstein means those whom we might now call incompatibilists, i.e. 
anyone who thinks that the decision of a person is not free if it is determined by 
natural laws.  In responding, Wittgenstein criticises, not only the idea that natural 18
 LFW, p. 430.17
 Ibid. Immediately prior to the quoted passage above Wittgenstein states that thinking that our 18
‘decisions follow natural laws’ gives us ‘no reason’ for thinking that they are ‘therefore in some way 
compelled’. 
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laws compel our actions, but also the broader claim that natural laws in any way 
cause events to unfold. By saying that an observed regularity merely demonstrates 
that a natural law is ‘correct, that’s all’, Wittgenstein means that the least contentious 
way of thinking about natural laws is as a means of observing regularities.  He thus 19
stands opposed to any understanding of natural laws as causing, and therefore 
preceding, events since ‘If I say the law of gravitation holds, this means nothing less 
than that the body moves according to the law of gravitation.’  20
 Given this general view of natural laws—which it is beyond the remit of this 
thesis to assess as such—Wittgenstein is interested primarily in why the 
incompatibilist should come to think that natural laws compel events to unfold. 
Wittgenstein remarks that ‘There is a convention that the laws of nature must be 
found simple’ and adds that it is a ‘very queer idea indeed’.  According to 21
Wittgenstein, the ‘convention’ that laws are simple and found in nature corresponds 
with the same mistaken thinking that leads the incompatibilist to think that the laws 
of nature cause events to unfold as they do. In this case, the more specific thought is 
that simple laws are there to be found. Wittgenstein typifies this as an idea that the 
laws of nature ‘were laid down by a Deity’ or ‘written in a book’ ; the postulation of 22
 By this, I do not wish to align Wittgenstein with a view of natural laws that places them within a 19
deductive system of “suitability and strength”; the main virtue (for some the main weakness) of which 
is that natural laws are not mysterious entities but conventional. E.g. Lewis, 1994, p. 478. Those who 
criticise the deductive systems approach do so because it is “mind-dependent” and does not necessarily 
reflect the world as it is. E.g. Armstrong 1983, 66–73; van Fraassen 1989, 40–64; Carroll 1990, 197–
206.
 LFW, pp. 429-30. See, Shanker 1993, pp. 218-220; ‘The most striking feature of Wittgenstein‘s ‘A 20
Lecture on the Freedom of the Will’ is not how different but rather, how similar it is to … Russell’s 
account of natural laws.’
 LFW, pp. 430-1. Cf. TLP 6.371; CV, p. 61.21
 LFW, p. 430.22
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a natural law is a ‘guess’ at what is contained within the book’s pages.  Wittgenstein 23
is quick to acknowledge that this picture of natural laws, as laid down by a Deity or 
written in a book, is a way of looking that we may find natural.  Nonetheless, he 24
evidently thinks it is a serious ‘blunder’ to suppose that this picture is somehow built 
into the very idea of a natural law. 
 Wittgenstein develops a similar line of criticism against the thought that 
natural laws offer a complete account of natural events, by which I mean the thought 
that everything that happens (including human actions) are determined by natural 
laws. This thought is not essential to incompatibilism and so any criticism 
Wittgenstein makes of this thought should be directed at what we now call hard 
determinists. (Of course Wittgenstein himself does not use the terms 
‘incompatibilism’ or ‘hard determinism’.) Hard determinists argue that freedom of the 
will is indeed incompatible with determination by natural laws, and that our actions/
decisions are so determined. Hard determinists can therefore be distinguished from 
those we now call libertarians precisely because the latter do not deny freedom of the 
will but argue instead that human actions alone are exempt from determination by the 
laws of nature. To the hard determinist, Wittgenstein effectively asks why we should 
even think that all events in the world are lawful. The kind of thinking Wittgenstein 
has in mind is when someone, a scientist for instance, notices a discrepancy in his 
results and says “well, there must be some law that explains it”.  
 Wittgenstein objects to this kind of thinking and asks what it would mean to 
deny that a certain state of affairs was governed by natural laws. He imagines a 
 LFW, p. 431.23
 This will be discussed at length in the second part of Chapter Three of this thesis.24
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scenario in which a scientist discovers a slight variation in his expected results. In 
such a case, he says, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, whilst we do not know 
exactly what law holds, we know roughly where we have gone wrong and what we 
need to modify to get more accurate predictions.  In this case, Wittgenstein admits, 25
saying “there must be some law”, means ‘it is some law pretty near to that’ and that 
this is ‘making a statement.’  But Wittgenstein says that in a case where we find a 26
gross discrepancy in our results all we can say is ‘it is not this law’ and leave it at 
that. Wittgenstein says we must therefore resist the tendency to say, “there must be 
some law”; or, at least, that to say that there must be would not be to genuinely ‘make 
a statement.’ For Wittgenstein argues that in this case there is no difference between 
saying ‘there must be some law’ and saying ‘there is no law’ or ‘it is lawless’. What 
he means is that, without some way of differentiating between ‘this law’ and ‘no law’, 
asserting that there is ‘some law’ is tantamount to saying ‘it goes as it goes,’ - which, 
like all tautologies, is an empty claim.  Ultimately, if the assumption of lawfulness is 27
to be distinguished from lawlessness, then the assumed law must be capable of being 
meaningfully distinguished from ‘any law whatsoever’ and from ‘no law at all’. As 
Wittgenstein states, saying “it is some other law” amounts to saying there is no law at 
all.  28
 To this, it might be objected that it is not unreasonable to think that the world 
follows general patterns, and that these general patterns might be focused to 
 LFW, p. 430.25
 Ibid.26
 Cf. LFW, p. 439; in the same way, an appeal to God’s will as the explanation of events ‘means 27
nothing at all’ since it is impossible to say when an event is not God’s will.
 LFW, p. 430.28
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something approximating ‘laws of nature’. From the point of view of this line of 
objection, it is implausible to insist that we must abandon any sense in which natural 
laws are in nature and order events in the world. To this, it must first be said that 
Wittgenstein does not deny that, in many scientific contexts, saying ‘it is some other 
law’ may indeed make a genuine statement about the world. What he wants to expose, 
however, is the utterly general character of such ‘statements’ in the form in which 
they might serve to shore up incompatibilist intuitions. Wittgenstein’s aim in this 
regard is to expose an implicit (and typically non-explicit) tendency to think in a 
certain way, viz. in the light of the picture of the laws of nature as laid down by a 
Deity or written in a book. 
 Partly in order to explain this tendency, Wittgenstein puts some of what the 
incompatibilist [sic. physiologist, scientist, etc.] says down to ambiguities in the 
‘surface grammar’ of the language being used. In particular, the use of the word ‘law’ 
which, as Wittgenstein points out, already ‘suggests more than an observed regularity 
which we take it will go on.’  What Wittgenstein means is that there is most certainly 29
a sense in which legal laws bring about, or proscribe, our actions; you might say that 
is the purpose of a legal law, i.e. to bring about conformity with the law. Where the 
incompatibilist goes wrong is in co-opting these proscriptive elements into our 
understanding of natural laws. Arguably, the same problem is encountered with 
words such as ‘cause’, ‘force,’ and ‘power’ that can be used descriptively as well as 
anthropomorphically as metaphors; for example, the ‘force’ of an idea is 
metaphorically related to a magnetic force of attraction. The suggestion that we are 
dealing here with metaphors seems to capture what it is that Wittgenstein thinks 
 LFW, p. 430.29
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‘bewitches’ the incompatibilist into thinking that natural laws are inherently 
compulsive.  I shall more on this in due course, but it suffices here to say that the 30
fact that we are dealing with metaphors and not arguments goes some way towards 
explaining Wittgenstein’s avowed neutrality in the face of his otherwise bold 
statements against incompatibilism. 
 Another way to put this is to say that the incompatibilist’s claims, e.g. that we 
lack freedom of the will, can be explained with reference to reasons other than that 
there is an observed regularity: 
There is no reason why, even if there was regularity in human decisions, I 
should not be free. There is nothing about regularity which makes 
anything free or not free. The notion of compulsion is there if you think of 
the regularity as compelled; as produced by rails. If, besides the notion of 
regularity, you bring in the notion of: ‘it must move like this because the 
rails are laid like this.’  31
Now it might be further objected at this point that Wittgenstein’s criticism 
misrepresents the incompatibilist’s view by tying it so closely to a certain picture of 
the laws of nature. In the following two points, I will examine two alternative ways of 
presenting the incompatibilist’s views that focus instead on the mistaken use of the 
term ‘compulsion’. 
 Cf. PI, §109.30
 LFW, p. 431.31
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(ii) The idea of compulsion by the laws of nature cannot be made intelligible in 
terms of the idea of one’s being compelled to act abnormally. 
Even if we accept the premise that natural laws determine our actions and that this 
constitutes a form of compulsion, it remains to be shown, by the incompatibilist, that 
this constitutes or contributes to a denial of freedom of the will. This debt of 
explanation is what leads me to make explicit the question, left implicit by 
Wittgenstein, viz. “compelled as opposed to what?” That is, in indicating his 
agreement with the compatibilists—that being ‘compelled’ by the laws of nature does 
not, by itself, threaten our freedom of the will merely our freedom not to be 
determined by the laws of nature—Wittgenstein emphasises the question of whether 
or not freedom of the will entails the freedom not to be determined by the laws of 
nature.  
 This is where Wittgenstein’s analogy with being pushed enters the scene. We 
naturally accept that being pushed against one’s will, for example, constitutes a 
paradigmatic negation of one’s freedom. We might suppose, therefore, that the 
incompatibilist might seek to interpret the idea of one’s being determined by natural 
laws through the analogy of one’s being ‘pushed’ by another agent. If so, the 
incompatibilist is obviously vulnerable to the criticism advanced in LFM; namely, 
that even if one’s decisions are determined by natural laws, there remains a 
meaningful distinction to be made between compulsion against one’s will and being 
caused to act. We can say, therefore, that a person’s decision was free even if it was 
determined because, and for no other reason, he willed it so. Nothing the 
incompatibilist says rules out our taking this freedom (from being compelled against 
one’s will) as the basis for a belief in freedom of the will. 
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 As we shall see, this is the classical compatibilist definition of freedom of the 
will that others, including Kai Nielsen, often appeal to in defence of compatibilism.  32
At the same time, however, incompatibilists are alive to the idea that an individual 
can lack freedom of the will without having it taken away; i.e. without being pushed. 
For this reason, mental or physical incapacity can be taken to be a more fitting 
comparison to determination by natural laws. Not only does incapacity of this kind 
not require any outside form of agency, but so too might we be unaware of its 
influence prior to its ‘discovery’. For example, conditions such as kleptomania seem 
to involve a discrete means of causation that is unlike being pushed into a room—one 
can hardly be unaware of being pushed against one’s will, whereas kleptomania 
requires diagnosis. These need not be the only reasons to favour comparing 
determinism with incapacity, but it can be said that the incompatibilist has reason to 
prefer the alternative comparison. 
 Under a detailed examination of the LFW, it will become clear that 
Wittgenstein too is alive to this alternative comparison. For instance, his worry about 
a pleonastic use of the term ‘compulsion’ extends, not just to the suggestion that we 
might all be being pushed around by the laws of nature, but also to the suggestion that 
we might all be compelled in the way that the kleptomaniac is compelled, i.e. as the 
result of an abnormal condition. The worry about the latter comparison is bound up 
with Wittgenstein’s insistence in LFM that the term ‘compulsion,’ like the term 
‘necessarily,’ requires a conceptual foil, i.e. a meaningful contrast. Again, we must be 
 In its simplest form, the classical compatibilist definition of freedom of the will consists in a positive 32
freedom to will and a negative freedom not to be hindered; e.g. for Hobbes, freedom of the will 
consists in not being hindered in doing what one has a will to do (Leviathan, p. 117).
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able to ask, “compelled as opposed to what?” Likewise, in the LFW, Wittgenstein 
insists: 
In general, one doesn't wish to say: he ought not to be punished because 
he couldn't have chosen otherwise. Unless you distinguish cases in which 
you could say ‘He could have chosen otherwise’ and cases in which you 
say ‘he couldn’t have chosen otherwise’.  33
The relevance of the ‘in general’ only becomes clear in light of the objection that not 
everyone can be compelled as the kleptomaniac is compelled. Wittgenstein in no way 
rules out our saying, in the kleptomaniac’s case, “he ought not to be punished because 
he couldn't have chosen otherwise” and therefore that mental incapacitation can be a 
reason for denying an individual’s freedom of the will. What Wittgenstein rules out, 
in the above cited passage, is associating the phrase “he ought not to be punished 
because he couldn’t have chosen otherwise” with determinism in the same way that 
we associate it with a condition like kleptomania; thereby using abnormality as a 
grounds for denying everyone’s freedom.  
 It is true that Wittgenstein does not explicitly identify a condition like 
kleptomania with mitigating a person’s responsibility. Although, the list of mitigating 
factors that he offers seems likely encompass conditions like kleptomania. The list of 
mitigating factors he provides includes being drunk, having a headache, or being 
engaged in a particularly tedious conversation with someone.  I do not mean to 34
suggest that Wittgenstein considers these states to be in any way similar to 
kleptomania. But his list is far from exhaustive and he does not circumscribe what 
 LFW, p. 437; these two sentences are two discrete paragraphs in Smythies’ notes, but the ‘unless’ 33
makes the continuation of the idea plain. Emphasis added.
 Ibid.34
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might or might not be added to it, provided ‘you can distinguish cases in which you 
may say “the man is free” and “the man is not free”.’ Neither does anything on the list 
constitute an excuse for any and all malfeasance. Wittgenstein admits that we might 
disagree about what should or should not go on the list, and it is partly for this reason 
that it is important to be able to distinguish cases in which we say “the man is free” 
and “the man is not free.” Therefore, Wittgenstein grants that one person might say 
‘[if] you choose the one or the other… you are responsible’ whilst another might say 
‘If you are drugged, that is too much’.  35
 It might still be objected that, if the requirement for being able to distinguish 
cases is the ability to disagree about individual cases, then a condition like 
kleptomania must be excluded from the list of mitigating factors. For instance, it 
might be argued that, in the kleptomaniac’s case, there is no room for disagreement 
about whether or not to hold the individual responsible; or rather there is no way in 
which two people who agreed about the diagnosis and the nature of the condition 
could then disagree about whether or not to hold the kleptomaniac responsible for 
acting compulsively. In other words, it is not a matter of being partial or impartial to 
the responsibility a person (in this case the kleptomaniac) has for his actions; perhaps 
anyone would say, without equivocation, that the kleptomaniac moves as ‘inevitably 
as a stone falling.’   36
 This objection is mistaken for the simple reason that, even in the case of 
kleptomania, it is possible to ‘distinguish cases in which you may say, “the man is 
free” and “the man is not free.”’ To begin with, it is only in certain circumstances that 
 LFW, p. 437.35
 LFW, p. 431.36
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the kleptomaniac can be said to be acting compulsively. And even if this were not the 
case, and a person’s actions could be said to always follow a compulsive path, it 
would still be possible to distinguish these compulsive individuals from individuals 
who are held responsible. What could certainly not be included in this list of 
mitigating factors is some perfectly general sense in which a human being might be 
said to be compelled, e.g. by his own nature or by the laws of nature. This is because, 
if we are so compelled, then we are all compelled in the same way and without 
exception and without any room for disagreement or discrimination between cases.  
 One possible objection to this line of argument might be that the 
incompatibilist does, in fact, leave open the possibility of our not being compelled, 
viz. if some libertarian theory of contra-causal freedom turns out to be true. 
Libertarian incompatibilists maintain that human beings are free to the extent that 
they can contravene the laws of nature and act spontaneously. I shall not attempt here 
a critical discussion of various libertarian proposals.  Yet it can at least be noted that, 37
even if a contrast between actions that are uncaused (i.e. spontaneous) and actions 
that are compelled (by the laws of nature) could be upheld, this would not lead to 
situations in which we could say either “the man is free” or “the man is not free”. 
This is because the hard determinist’s position is premised on the claim that, in the 
event that we are determined by the laws of nature, “the man is not free”. The 
libertarian incompatibilist would only reinforce the exclusivity of the disjunction by 
interposing that we could say “the man is free” provided only that the thesis of 
determinism is false. Wittgenstein premises the distinction between the two 
 E.g. van Inwagen 1983 in Watson 2005, pp. 38-57; Searle, 2001, pp. 283-288; Kane 1999 in Watson 37
2005, pp. 305-309.
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statements on an inclusive disjunction, i.e. under no circumstances can we preclude 
the possibility of either statement being true. 
 This shows itself in the kinds of mitigating circumstances Wittgenstein 
describes—e.g. having a headache, being tired/drunk/drugged, etc.—a list that, I have 
said, might also include conditions like kleptomania. It is clear, however, that being 
able to distinguish between circumstances in which we say, “the man is free” or “the 
man is not free” does not, by itself, legitimate the inclusion of determination by 
natural laws to this list of mitigating factors. Wittgenstein’s is the more subtle claim 
that, distinguishing between cases in which we say “the man is free” or “the man is 
not free” is not ‘black and white’ but a question of ‘degree’.  Wittgenstein makes this 38
point earlier in the LFW to emphasise that thinking that it is ‘only a question of 
degree’ between what we know now and knowing the laws of a human being is 
mistakenly to assume that the difference between two extremes is always one of 
degree. In alluding to the analogy in connection with Wittgenstein’s inclusive 
disjunction and the incompatibilist’s exclusive one, I am merely highlighting the 
danger of making the same assumption: that he and the incompatibilist are providing 
similar answers to the question ‘compelled as opposed to what?’ That they are not is 
evident in the way that Wittgenstein defends saying either “the man is free” or “the 
man is not free” whereas the incompatibilist defends saying either “all men are free” 
or “no men are free.” The latter conflicts, not only with Wittgenstein’s inclusive 
approach, but also with an understanding of the mitigating circumstances for which 
the statement “the man is not free” is appropriate, circumstances that include being 
physically or mentally incapacitated. 
 LFW, p. 432.38
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 It is worth remembering that Wittgenstein’s inclusivity extends only so far as 
his compatibilist sympathies. That is, for Wittgenstein, it is evidently possible to say 
either “the man is free” or “the man is not free” since the truth of determinism need 
have no bearing on either statement’s validity. To the extent that this line of objection 
is forceful, then, we may conclude that Wittgenstein has ruled out, not one but two, 
ways of interpreting the incompatibilist’s use of the word ‘compulsion,’ as meaning 
either against our will or as the result of an abnormality. We shall return to look more 
closely at the forcefulness of the objection from pleonasm, especially with reference 
to abnormal cases, in Chapter Two. 
iii) The idea of compulsion by the laws of nature cannot be made intelligible in 
terms of the idea of one’s being compelled to act normally. 
If Wittgenstein is right to maintain that the sense of compulsion involved in being 
determined by the laws of nature is not equivalent to being compelled either against 
one’s will or because of some abnormality, then it might be argued that the 
compulsion inherent in natural laws is the norm for human behaviour. This too seems 
to adequately capture certain aspects of the incompatibilist’s views; not least that, if 
the thesis of determinism is true, then everyone is so determined; and that we are 
determined by virtue of the fact of who, and more importantly what, we are. It might 
be that we can formulate these aspects of the incompatibilist’s understanding of 
compulsion such that we are understood to be compelled, not to act against our will 
or abnormally, but in accordance with our typical behaviour. Compulsion, then, is not 
an aberration, but the norm; it is how we must be.  
 In the LFW, Wittgenstein considers this final suggestion by using a thought-
experiment to highlight the difference between being forced to act against one’s will 
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and being compelled to act as one would have anyway. Wittgenstein imagines the 
following unlikely scenario:  
Suppose in the room below, there is a man, and he has certain people with 
him, and he says: ‘Look, I can make Wittgenstein go exactly where I 
want.’ He has a mechanism, and he regulates it with the crank, and you 
see (with a mirror) that I walk exactly as the man wants me to. Then 
someone comes up to me and says ‘Were you dragged about? Were you 
free?’ I say: ‘Of course I was free.’  39
In the experiment, the Downstairs Crank manipulates Wittgenstein’s (W’s) 
movements in such a way that W himself is unaware. Other people are aware of the 
manipulation, however, so that the Downstairs Crank shows his manipulation by 
modifying W’s behaviour so that he acts atypically—others would say that W’s 
actions were ‘queer,’ i.e. out of character. What Wittgenstein means is that, by 
showing his manipulation of W, the Downstairs Crank invalidates W’s responsibility. 
For instance, if W were made to kill someone, the Law Court would find him 
innocent, even if his own testimony was that he was free.  Despite the bizarre nature 40
of the envisaged scenario, Wittgenstein acknowledges that we encounter cases similar 
to this on a daily basis, i.e. cases where a person thinks he is acting freely but is really 
the subject of someone’s manipulation.  Whilst it might seem that Wittgenstein is 41
lending credence to the incompatibilist’s point of view, he recognises that this version 
of the Downstairs Crank analogy is not an accurate representation of determination 
 LFW, p. 434. In 1989 publication of Smythies’ notes, Wittgenstein is referred to as ‘W.’ For the sake 39
of clarity, I will revert to this shorthand in my analysis.
 LFW, p. 435.40
 LFW, p. 434; Wittgenstein also uses the example of a card sharp who can make us choose the card 41
he wants us to choose. 
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by natural laws, the main difference being that W is forced to act against his will. W 
may not be aware of this, but others are, and these others are able to guard against W 
being held responsible for his actions.  
 Wittgenstein therefore modifies the analogy in order to bring it closer into line 
with determination by natural laws. He imagines instead that the Downstairs Crank 
manipulates W’s behaviour in such a way that W acts typically, to the extent that:  
Suppose I had had violent quarrels with a particular gentleman every day. 
Every reasonable person was expecting me to quarrel anyhow. I, who 
acted according to what they did, did only what everyone would have 
expected me to do. This is different from the case where I would have 
done something alien to my ordinary character. (If, for instance, the 
people downstairs moved their apparatus so as to make my actions 
[in]compatible with the actions I did every day.)  42
The difference between the two variations of the thought-experiment can be put as 
follows: in the former case, W is either forced to act against his will or else he has no 
will of his own. In the latter case, W is no longer manipulated against his will but is 
‘railroaded’ to act in accordance with what can be considered to be his own wishes 
and desires, i.e. he has the freedom to do what he wants to do and not otherwise. The 
importance of this difference is keenly felt if we consider that most compatibilists 
argue that the freedom to do as one wishes is the apotheosis of a freedom of the will. 
On the other hand, incompatibilists often argue that, in order to be free, we must be 
“able to do otherwise (than we in fact do)”. From what we have said so far, we might 
suppose that Wittgenstein would deny that the latter kind of freedom is required.  
 LFW, p. 435.42
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 Whilst it is true that, for Wittgenstein, the image of natural laws as ‘rails’ 
along which we travel is by no means inevitable, he accepts that the doctrine of 
determinism may be true and that determinism may well mean that events take a 
single course. Yet Wittgenstein at no point envisages that this in any way implies that 
our actions are compelled. As we noted during my analysis of i), Wittgenstein is 
beholden to the view that regularity, or causation, does not imply compulsion. Why 
then does Wittgenstein admit that there are good reasons for saying that W is not 
responsible for his actions? An impartial reader, even a compatibilist, can accept that, 
in the initial formulation of the experiment, W is not responsible. Compatibilists are 
able, even committed, to accepting that our freedom can be lost, if for instance we are 
compelled against our will or have an underlying condition. But the suggestion in the 
second instantiation of the Downstairs Crank analogy is that we might lack freedom 
whatever we do. The key to why Wittgenstein supposes that this is true lies in the 
difference between the above experiment and so-called Frankfurt-style cases.   43
 Harry Frankfurt famously expounded a series of thought-experiments in 
which an agent, like W, is unwittingly ‘railroaded’ into a single course of action 
which, it just so happens, is the course he would have taken without intervention.  44
Frankfurt-style cases also often involve a malevolent controller, like the Downstairs 
Crank, who remotely restricts an agent’s ability to choose anything other than his 
current course of action. The difference between these cases and Wittgenstein’s 
experiment—and the problem from a compatibilist point of view—is that W’s 
 Frankfurt 1969, pp. 829–39.43
 To take one such Frankfurt-style case: a participant in an election places his vote entirely unaware 44
that, should he change his mind and vote for someone else, he will be impelled to vote the way he 
initially intended. On this particular occasion, it just so happens, the implant is never activated because 
the voter does not change his mind. Frankfurt argues that this supports a compatibilist interpretation of 
freedom of the will since the voter acted freely and responsibly despite not being able to do otherwise. 
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behaviour, even in the modified example, is still to be contrasted with a ‘freedom’ 
possessed by W had the Crank never existed. The difference is not hard to explain, 
and is the result of the different ways in which the thought-experiments play out. In 
Frankfurt-style cases, the malevolent controller plays no active part in the 
manipulation; the controller’s involvement is only potential, not actual. In the 
Downstairs Crank example, however, the crank is necessarily active in W’s 
manipulation. For this reason, the Downstairs Crank example is a truer comparison 
with determinism which, however discrete, is nevertheless thought by the 
incompatibilist to be an actively controlling force. This is important, given that both 
Frankfurt and Wittgenstein wish to reflect the incompatibilist’s position accurately 
and not merely approximate it. In any case, the incompatibilist seems justified in 
claiming that the analogy with determinism is lost if there is no active link between 
an individual’s actions and the determining force. In short, any success we might have 
in using these examples is lost if we fail to entertain, as the incompatibilist does, that 
the Downstairs Crank is doing something. 
 Unlike Frankfurt, who is undeniably a compatibilist, Wittgenstein entertains 
the view that W may not be responsible for his actions even though he would have 
carried out those actions without any intervention from the Downstairs Crank. 
Wittgenstein admits no certainty in this judgement, however; he merely presumes that 
the Law Court would not hold W responsible in either version of the Downstairs 
Crank experiment. It is important, however, not to overestimate Wittgenstein’s 
admitting that such cases might mitigate an individual’s responsibility for he points 
out that: 
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We are comparing the case of a human being with those special cases 
where we would say that a man was decided: where we would say that he 
thought he was deciding freely, but was actually compelled. Why should 
anyone be inclined to compare ordinary cases with such a very special 
case?  45
Wittgenstein’s argument against the incompatibilist is therefore that, if the second 
instantiation of the Downstairs Crank example does make use of an intelligible sense 
of compulsion, it can only be made intelligible as a rare and desultory variation of the 
sort of manipulation illustrated by the first version of the thought-experiment. This 
point is worth emphasising, specifically that it is only as a very rare example that we 
can compare the two sorts of manipulation at all. This is because, if the first 
instantiation of the Downstairs Crank example establishes a principal case of 
compulsion (i.e. against one’s will), then the second instantiation, which is a 
modification of this general principle, represents a modification of the general rule 
that compulsion means being manipulated against one’s will. Only in this way can we 
make sense of such examples.  
 If this were not the case then we may have to envisage that compulsion might 
always mean being forced to act in line with what one would have done anyway. 
Such a concept would, it could be argued, have few contexts of application even if it 
were not pleonastic. That is, if all instances of compulsion—coercion, constraint, 
manipulation, etc.—were not unwelcome or surprising then we should likely have no 
idea of compulsion at all. But even if we did, it would be of an altogether different 
and unfamiliar sort. As in LFM, Wittgenstein’s point is that the idea of compulsion 
 LFW, p. 435.45
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associated with being forced to act against one’s will is not relevant in the second 
Downstairs Crank experiment and is therefore not to be associated with our being 
determined by the laws of nature. At the very least, it is wrong to assume that we can 
take for granted the similarities offered here between a man who is forced to act 
against his will, and a man who is forced to act as he would anyway.  
 For Wittgenstein, even if we assume that the incompatibilist’s characterisation 
of the laws of nature is correct and that therefore we cannot act otherwise than we in 
fact do act, this would still not equate to a denial of the belief in freedom of the will. 
If we allow the incompatibilist his mistaken views of natural laws, what would result 
is a dissolution of the meaningful distinction between freedom and compulsion. It 
would therefore make no sense to speak either of freedom or compulsion. In LFM we 
can see how Wittgenstein treats this as an essential juxtaposition: that is, freedom is 
understood in contrast with compulsion and vice versa. If, however, we are 
compelled, not against our will, but in accordance with our natures, then it once more 
demonstrates the ill-fit between the familiar use of these terms, ‘freedom’ and 
‘compulsion,’ and the incompatibilist’s notion of compulsion by natural laws. 
 The limited scope of the arguments we have considered so far—concentrating 
on the term ‘compulsion’ in the incompatibilist’s lexicon—all relate to the 
incompatibilist’s inability to give a satisfactory answer to the question “compelled as 
opposed to what?” This criticism is behind each of the three arguments I have 
outlined: that the idea of compulsion in this context is not built into the idea of the 
laws of nature and that it cannot be rendered intelligible in terms of being compelled 
to act either abnormally or normally. Now, the indeterminist might try to respond to 
Wittgenstein’s objection from pleonasm in one of three ways. First, s/he might try to 
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make clear a non-metaphorical sense in which the laws of nature really do ‘compel’ 
events. Second, s/he might defend the analogies with pushing or conditions like 
kleptomania against Wittgenstein’s criticisms. But third, s/he might simply give up 
any commitment to conceiving of determinism in terms of any kind of compulsion. 
This third dialectical possibility is especially significant given that, as we have 
already noted, Wittgenstein admits the conceivability of a state of affairs in which, 
because of our commitment to determinism, we give up altogether the distinction 
between freedom and compulsion. And this raises a puzzle. For how are we to 
reconcile the following two claims, both of which appear to be central to 
Wittgenstein’s approach? 
1) Determination by natural laws is not incompatible with a belief in freedom of the 
will. 
and 
2) The discovery that we are determined by natural laws might lead us to no longer 
believe we are free. 
Clues to what it is that reconciles these two claims lie both inside and outside of the 
LFW. During a conversation on Freud only a year or so prior to the LFW, 
Wittgenstein objects to it being said that “Determinism applies to the mind as truly as 
to physical things”. He has in mind Freud’s argument that, unless feelings and 
thoughts follow laws of their own, then “mental phenomena are guided by chance”. 
In words strikingly reminiscent of his remark in the LFW concerning ubiquitous laws 
of nature, Wittgenstein asserts that this amounts to saying no more than “There must 
be some law” which, pace his earlier assertion in the LFW is only ‘making a 
!  of !37 240
statement’ if one has in mind a slight change in one’s experiment.  Since, as 46
Wittgenstein puts it, we ‘think of experiments’ only in relation to ‘physical things’, 
Freud’s words are at best ‘obscure’; and therefore amount to saying no more than ‘it 
goes as it goes’.   47
 More importantly, that statements concerning feeling and motivation are 
judged by Wittgenstein to be non-empirical helps to explain why, in the LFW, he 
should say that ‘it is most misleading and out of the question in fact’ to suppose that 
we might ‘forecast a man’s actions’.  It might be felt that such a bold statement—48
that there are, and can be, no laws of a human being—brings Wittgenstein’s 
impartiality to an end. Despite the allusive nature of the remark, his implication is 
likely that the thesis of determinism is false (or at least unprovable); perhaps he 
thinks that it is impossible that we will find the laws of a human being or else that 
freedom of the will is essentially lawless. However, whatever significance the remark 
has vis-á-vis his own rejection of compatibilism, it can have little bearing on the 
opening question of the LFW: ‘Could one say that the decision of a person was not 
free because it was determined by natural laws?’ This question presumes, at least, the 
‘conceivability’ (as it is called in LFM) of our coming to know these laws, and of our 
being (in some sense) determined.  
 For this reason, a more incisive interpretation of the remark would be that, for 
Wittgenstein, ‘the fact that there aren’t actually any such laws’ is ‘important’ precisely 
because this ‘fact’ does not prevent the incompatibilist from denying freedom of the 
will on the strength of such laws. At least part of his point, then, is that the question 
 LC, p. 42.46
 Ibid.47
 LFW, p. 430.48
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of compatibility is not, and may never be, primarily concerned with the truth of 
determinism. It is for this reason that Wittgenstein remains similarly opposed to a 
compatibilist interpretation; that is, his views are not premised on the truth of 
determinism. The incompatibilist’s arguments are ‘blunders’, however, precisely 
because they depend upon the truth of the deterministic thesis. Nevertheless, 
Wittgenstein falls short of arguing in favour of either view, perhaps because he sees 
no point in defending freedom of the will from an, at best, obscure thesis of 
determinism.  
 It is therefore crucial to ask what Wittgenstein does wish us to understand. In 
what follows, I shall argue that his primary aim in the LFW is not to answer the 
Compatibility Question on the compatibilists’ side of the debate, but rather to identify 
and understand the true source of the way in which attention to the laws of nature is 
capable of undermining our belief in the freedom of the will. That is to say, what is 
‘important’ for Wittgenstein is uncovering, as he puts it in LE, a ‘tendency in the 
human mind’.  His opposition to incompatibilism is not intended, therefore, as a 49
defence of compatibilism, but as a way of highlighting the incompatibilist’s tendency, 
viz. to think of natural laws as though they were rails along which events move. As 
we shall see in the next part, however, Wittgenstein goes to similar lengths to uncover 
a tendency in the compatibilist’s thinking: that freedom of the will consists in a 
freedom of action.  
 LE, p. 12.49
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Part Two: The contrast with Kai Nielsen’s 
compatibilist defence of freedom of the will 
For all we have said so far, one might try to define compatibilism about freedom of 
the will solely in terms of a denial; namely the denial of the claim that, if we are 
determined by natural laws, then a person cannot be held responsible since s/he could 
not do otherwise. However, one potential problem with defining compatibilism in this 
way—merely as ‘anti-incompatibilism’—is that compatibilists typically present their 
claim as having a more positive import. For instance, Kai Nielsen, whose account of 
compatibilism interests us now, equates compatibilism with ‘soft-determinism’.  A 50
soft-determinist is a compatibilist in so far as each maintains that, even if the thesis of 
determinism is true, people are capable of acting freely and responsibly. However, a 
soft-determinist makes the further, stronger claim that human beings are determined 
and do act freely and responsibly.  
 By using the label ‘soft determinism’ ‘to refer to the view that maintains that 
determinism and freedom are logically compatible’ Nielsen exemplifies a certain 
readiness to go beyond an anti-incompatibilist’s answer to the Compatibility 
Question.  I suggest that any readiness to equate compatibilism with soft-51
determinism is due, in part, to the assumption that the compatibilist represents the 
‘default’ point of view; i.e. that the burden of proof is on the incompatibilist to 
demonstrate that we lack freedom of the will. If, however, compatibilism is 
understood as anti-incompatibilism, then strictly speaking the most that a 
compatibilist can demonstrate is that it is possible to believe in freedom of the will 
 Nielsen 1971, pp. 55-64.50
 Nielsen 1971, p. 56.51
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even if determinism is true. This is one potential way to understand what it is that 
separates Wittgenstein from other compatibilists, like Nielsen. 
 In order to begin to bring out the significance of the fact that Wittgenstein 
refuses to infer directly from anti-incompatibilism a compatibilist defence of freedom 
of the will, we can return to the passage on freedom of the will in LFM. A crucial 
theme there is the idea of reaction against any impression of uncertainty or fragility. 
Thus, the mathematician that Wittgenstein envisages in LFM is one who uses the 
term ‘necessarily’ to insist that there is no uncertainty in his results; the usage reflects 
a desire to think of the practice of mathematics as something fixed, immutable, 
certain. In a similar way, the compatibilist, no less than the incompatibilist, 
demonstrates a tendency to look for answers to the Compatibility Question that are 
fixed and certain. I want to show that, for Wittgenstein, on the other hand, it is the 
uncertainty or fragility of our practices that is at the heart of what he wishes to say 
concerning freedom of the will. Thus, whilst the incompatibilist is still wrong to 
claim that we might all be compelled if the doctrine of determinism is true, the 
compatibilist is equally wrong to think that the correction of this mistake is sufficient 
to shore up our belief in the freedom of the will.  Due to the uncertainty or fragility 52
of our practices of ‘freedom and resentment’, in P. F. Strawson’s summary phrase, we 
must acknowledge the conceivability of the threat that the idea of compulsion 
together with our understanding of freedom of the will might be abandoned 
altogether. 
 My aim now is to show that, because of its central recognition of the fragility 
of our belief in freedom of the will and the contingency of its basis in our ways of 
 Cf. Wittgenstein’s opposition to thinking only in ‘black and white’ terms. LFW, p. 432. See p. 25 52
above.
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acting, Wittgenstein’s own approach is quite different from the putatively 
Wittgensteinian form of compatibilism exemplified by Kai Nielsen. It shall emerge 
that, in Wittgenstein’s view, the Compatibility Question only takes us so far. For there 
is a deeper, more human problem of how we are to come to terms with the fragility of 
our beliefs and practices regarding freedom of the will and our feelings of Angst 
regarding the threat of determinism. 
Reason and Practice 
Before turning to points iv) to vi), it is instructive to consider the extent to which 
points i) to iii) can be accommodated within Nielsen’s approach. These points were: 
i) The idea of compulsion by the laws of nature is not built into the idea of the laws 
of nature. 
ii) The idea of compulsion by the laws of nature cannot be made intelligible in terms 
of the idea of one’s being compelled to act abnormally. 
iii) The idea of compulsion by the laws of nature cannot be made intelligible in terms 
of the idea of one’s being compelled to act normally. 
Ostensibly at least, these ideas reveal a shared basis for Wittgenstein’s and Nielsen’s 
respective accounts. However, our main focus in what follows is the difference in the 
way each thinker understands the relationship between reason and practice. I use the 
words ‘reason’ and ‘practice’ for several reasons, not least because Nielsen’s 
introduction to philosophy bears this title, Reason & Practice (1971).  This book—53
written roughly half-way through the fifty year period spanning the inauguration of 
 I am principally interested in Chapter 6 of Nielsen’s book, entitled “The Compatibility of Freedom 53
and Determinism”; Nielsen 1971, pp. 55-64. This chapter was later reprinted (with minor revisions) in 
Kane 2002, pp. 39-46.
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Wittgenstein's LFW in 1939 and their publication in 1989—is concerned primarily 
with the problem concerning freedom of the will, and with demonstrating the 
compatibility of freedom and determinism. Nielsen’s suitability for our comparison 
derives principally from his broadly ‘Wittgensteinian’ approach to the problem; 
despite the fact that Nielsen barely references Wittgenstein throughout and then only 
to distance himself from Wittgenstein’s other ‘disciples’.  It is nevertheless fair to 54
say that Nielsen’s allegiance remains towards a post-Wittgensteinian philosophy that 
is a version of ordinary language philosophy. Because of when Reason & Practice 
was written, however, we can assume that Nielsen was unaware of the content of the 
LFW and therefore of Wittgenstein’s specific views on the freedom of the will. 
Moreover, Nielsen readily associates his view with other dyed-in-the-wool 
compatibilists, such as Hume, Mill and Ayer. Not least because of its proximity both 
to Wittgenstein’s philosophy in general and to the mainstream tradition of 
compatibilism, Nielsen’s work is therefore especially well placed to help us to bring 
into relief the distinctive significance of Wittgenstein’s own approach specifically to 
the problem of freedom of the will. 
 The specific brand of compatibilism that Nielsen defends is what I propose to 
call ‘categorial compatibilism’. Categorial compatibilism is premised upon the idea 
that talk of reasons, motivations, etc. and talk of causes belong to two 
incommensurate ‘spaces’ or categories of description. For instance, I can describe a 
person’s decision wholly in terms of its causal influences or I can describe that same 
decision as correct or incorrect, just or unjust, hateful or empathetic, free or 
compelled. There is no inconsistency in describing the same decision in these 
 Nielsen 1971, p. 462.54
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different ways since each description belongs to a different category of description, 
i.e. each relates to a different aspect of the decision. Such a view is not unique to 
Nielsen, and we might already see how much of what we have said concerning 
Wittgenstein's LFW fits in with a compatibilism based on a difference in category. 
Many compatibilists are in tacit support of such a view and the view has other 
advocates besides Nielsen and Wittgenstein.  For my purposes, however, I am 55
simply concerned with how these two thinkers are able to reach such different 
conclusions from such similar premises. 
 Much of what Nielsen has to say chimes with what we have said so far 
concerning points i) to iii). For instance, in a succinct summation of his views, 
Nielsen says: 
There is…a persistent confusion between laws of nature and legal laws … 
Legal laws prescribe a certain course of action. Many of them are 
intended to constrain or coerce you into acting in a certain way. But laws 
of nature are not prescriptions to act in a certain way. They do not 
constrain you; rather, they are statements of regularities, of de facto 
invariable sequences that are parts of the world.  56
There is a clear affinity between what Nielsen says here about legal laws and 
Wittgenstein's concern, pointed out in i) above, that ‘the idea of compulsion already 
lies in the word “law”.’  Not only this, but Nielsen shares Wittgenstein’s cautious 57
 Cf. Kenny 1976, p. 13. Kenny defends a categorial compatibilist position when he argues that the 55
meaning of the words I speak are not to be conflated with the movement of my larynx, even if the 
words I utter only come about as a result of that movement. Cf. Lowe 1989; Lowe also blocks 
reductivist attempts to reduce the concept of “person” to that of “organism”. In a similar way, we can 
avoid reductivist attempts to reduce concepts such as “reason” to the same category as “cause.”
 Nielsen 1971, pp. 57-8.56
 LFW, p. 420.57
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approach towards the question of what a natural law consists in. Nielsen calls a 
natural law a de facto description of observed regularities but concedes that some 
further element(s) may be required for causation. However, he is clear that 
compulsion is not one of those elements.  58
 For Nielsen, incompatibilists exhibit a tendency to ‘mistakenly infer’ that an 
‘event or effect is somehow contained within the cause.’  Nielsen has in mind here 59
the move from efficient to final causation, which Wittgenstein also invokes with his 
reference to the incompatibilist’s ‘peculiar’ and fatalistic ‘way of looking at things’, 
e.g. as though natural laws are written in a book or laid down by a deity. Quoting A. J. 
Ayer, Nielsen reiterates that ‘from the fact that my action is causally determined it 
does not follow that I am constrained to do it.’  That is, both Nielsen and Ayer 60
recognise, as Wittgenstein does with respect to natural laws, that compulsion is not 
built into the idea of a cause.  
 Furthermore, Nielsen argues in favour of Wittgenstein’s claim that the 
incompatibilist’s idea of ‘compulsion’ is a misappropriation of our existing notion of 
compulsion against one’s will since to be free means to act ‘without constraint or 
compulsion’.  In light of this familiar definition of freedom and compulsion, Nielsen 61
forcibly argues that the only way to render the concept of freedom of the will 
intelligible, and for it not to be pleonastic, is for it to have a conceptual foil: 
 Nielsen 1971, p. 62.58
 Nielsen 1971, p. 57.59
 Nielsen 1971, p. 59.60
 Nielsen 1971, p. 57.61
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The conceptual facts we need to clarify are these: if the word ‘freedom’ is 
to have a meaning, it must be contrasted with something, for otherwise it 
is quite unintelligible.  62
Nielsen says the same must be true of any descriptive term. For example, to 
understand the word ‘wok’ we must be able to distinguish it from any other term, e.g. 
‘frying pan’. The acid test Nielsen proposes is to ask for ‘some conceivable 
situations’ in which the word is used correctly and situations in which it cannot so be 
used.  Anything failing this test can then be said to be unintelligible nonsense. Such 63
failure, argues Nielsen, is exactly what we find in the case of the incompatibilist’s 
understanding of ‘freedom’.  
 It is worth pausing at this juncture to consider some problems with Nielsen’s 
specific formulations of the points he broadly shares with Wittgenstein. To begin 
with, there seems to be a leap from talking about the need for a conceptual foil to 
talking specifically about a conceptual contrast or opposite. Using Nielsen’s own 
example, we know what the word ‘wok’ means because it can be distinguished from 
‘frying pan,’ ‘sock,’ ‘sunset’ etc. (in fact anything that is not itself a wok). Yet, 
Nielsen maintains that the relevant conceptual foil to ‘freedom’ is ‘compulsion’ since 
the two ideas are opposed to each other. If the two cases are to be analogous, 
however, why look for an opposite at all? What, for instance, is the opposite of 
‘wok’? On the other hand, ‘Freedom’ can be contrasted with ‘compulsion’ but also 
with ‘wok’. While it is true that supplying a different contrast gives a different sense 
to the word, it is not clear that this is what Nielsen intends to say. Nielsen wants 
 Nielsen 1971, p. 59.62
 Ibid.63
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instead to say that freedom can only be made sense of in contrast to being compelled 
against one’s will. This is why he slips from talk of meaningful contrasts to talk of an 
opposite.  
 In this respect, Nielsen’s position appears far more vulnerable than 
Wittgenstein’s to counter-objection. To begin with, Wittgenstein focuses on the word 
‘compulsion,’ not ‘freedom’. ‘Freedom’ is thereby granted multiple possible 
meanings but is introduced only in its familiar contrast with ‘compulsion’. 
Accordingly, Wittgenstein does not rule out the possibility of finding an intelligible 
sense of the term ‘freedom’, one that is opposed to determinism. Nielsen, on the other 
hand, infers directly from the incompatibilist’s lack of specificity vis-à-vis the 
meaning of the term ‘freedom’ that the incompatibilist is speaking nonsense. But 
there is arguably a lack of subtlety involved in thinking that a prolonged inability to 
articulate an idea means that the idea is unintelligible; it might simply mean that the 
idea must be shown or that the idea corresponds with a certain picture. 
 Nielsen evidently concurs with Wittgenstein, however, in judging the 
incompatibilist’s ‘blunder’ to have a grammatical dimension, i.e. the incompatibilist 
is led astray by the ‘surface grammar’ of the words he is using.  One of Nielsen’s 64
examples involves the conflation of causal and logical necessitation; in particular the 
way the word ‘must’ is used in each case. Nielsen considers the difference between: 
1) If you cut off his head, he must die. 
 And 
2) If it is a square, it must have four sides. 
 PI, §664.64
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Nielsen appears to have in mind precisely the same analogy as the one that 
Wittgenstein develops in LFM; namely, the analogy between the mathematician’s use 
of such terms as ‘must’ and ‘necessarily’, and an incompatibilist’s use of such terms. 
Nielsen wants to show that the incompatibilist is mistaken if he thinks that causal 
necessity equates with logical necessity. We should, however, keep in mind the 
possibility that, for his part, Wittgenstein ultimately has a rather different aim in 
drawing the same comparison, namely to highlight the fragility of our practices; both 
in the contexts of the philosophy of mathematics and the freedom of the will.  
 Nielsen proceeds to argue that the words ‘can’ and ‘cannot’ are similarly 
misunderstood by the incompatibilist. Specifically, the incompatibilist betrays his 
conflation of causal and logical language, by defining freedom as the ‘ability to do 
otherwise (than we did)’. According to Nielsen, the incompatibilist mistakenly infers 
that, if we are determined by natural laws, then we can’t act differently than we do: 
we are ‘railroaded’ into a definite course of action. If this is true, Nielsen asks, then 
how can it be said that an individual can, for example, live without a head; is there 
some contradiction involved in imagining the headless horseman? There is of course 
a contradiction involved in the idea of a five-sided square. 
 Again, however, Nielsen is open to counter-objection on this score. For the 
incompatibilist is not obviously committed to saying that human beings couldn’t have 
been otherwise than they are now by nature. The incompatibilist wants to say that we 
are no freer, in our determined state, than a falling stone would be, however it might 
fall. As Wittgenstein puts it, the incompatibilist’s sentiment that “the thief who steals 
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a banana moves as inevitably as a stone falling” is ‘nothing more than comparing his 
action with a stone.’  65
 The real gulf between Nielsen’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches, however, 
begins to emerge in the light of Nielsen’s use of the example of the kleptomaniac. In 
Nielsen’s case, this is part of his attempt to make room for denials of freedom of the 
will in particular cases, even when the reason for such a denial is that a person’s 
actions are causally determined. This reflects Nielsen’s view that part of what it 
means to defend the compatibility of freedom and determinism is to provide for a 
distinction between those situations in which the word ‘freedom’ can be used 
correctly and those situations in which it cannot. Cases of abnormality pose a 
particular threat to categorial compatibilism in so far as the categorial difference 
Nielsen relies upon (between reasons and causes) appears to be refuted by the fact 
that we both can and do withhold responsibility in certain cases, including when a 
physical anomaly has been discovered. For this reason, it appears that a strict 
categorial difference between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’ cannot 
be upheld.  
It is therefore telling that Nielsen responds to the kleptomaniac’s case in a very 
different way to Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein, it is reasonable to say either “he is to 
blame” or “no, in this case it is too much” and that we can do so for a variety of 
reasons. Nielsen, on the other hand, purports to provide an account of precisely what 
the difference is between the kleptomaniac and an ‘ordinary thief’: 
The ordinary thief goes through a process of deciding whether or not to 
steal, and his decision decisively effects his behaviour. If he actually 
 LFW, pp. 431-2.65
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resolved to refrain from stealing, he could carry out his resolution. But 
this is not so with the kleptomaniac. Thus, this observable difference 
between the ordinary thief and the kleptomaniac, quite independent of the 
issue of determinism, enables us to ascertain that the former is freer than 
the latter.  66
For Nielsen then, the kleptomaniac is unlike the thief because, although the 
kleptomaniac might decide not to steal, this decision does not ‘decisively effect his 
behaviour’. The kleptomaniac therefore lacks the requisite capacity that, according to 
Nielsen, defines freedom of the will, i.e. the ability to act in accordance with his 
rational deliberations. Thus, whilst the kleptomaniac is not compelled by an external 
agent to act against his will, he lacks a will of his own. 
 However, there are problems with Nielsen’s explanation of why the 
kleptomaniac’s ‘thefts’ do not belong to the ‘space of reasons’. To begin with, it is 
unclear what it means to say that the ordinary thief’s decisions ‘decisively effect his 
behaviour’. According to Nielsen’s own acid test, in order for this to be intelligible 
we must be able to specify instances when a person’s decision is not decisive. But 
what is an ‘indecisive decision’ except mere indecision? I can only suggest that it 
reflects either i) the kleptomaniac’s failure to go through a process of deciding, or else 
ii) the fact that his decision does not affect his behaviour. The latter option is less 
problematic than the former since in the case of i), we have no reason to assume that 
the kleptomaniac does not go through a process of deciding. Moreover, we have no 
reason to assume that the ‘ordinary thief’ does go through a process of deciding. That 
there is a difference in criminal law between an ‘opportunistic’ crime (or a ‘crime of 
 Nielsen 1971, p. 61. As cited in Kane 2002, p. 44.66
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negligence’) and a ‘premeditated crime’ implies that criminal acts can be committed 
without prior consideration, but remain crimes nonetheless. Moreover, quite generally 
we may suppose that whether or not any act requires a prior act of will or volition is 
far from clear. In the LFW, Wittgenstein is critical of those who argue that freedom of 
the will is constituted by an ability to choose to choose (or will to will). More 
specifically, Wittgenstein takes issue with Bishop Barnes’ assertion that ‘[c]onstant 
and inevitable experience teaches me that I have freedom of choice’. Wittgenstein 
objects that: 
No-one would say: ‘Now I choose to choose so and so’. ‘I chose to 
choose to go for a walk’—I take it this would come to exactly the same 
thing as to say ‘I chose to go for a walk.’   67
This remark clearly conflicts with Nielsen’s positive definition of freedom as ‘the 
ability and opportunity to do what one wants to do in accordance with one’s own 
rational deliberations.’  Nielsen evidently holds that every free act is preceded by an 68
act of will (a choice or decision) or a process of deliberation. But just as Wittgenstein 
says in §622 of the Investigations that ‘ordinarily, when I raise my hand I do not try 
to raise it,’ it would be equally wrong to maintain that, ordinarily, when I walk into a 
room, I will to do so.  The point is that sometimes ‘willing’ and ‘acting’ are 69
conceptually, rather than causally related; i.e. that ‘normally, “willing” simply is 
“acting”’.   70
 LFW, p. 442.67
 Nielsen 1971, p. 57.68
 Cf. LFW, p. 438.69
 Phillips 2004, p. 28.70
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 Still, we might go even further in contradiction of Nielsen’s reliance upon 
‘decisive decisions’: it may be that the ‘darker, savage, and non-rational aspects of 
ourselves are equally—if not more—important’ in identifying the actor with the 
action.  Like Irving Thalberg, whose words I am quoting, the Wittgensteinian 71
response, to associating the will so completely with cognitive states of mind, is that it 
must first be explained ‘why I cannot be acting on my own desires, and freely to boot, 
at any time that non-rational factors prevail.’  72
 Unlike some compatibilists, however, Nielsen is not committed to saying that 
all free actions are preceded by an act of volition; he states clearly that freedom rests 
in the opportunity to act in accordance with one’s rational deliberations.  In this way, 73
Nielsen might seek to accommodate the objection that not every action is preceded by 
an act of volition, in the same way that Wittgenstein might accommodate the same 
objection by acknowledging that I do sometimes try to raise my arm. The problem is 
that, unlike Wittgenstein, Nielsen commits himself to showing that we always have 
an opportunity to deliberate. But it is far from clear that the thief’s impromptu act of 
stealing, or my walking into a room, are the kinds of situations in which I might 
feasibly be said to have had the opportunity to deliberate. Certainly, there are all sorts 
of assumptions bundled up with any such claim that, prior to every free act there is an 
opportunity to deliberate and so act upon the deliberation. 
 One alternative suggestion to Nielsen’s interpretation of the case of the 
kleptomaniac is this. Perhaps we need not suppose that the kleptomaniac lacks the 
 Thalberg 1978, pp. 224.71
 Ibid.72
 Wittgenstein’s criticism of Bishop Barnes can be levelled at any hierarchical account of willing; e.g. 73
Frankfurt 1971, pp. 5-20. Frankfurt contrasts the ‘freedom of action’ (to do what one wills) with a 
‘freedom of the will’, viz. the ability to will what one wants to will. the LFW allow for no such 
distinction based on hierarchy.
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opportunity to act in accordance with his deliberations, but that we lack the ability to 
understand and make sense of whatever deliberations might have taken place. We 
might recall in this connection Kierkegaard’s parable of the escaped patient from a 
mental asylum, who convinces himself that the best way to avoid being captured is to 
convince everyone of the objective truth of his statements, and thereby his sanity. He 
therefore puts a ball into the tail of his coat, and on each stride, as the ball hits his 
backside, he shouts “Bang, the Earth is round!” There is a certain rationale to the 
madman’s deliberations that is disquieting, yet the rationale and the deliberation are 
there. As Kierkegaard notes: ‘it was clear to the physician that the patient was not 
cured; though it is not to be thought that the cure would consist in getting him to 
accept the opinion that the earth is flat.’  Similarly, a kleptomaniac may have a 74
pathology of deciding what to steal, but what he steals is then immediately thrown 
away. In this case, what separates the kleptomaniac from the thief is less clear, but a 
‘cure’ to the kleptomaniac’s condition would not consist in convincing him to keep 
what he steals. 
 Turning now to ii) – an appeal to the fact that the kleptomaniac’s decision 
does not affect his behaviour – it appears as if we can avoid (or lessen) the above 
objections to Nielsen’s view if we take him to be arguing that the kleptomaniac does 
go through a process of deciding but that he fails to act on it. Wittgenstein, however, 
is evidently critical of this idea as well when he says in the LFW: 
 Kierkegaard in Oden, T. C. (ed.) 1989, p. 50. 74
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Suppose a man makes a resolution and says ‘I shall from now on be more 
charitable’, and then throws the next person he is talking to out of the 
room—does his action affect what he meant?  75
Here the uncharitable man is making a decision and failing to act on it. As a result, 
the meaning of his resolution is, I would suggest, most certainly altered, perhaps even 
empty. The appeal made in ii) is similar if only because the kleptomaniac too makes a 
resolution that he fails to act on. But there is a very clear difference, I should say, 
between a kleptomaniac who steals despite deciding not to and a kleptomaniac who 
fails in his resolution to be more charitable. I want to say that the difference comes 
down to the kleptomaniac having no excuse to fail in his resolution to be more 
charitable and hence to our expecting that he should succeed. Wittgenstein’s point is 
that, at least part of what it means to make a resolution, is that we should then expect 
the individual to act accordingly; if we were always in a position to doubt that a 
resolution will be kept, we would cease making resolutions. A similar process of 
mitigating one’s expectations takes place in the case of the kleptomaniac, but in his 
case his failure to decide does not affect the meaning of his words since what he says 
is already coloured by his diagnosis. Admittedly, one might only arrive at this 
diagnosis after the kleptomaniac’s repeated failure; in which case the meaning of his 
words have been altered by repeated failure. Even so, the supposition—that it is the 
kleptomaniac’s decisions which are faulty—can also be challenged on the grounds 
that, were we to mitigate the kleptomaniac’s actions in cases where he repeatedly fails 
to carry out his decision not to steal, we can imagine cases in which the kleptomaniac 
pathologically forms a decision to steal; or, in line with an earlier objection, where no 
 LFW, p. 439.75
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decision takes place whatsoever. Not in every case then, can the kleptomaniac’s 
failure to form decisive decisions be the mitigating factor in not holding him 
responsible. 
 From the perspective of Wittgenstein's LFW, we may therefore frame the 
following line of criticism against Nielsen. In the same way that the incompatibilist 
mistakenly thinks that all forms of compulsion boil down to the same thing, i.e. that 
all abnormalities have determination by natural laws in common, Nielsen is mistaken 
in thinking that freedom of the will boils down to a freedom of action, viz. an ability 
to make decisive decisions. It might be presumed that Nielsen’s positive 
characterisation of freedom is called for due to his strict categorial separation of cause 
and constraint. That is, Nielsen wishes to establish a clear distinction between a 
freedom that is certain, on the one hand, and an equally certain lack of freedom on the 
other. Yet by highlighting the incompatibilist’s conflation of cause and constraint, 
Nielsen merely demonstrates that freedom is not an impossibility. To make the further 
claim that freedom of the will itself is assured requires us to look beyond a difference 
in categories; to determine, in other words, what freedom of the will amounts to. The 
alternative approach exemplified by Wittgenstein's LFW, is that we uphold the strict 
categorial difference simpliciter. What uncertainty or fragility is left over once this 
minimal compatibilism is provided for is accounted for elsewhere in the LFW. 
iv) Belief and disbelief in freedom of the will as rival ‘ways of acting’ 
Notwithstanding the substantial points of divergence that we have noted, we can take 
it that, on points i) to iii), Wittgenstein and Nielsen are in broad agreement. They 
agree that natural laws are not inherently compulsive (in the familiar sense of that 
term) and that we cannot make the idea of compulsion intelligible in this context by 
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the idea of one’s being compelled to act abnormally or normally. As we have begun to 
see, Wittgenstein’s more nuanced approach to the conceptual foil argument and to 
cases of abnormality is indicative of a more fundamental disagreement between the 
two; namely, whether or not anti-incompatibilism is sufficient to defend freedom of 
the will against the threat of determinism. Whilst Wittgenstein shares with Nielsen the 
view that being determined by natural laws does not constitute a necessary or 
sufficient basis for denying freedom of the will, he accepts that we might, due to our 
increased awareness of the causes of our actions, ‘give up’ our existing beliefs and 
practices that are based on a distinction between freedom and compulsion. As I have 
suggested, this reflects Wittgenstein’s sense of the uncertainty or fragility of our 
current practices of attributing freedom. This, in turn, is based on Wittgenstein’s 
argument that our current practices are based in nothing more robust than a ‘way of 
acting’. 
 Consider a further analogy that Wittgenstein develops in the LFW. He invites 
us to imagine a Driverless Car that is set in motion along a level surface which, 
despite being rigged to drive in a straight line, nevertheless ‘describes a queer path.’  76
The reasons for the car’s erratic movements are, at least for the time being, unknown. 
Wittgenstein does not mean that the car’s movements are inscrutable; the car is a 
perfectly ordinary mechanism, or so we can assume. By saying that the reasons for 
the car’s movements are unknown, Wittgenstein means simply that we do not yet 
have an explanation.  Now, Wittgenstein acknowledges, one response to this 77
situation is to look for some law, such as to explain the car’s erratic movements. But 
 LFW, p. 433.76
 Cf. LC, p. 42.77
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he also wants to emphasise another possibility. Rather than look for the cause of the 
car’s erratic movement we might ‘give up entirely and say the steering wheel is 
free.’  This last course of action might suggest that we make up our mind whether to 78
see the car as free or as fixed. This is not Wittgenstein's understanding of either 
course of action; indeed, it would be impossible to choose one way of acting over 
another without betraying a prior commitment to looking or not.  But what could 79
inform such a choice apart from a prior commitment, either to looking (for the 
regularity) or to giving up (and saying it moves freely)?  
 Wittgenstein rules out that we might rely on what appears, at the time, to 
promise best results. He says that even if some regularity in the car’s movement had 
been found we might still say, “It is free, but now it chooses to move regularly.”  80
This is not simply a stubborn refusal to face facts. To begin with, Wittgenstein has 
pointed out that nothing about the discovery of a regularity provides a sufficient 
justification for thinking of anything as free or unfree, even in so obvious a case of 
mechanism as the car.  If this claim of Wittgenstein’s holds muster, then it must also 81
be granted that, in cases where a regularity is all we have to go on, we cannot talk of 
proving or disproving freedom of the will: the evidence simply underdetermines 
whether we should think of the regularity as ‘caused’ or ‘free’ (or both). 
 Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the way our talk of freedom relies on our ‘ways of 
acting’ is not a stance that Nielsen, and other likeminded compatibilists, can easily 
 LFW, p. 433.78
 LFW, p. 431.79
 LFW, p. 433. Cf. CV, p. 86: ‘Imagine someone watching a pendulum and thinking: God makes it 80
move like that. Well, doesn’t God have the right even to act in accordance with a calculation?’
 LFW, p. 431.81
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countenance. Even so, perhaps more than any other compatibilist, Nielsen is 
committed to taking seriously the possibility that our current ways of going on with 
the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘compulsion’ rests on nothing more than a ‘way of acting’ 
since he uses a closely related hypothesis as an initial premise in a further argument 
against the incompatibilist. Nielsen states boldly that the incompatibilist’s doubts are 
self-inflicted: 
The part about compulsion or constraint is metaphorical. It is because of 
the metaphor, and not because of the fact, that we come to think that there 
is an antithesis between causality and freedom. It is the manner here and 
not the matter that causes the trouble.  82
One can see how Nielsen is here deploying some of the same notions as Wittgenstein. 
Yet for Nielsen, the incompatibilist’s manner, i.e. his ways of acting, e.g. looking for 
regularities, etc. are simply an epiphenomenon of his conceptual confusion. For 
Nielsen, the basis for the incompatibilist’s anxious way of thinking about natural laws 
is just a mistake. The compulsion the incompatibilist describes is merely 
metaphorical; the metaphysics is taken care of by the conceptual argumentation 
Nielsen levels against incompatibilism. I want to show that, from the point of view of 
the LFW, Nielsen’s position is questionable in this regard, due to his a) too readily 
discounting the incompatibilist’s ‘manner’ as a mere symptom of his conceptual 
confusion and b) failing to recognise his own ‘manner’. 
 It is especially telling in this regard that Nielsen flatly denies that there is or 
need be any real ‘Angst’ in the face of the threat of determinism: 
 Nielsen 1971, p. 58. The passage as quoted includes a line of text that appears only in an edited 82
version of his article. See Nielsen in Kane (ed.) 2002, p. 42.
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There is no Angst over the ubiquitousness of causal laws. There is no 
feeling that life would be meaningless and man would be a prisoner of his 
past if determinism is true. Holbach is wrong. Even if determinism is true 
freedom is not an illusion.  83
It may seem that Nielsen has here contradicted himself by saying that the ‘manner,’ 
e.g. the incompatibilist’s angst, is at once the ‘trouble’ and entirely absent. What 
connects these two states of affairs, however, is the introduction of the ‘compatibilist 
thesis’ as it is defended by Nielsen himself. 
With such philosophers as Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, John Stuart 
Mill, Moritz Schlick, and A. J. Ayer—all staunch defenders of the 
compatibility thesis—there is a vast shift not only in argument but also in 
attitude.  84
The implication here is that the compatibilist perspective effects a ‘shift in attitude’ 
that invariably removes any feelings of Angst associated with the threat of 
determinism; Nielsen uses Dostoevsky as his example of someone who, whilst 
profoundly concerned with the responsibility a person has for his actions, thought that 
human nature made that kind of responsibility impossible. What we are to imagine is 
that Dostoevsky lacks the argumentative expertise that Hobbes, Hume, and Nielsen 
demonstrate.  This expertise allows the compatibilist to separate the causal and the 85
 Nielsen 1971, p. 56. The ‘Holbach’ referred to is Baron Holbach the enlightenment thinker and early 83
supporter of causal determinism who, Nielsen says early in his book, describes the feeling 
accompanying scientific discoveries as Angst-laden.
 Ibid. Emphasis added.84
 In Chapter Four, I will consider Dostoevsky’s own treatment of the problem in The Brothers 85
Karamazov.
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spiritual—human freedom, responsibility and action on the one hand, and human 
nature, psychology and behaviour on the other. 
  By contrast, Wittgenstein recognises that anti-incompatibilism is not in itself 
sufficient to answer the threat of determinism to our current practices of 
discriminating between cases of freedom of the will and cases of compulsion, i.e. our 
current ways of acting. While he is, like Nielsen, manifestly opposed to 
incompatibilism as a thesis, Wittgenstein acknowledges that this may have no impact 
on our deep-seated feeling of Angst in the face of the threat of determinism. This is 
because Wittgenstein has a different understanding of the relationship between the 
incompatibilist’s Angst—as reflected in what Wittgenstein calls his ‘peculiar’ ‘way of 
looking at things,’ e.g. thinking of events as ‘moving on rails’—and the theoretical 
commitments that offered in its defence, e.g. the hypothesis that freedom is an 
illusion if our decisions are determined by natural laws. Wittgenstein understands the 
directionality here quite differently to Nielsen: the incompatibilist’s theoretical 
position flows from his deep-seated feelings of Angst; the latter are not just 
‘symptoms’ of the former.  
 Returning to Wittgenstein’s Driverless Car analogy, we may say that the 
compatibilist is analogous to the one who gives up looking for the cause of the car’s 
motion. The Driverless Car analogy is intended to demonstrate that, even in the case 
of something that is quite clearly a mechanism and nothing else, we are able to say ‘it 
moves freely’ or ‘it is caused’. Neither of these statements is incompatible with the 
other, in the sense of ruling the other out, and yet we are perhaps inclined to say that 
we cannot (or do not) say both at once. Doubtless, Nielsen would take this as further 
vindication of the categorial difference that separates each view. From Wittgenstein’s 
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point of view, this fails to specify which comes first, the conceptual argumentation or 
the way of acting. For Wittgenstein, that we do not say both ‘the car is free’ and ‘the 
car is caused’ means that the better explanation is that the act—of looking for a 
regularity or giving up—comes first, followed by the argumentation. 
 In a Wittgensteinian perspective, Nielsen is therefore wrong to assume that the 
incompatibilist only feels Angst as a result of his failure to attend to the categorical 
difference between causes and reasons. Wittgenstein offers a more comprehensive 
interpretation of both the compatibilist’s and incompatibilist’s feelings, whether 
sanguine or anxious. With this in mind, let us now consider a further suggestion: that, 
despite one’s being convinced by anti-incompatibilist arguments, one may still be 
converted to the incompatibilist’s ‘peculiar way of looking’. 
v) The indirect role that natural laws can play in undermining a belief in freedom 
of the will 
I have argued that the intended upshot of Wittgenstein’s Driverless Car analogy is that 
it is wrong to think that the discovery of laws of nature, i.e. of observed regularities, 
constitutes direct proof of the incompatibilist’s thesis; and that, conversely, it is 
wrong to think that the lack of such a discovery constitutes proof of our freedom. 
Implicit in these claims, however, is the suggestion that we might come to see things 
as the incompatibilist does by following his course of action. I have suggested that, 
far from trivialising the disagreement, Wittgenstein’s approach looks beyond the 
‘surface grammar’ to the deeper existential problem at its heart. I shall have much 
more to say about what this deeper problem amounts to in subsequent chapters. For 
now, I will focus on the way in which this deeper problem is introduced.  
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 The context of this deeper problem is provided for by the question 
Wittgenstein repeatedly asks during the LFW 
You might say this is a very queer idea indeed. Where did people get it? 
Somewhere the rules are laid down. … What would encourage one to use 
this metaphor? To think about natural events in this way? …  86
And again. 
‘We shall find these regularities out too?’ Who will? In 1,000 or in 10,000 
years? - Is there really any reason to say they will find these out?  87
In Nielsen’s vernacular, Wittgenstein wishes to disclose the ‘manner’ that implicitly 
underlies the incompatibilist’s interpretation of the ‘matter’.  As Wittgenstein 88
observes there is a tendency to ‘become ever so optimistic, saying “It is only a 
question of time…”’, i.e. before we know the laws of a human being.  He adds that 89
there are, in fact, ‘two camps, optimists and pessimists’ who, in the case of a ‘new 
discovery’, are both equally guilty of making a mistake; you might say that both are 
mistaken in so far as they see the discovery as either benign or malevolent when it is 
neither. Whilst I shall continue to refer mainly to the incompatibilist’s ‘manner’ it is at 
least worth noting that Wittgenstein’s observation is that ‘Two mistakes are made in 
such a case (of a new discovery)’ and that the second mistake concerns those, like 
 LFW, pp. 430-1.86
 LFW, p. 432. See also, LFW, pp. 439-440.87
 Cf. Winch 1997, p. 60; Winch notes that it was characteristic of Wittgenstein’s approach to shift 88
‘attention away from the object to which a problematic concept is applied towards the person applying 
the concept’.
 LFW, p. 441. Cf. LFW, p. 432.89
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Nielsen, who don’t see anything in the hypothesis at all.  In any case, Wittgenstein 90
distinguishes himself from both camps—and therefore in effect from Nielsen—by 
recognising that both sides are mistaken and yet both can reasonably have their say: 
It seems as if, if you are very strongly impressed by the responsibility 
which a human being has for his actions, you are inclined to say that these 
actions and choices can't follow natural laws. Conversely, if you are very 
strongly inclined to say that they do follow natural laws, then you are 
inclined to say ‘I can’t be made responsible for my choice.’ That you are 
inclined in this way, I should say, is a fact of psychology.  91
This passage sheds crucial light on Wittgenstein’s impartiality with regards the 
defence or denial of freedom of the will; in particular, the way he affords both the 
compatibilist’s and the (‘hard’) determinist’s views equal weight. In seeking to 
understand what Wittgenstein means by a ‘fact of psychology’ in this context, it is 
important to foreclose a possible misunderstanding. For it might seem as if he is 
simply begging the question. By remarking that, as a matter of psychological fact, we 
are ‘inclined in this way’ might be taken to imply that our beliefs are a symptom of 
our already determinate natures; believing that we are free, despite being determined 
by natural laws, might just be a case in point of one’s being compelled by natural 
laws. Of course, however, this has been ruled out by Wittgenstein on the grounds that 
being determined by natural laws does not entail that we lack freedom of the will. By 
speaking of a ‘fact of psychology’ here, Wittgenstein plausibly means rather to 
 LFW, p. 441. Emphasis added.90
 LFW, p. 433.91
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register the contingency of our ways of thinking/acting, and their contingent basis in 
our human form of life. 
 Now, again, one may object that Wittgenstein’s stance here reduces to an 
implausible kind of voluntarism: viz. that it is simply a matter of fiat whether or not 
one holds on to belief in freedom of the will. But it is very clear that he does not view 
our ‘inclinations’ in this context as matters of choice or fiat. On the contrary: 
I want to impress upon you that given a certain attitude, you may be, for 
reasons unknown, compelled to look at it a certain way. A certain image 
can force itself upon you. Imagine, for instance, that you are not free; or 
that you are compelled. 
Must you look at looking for something in this way? No. But it is one of 
the most important facts of human life that such impressions sometimes 
force themselves on you.  92
Nowhere else in the LFW does Wittgenstein make his intentions as explicit as he does 
here. His express intention is to impress upon us that we needn’t look at things the 
way the incompatibilist does, but that it is one of the ‘most important facts’ about 
human psychology—‘for reasons unknown’—that we find certain images—for 
example, of our lives as going along ‘rails’—all but inevitable. Part of Wittgenstein’s 
point here is in this way to impress on us the inscrutability of the incompatibilist’s 
starting position, i.e. the Angst that Nielsen reduces to a mere symptom of conceptual 
confusion. By way of comparison, Wittgenstein offers an example in which, when he 
has ‘looked frantically for a key,’ he has thought to himself ‘If an omniscient is 
looking at me, he must be making fun at me. What a joke for the Deity, seeing me 
 LFW, p. 435.92
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look when he knows all the time.’ Wittgenstein asks: ‘Is there any good reason for 
looking at it in this way?’  No doubt, this question is partly intended to show that 93
‘looking at it in this way’ is only one way in which we might look at it, and one that is 
radically underdetermined by the evidence. But pace Nielsen’s account of such 
thoughts as mere symptoms of conceptual confusion, Wittgenstein evidently thinks of 
it as a deeply important feature of human psychology that such thoughts ‘force 
themselves on you’.  
 If Wittgenstein’s approach in this regard is to be compelling, however, we 
need to ask how exactly certain forms of scientifically oriented attention are capable 
of undermining belief in freedom of the will. Accordingly, I shall now consider a 
more detailed account of one way in which freedom of the will might come to be 
forsaken on the grounds that we are determined by natural laws. 
vi) How predicting a person’s actions is capable of undermining the person’s 
attitude towards their own actions as free. 
Perhaps the most novel and surprising aspect of Wittgenstein’s approach to the 
problem of freedom of the will, both in LFM and in the LFW, is his commitment to 
the conceivability that we might forsake talk of freedom and compulsion altogether. 
In the case of the LFW, it is towards the end of the LFW that Wittgenstein returns to 
the question of whether we might, at some future time, abandon all talk of freedom 
and compulsion and speak only in terms of causes. This suggestion is in keeping with 
everything we have said so far about the compatibility of freedom and determination 
by natural laws. It has emerged from our discussion so far that the principal point of 
divergence between Wittgenstein and Nielsen is that, for Wittgenstein, opposition to 
 Ibid.93
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incompatibilism need not, in any way, motivate a belief in freedom of the will. At 
most, we can say that it is possible, in light of the categorial difference between 
spaces, for us to speak meaningfully about freedom of the will. Equally, however, it is 
possible for us to give up talking about freedom, and to talk instead solely in terms of 
causes. This eventuality is not the same as that typically envisaged by both sides to 
the debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism; i.e. the eventuality that we 
deny freedom of the will by affirming that our actions are compelled by the laws of 
nature. The eventuality that Wittgenstein entertains, rather, is one in which we can no 
longer speak in terms of freedom or compulsion.  
 In particular, Wittgenstein imagines that we might, at some future time, be 
able to know, with a high degree of accuracy, what the outcome of our decisions 
might be. In LFM this takes the form of a mechanism that, not so much predicts, but 
describes the underlying causes of our actions in real time. In the LFW, this image 
resurfaces but now in connection with our ability to predict what people will do. 
Early on in the LFW, Wittgenstein separates this ability to predict what a person will 
do from the kind of knowledge we might acquire from the aforementioned 
mechanism: 
It is in one way rubbish to say ‘If my actions can be predicted I can’t 
choose.’ … The idea that you can connect predicting what a man will 
choose with materialism is rubbish. Prediction doesn’t mean you will 
predict from material data.  94
The initial point Wittgenstein wishes to make is that there is no reason to infer, “If my 
actions can be predicted I can’t choose.” I will return to this point in a moment. I wish 
 LFW, p. 442.94
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to consider first Wittgenstein’s separation of prediction from materialism, which he 
does by acknowledging the fact that predicting what someone will do next does not 
entail that we ‘knew all the laws of nature, and could observe all the particles’ leading 
up to their action.  The sorts of things Wittgenstein has in mind are when we might 95
say, “she knows me better than I know myself” or “he doesn’t know it yet, but he’ll 
agree in the end”. Neither of the two scenarios just hinted at presume that the 
speakers have any insight into the physical causes underpinning the subject’s 
intentions. For Wittgenstein, the specific ‘problem of prediction’ is not just another 
aspect of ‘the problem of determinism’. He does accept, however, that prediction can 
be a problem irrespective of whether or not the prediction uses material data, in cases 
when it is the agent who knows what it is he will do: 
Prediction is incompatible with choice in the case where you yourself 
predict what you will choose, or I predict and then tell you... [T]he 
situation in which the difficulty lies is that in which when choosing I 
remember the fact that I predicted my choice.  96
This brings me back to the initial point Wittgenstein is making: that predictability is 
not, by itself, incompatible with choice. This problem only arises when we are made 
aware of the prediction. For this reason, he initially casts it as an epistemic problem: 
The difficulty I feel comes to something like this: Can there be both 
certainty and uncertainty? One might say: Aren’t you in your description 
 LFM, p. 242.95
 LFW, p. 442. 96
!  of !67 240
presupposing two contradictory states of mind in this person at the same 
time, that of not knowing and that of knowing?  97
The epistemic problem would be that deliberation and decision require a level of 
uncertainty about what one is going to do, and yet the prediction implies that one 
already knows what it is one will do. We might say this is a straightforward 
contradiction or make the weaker claim that there is just no point in going through a 
process of deciding. Wittgenstein is indeed initially taken with this problem, but he 
goes on to weaken the claim so that knowing what I will do next is not always in 
conflict with my choosing what to do, that ‘it is possible we know the whole time 
what we are going to choose and that nevertheless a process of choice is going on’.  98
Wittgenstein gives several examples of when our knowing what we will choose does 
not interfere with choosing. I may, for instance, predict what I will do and then 
remember only at the moment of choice. In this case, there are grounds for saying I 
knew what I will choose and for saying that I went through a process of choosing.  
 Yet, in this case it might be objected that I didn’t know what I will choose—I 
knew and then forgot—and that we have therefore merely avoided, rather than 
tackled, the epistemic problem outlined above. More interesting, therefore, is an 
example Wittgenstein raises of ‘reading a novel and applying it to a situation in your 
own life.’  The image this conjures up is of our reading a book and, seeing our 99
thoughts laid out like stepping stones across a river, our acting on the basis of the 
author’s “prediction” of what the character does in similar circumstances to our own. 
 Ibid.97
 LFW, p. 443.98
 Ibid.99
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This does not seem to raise the same difficulty associated with our having our 
thoughts and choices predicted for us—perhaps because it is we who draw the 
inference between the thoughts contained in the book and our own situation. Of 
course, this is a rarefied example and different from the case where we are told 
outright that we will do x and then try to decide to do x.  
 Recognising this, Wittgenstein continues that it is not the epistemic problem 
per se that leads prediction to undermine choice. Rather, the undermining comes from 
the fact that, having one’s actions predicted seems to undercut any purpose for 
deliberation; it seems to rob deliberation and decision of their point.  And quite 100
generally, if scientific discoveries lead to increasingly successful predictions of our 
action, our practices based around the distinction between freedom and compulsion 
might likewise seem to lose their point. What we are being asked to consider is not a 
concession to the incompatibilist’s thesis that a belief in freedom of the will is 
logically incompatible with our decisions being causally determined. Rather, what we 
are being asked to consider is a process in which, through our ever-increasing 
attention on the successes of scientific explanation and prediction, our practices of 
freedom and resentment start to lose their point for us. 
 Characteristically, Wittgenstein portrays the relationship between an increased 
awareness of the causes of our actions and our ceasing to draw distinctions (or 
deliberate), in terms of our playing a game.  Whilst it remains implicit in what he 101
says here, it is evident that he is hinting at choice being a language-game that we 
 LFW, p. 443; ‘One might say: “If I had prophesied to Mr. Malcolm what he was going to choose 100
tomorrow and he had read my prophecy, then he would not deliberate.”’
 Cf. Bouwsma 1986, p. 18; ‘the real puzzle is that our attitudes, holding people responsible, praising, 101
blaming, might be quite different from what they are, if we could actually see the succession of causes 
at work.’
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could stop playing. To begin with, Wittgenstein uses the analogy with a game of chess 
or roulette in order to explain that, if we could predict the outcome, we might stop 
playing the game.   102
 Wittgenstein anticipates the objection that this shows that roulette is ‘no game 
of chance at all’ and that we only ‘think that it is a game of chance [in] our 
ignorance.’  Wittgenstein says he would contradict this by saying: “No. It is a game 103
of chance now that we are ignorant; if in the future we were no longer ignorant it 
would no longer be a game of chance.”  It may seem as if this is no contradiction at 104
all. He calls it one, however, based on an argument we have already considered; 
namely, that denying freedom of the will is not the same as affirming that we are 
compelled, since compulsion requires a foil, i.e. we must be able to answer the 
question “compelled as opposed to what?” Similarly, playing roulette as a game of 
chance means playing it without knowledge of the outcome. At the same time this 
explains how someone can cheat at roulette, i.e. by knowing or rigging the result. It is 
this contrast, and our ignorance, that makes our playing the game matter (i.e. 
meaningful, intelligible, etc.). Wittgenstein is therefore right to say that the former 
claim, if taken as an absolute claim (i.e. “there are no games of chance”), is 
contradicted by the fact that the game is a game of chance if it is played in ignorance 
of the outcome.   105
 LFW, p. 443.102
 Ibid.103
 Ibid.104
 Cf. TLP, 5.1362; ‘Freedom of the will consists in the fact that future actions are now not 105
known.’ (Cf. NB, 27.4.15)
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 Now, a natural objection to Wittgenstein’s view in this respect is that holding 
people responsible is not a game like roulette; that is, it matters in a completely 
different way. It is not enough for us to say it is meaningful, now we are ignorant, to 
punish people for their wrongdoings if we are, by some objective standard, wrong to 
do so. Wittgenstein’s response to this line of objection is scarcely clear; I will address 
the issue in subsequent chapters. What is of first importance, however, is to 
understand the upshot that is drawn from his analogy with games in this context: 
We can’t even say that if prediction was possible Moore and I would not 
play the game. You might say: The point of the game would then be 
different. And the point of choosing would be changed if we had a 
prediction of it.   106
Wittgenstein argues that the loss of our ignorance, i.e. the knowledge of the laws that 
govern our actions, would simply ‘change the business’.  In other words, we would 107
have a different way of thinking/acting. Wittgenstein keeps an open mind whether, in 
the scenario he entertains, a heightened awareness of the causes of our own actions 
would lead to a revolution or an evolution of our practices. the LFW end on this 
thought: that whether or not this ‘change in the business’ would amount to us playing 
a new game or rather the same game in a new way is a moot point. Wittgenstein 
closes by saying: ‘I would say: You can call it a different game, or not call it a 
different game.’  In any case, Wittgenstein clearly thinks that our ways of going on 108
with terms like ‘freedom’ and ‘compulsion’—our ways of ‘playing the game’—are 
 LFW, pp. 443-4.106
 LFW, p. 443.107
 LFW, p. 444.108
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capable of being fundamentally changed by our increased awareness of the causes of 
our actions.  
 Thus, to the straightforward question of whether or not Wittgenstein is a 
compatibilist, we can answer in the affirmative provided only that we assume the 
minimal definition of compatibilism as anti-incompatibilism. That is, whereas 
Wittgenstein explicitly denies that we could say that a person’s decision was not free 
because it was determined by natural laws, he falls short of claiming that the freedom 
of a person’s decision is compatible with being determined by natural laws. 
Furthermore, as we have also seen, it is central to Wittgenstein’s approach to 
acknowledge that an increased awareness of natural laws might erode the categorial 
difference upon which the compatibilist’s arguments rest. Accordingly, to the question 
of whether or not Wittgenstein thinks that anti-incompatibilism is sufficient to 
provide a defence of freedom of the will, I believe we must answer in the negative. 
The explanation for this consistent, if distinctive, combination of claims is that 
Wittgenstein regards a compatibilist answer to the Compatibility Question as being, at 
most, a way of defending the possibility of freedom of the will, i.e. a defence of the 
view that determinism underdetermines the conclusion that we lack freedom of the 
will. In the standard sense of the label, Wittgenstein is not a compatibilist. 
 In this chapter, I have shown how Wittgenstein’s own approach to the 
question of the freedom of the will, as developed primarily in the LFW, comes apart 
from that of an avowed compatibilist like Nielsen, despite important common ground 
between the two thinkers. In the next chapter, I shall further bring out the distinctive 
contributions that the LFW stand to make by showing how Wittgenstein’s own 
approach diverges at crucial junctures from that adopted by another thinker whom it 
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is natural to associate with a broadly Wittgensteinian approach to freedom of the will; 
namely, P. F. Strawson. Like Wittgenstein, and in a way quite different from Nielsen, 
Strawson also puts a characterisation of our ‘attitudes’ and practices at the forefront 
of his analysis. However, I shall show how Wittgenstein’s approach continues to 
distinguish itself by the fact that he seeks neither to defend nor deny belief in freedom 
of the will. Specifically, I hope to show how Wittgenstein’s apparent impartiality vis-
a-vis this belief makes him better placed than is Strawson to respond to the often-
levelled charge that an approach that falls back on the entrenched nature of our 
existing ‘practices’ and ‘attitudes’ only ducks the ‘real’ question of whether or not we 
are right to believe in freedom of the will.  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Chapter II 
Reactive Attitudes in Wittgenstein’s 
“Lectures on Freedom of the Will” 
————————— 
The human beings around us exert just by their presence a power which belongs 
uniquely to themselves to stop, to diminish, or modify, each movement which our 
bodies design. A person who crosses our path does not turn aside our steps in the 
same manner as a street sign, no one stands up, or moves about, or sits down again in 
quite the same fashion when he is alone in a room as when he has a visitor. 
 —Simone Weil, ‘The Illiad: Poem of Might’  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I turn now to consider how Wittgenstein’s “Lectures on Freedom of the Will” (LFW)
—as we have described this approach in a preliminary way in Chapter One—stands 
in relation to a lecture given by a near-contemporary of Wittgenstein’s; namely P. F. 
Strawson’s seminal essay, “Freedom & Resentment” (FR).  As we shall see, there 109
are close affinities between the two approaches. It is therefore unsurprising that 
Wittgenstein’s account appears, on the face of it, to be vulnerable to some of the same 
major lines of criticism that have been levelled against Strawson’s more widely-
discussed contribution. As in the preceding chapter, my first aim here is to assess 
Strawson’s own line of defence of the practice-based framework that, I shall argue, is 
closer to the approach of the LFW than standard forms of compatibilism. However, I 
will show that the two approaches diverge in a way that makes Wittgenstein’s better 
placed to withstand the ‘Systematic Concern’ that, as we shall see, threatens to 
undermine Strawson’s practice-based approach to the problem of freedom of the will. 
Ultimately, this reflects the way in which Wittgenstein’s own practice-based approach 
is put to very different philosophical ends than Strawson’s aim to defend what he 
calls a ‘radically modified optimism’ about freedom of the will. Wittgenstein’s own 
development of a practice-based approach is part of a wider therapeutic methodology 
that I will bring to light in the final chapter. 
 I shall begin by identifying the general framework that, as I shall argue, has a 
bearing on both Wittgenstein’s overall approach in the LFW and Strawson’s defence 
of our primitive commitment to a system of interpersonal, ‘reactive attitudes’, e.g. 
feelings of resentment and gratitude, praise and blame, and the like. I shall 
 Strawson. P. F. 2008, pp. 1-28. 109
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characterise the general framework that both Wittgenstein and Strawson develop as a 
practice-based approach. I shall initially make this characterisation convincing by 
demonstrating the centrality in both the LFW and Strawson’s essay of the idea that 
our attitudes towards other human beings as free and responsible can be understood in 
terms of practices that are fundamentally shaped by primitive and spontaneous 
expressions of human nature. I shall then consider Strawson’s claim that these 
primitive expressions of human nature are too ‘deeply-rooted’ for us to contemplate 
repudiating them entirely. This claim I will consider alongside what McKenna and 
Russell, following Fischer and Ravizza, call a Systematic Concern that any defence 
of the commitment to act as if people are free and responsible overlooks the ‘real’ 
question of whether or not we are actually free and responsible.  Given their 110
comparative approaches, the question of what resources are available to Strawson to 
respond to the Systematic Concern is pivotal for our assessment of Wittgenstein’s 
position as well. I will conclude that Wittgenstein is better placed than Strawson to 
respond to the Systematic Concern: for, in Wittgenstein, human practices and 
institutions, primitive reaction and facts of human nature, are not supposed to play the 
justificatory role that Strawson’s critics are worried they cannot possibly fulfil. From 
the perspective of the LFW, Strawson’s practice-based approach indeed inevitably 
falls short of a defence of our attitudes of freedom and resentment. 
 McKenna & Russell 2008, p. 12. See also, Fischer & Ravizza 1993, p. 18.110
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Part One: Wittgenstein on the primacy of 
practice 
It is widely recognised that, in a general way, Strawson’s FR bears the marks of 
Wittgensteinian influence.  But the precise conceptual relationship between 111
Wittgenstein’s own approach to the problem of freedom of the will and Strawson’s 
seminal essay on the topic needs closer scrutiny. In what follows, I shall explain the 
sense in which I think Wittgenstein’s LFW connect with a certain eschewal of 
theoretical justification in favour of an appeal to the primacy of practice. I will shortly 
come to show how and in what sense Strawson’s framework is practice-based but first 
I should like to examine how a practice-based approach manifests itself in the LFW. 
Consider, first, a passage from The Yellow Book (1933), in which Wittgenstein 
articulates his general misgivings about a certain style of explanation of phenomena: 
There is one type of explanation which I wish to criticise, arising 
from the tendency to explain a phenomenon by one cause, and then 
to show the phenomenon to be “really” another. This tendency is 
enormously strong. It is what is responsible for people saying that 
punishment must be one of three things, revenge, a deterrent, or 
improvement … Other examples of it are the explanation of striking 
a table in a rage as a remnant of a time when people struck to kill … 
The idea which underlies this sort of method is that every time what 
 E.g. Strawson, P. F. 1985, pp. 3, 10, 14-19, 24-27, etc.; Strawson, P. F. 1954, pp. 70-99. See also, 111
Snowdon, P. “Foreword” in Strawson, P. F. 2008, pp. vii-ix.
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is sought is the motive … [Yet] striking an object may merely be a 
natural reaction in rage.  112
Wittgenstein opposes any assumption that spontaneous (re)actions must in every case 
be the expression of a single, particular motive, e.g. the desire to do something useful. 
The danger he associates with this method is that it misrepresents that which it seeks 
to capture; in Wittgenstein’s words, ‘to show the phenomenon to be “really” another’. 
In the above, Wittgenstein gives the example of someone striking a table, not out of a 
primeval desire to kill, but simply as ‘a natural reaction in rage’. In his view, the 
quality of the act may well be distorted if we try to explain it in terms unconnected 
with the circumstances of the act, e.g. “He may say it was because I didn’t ask 
permission, but it’s “really” just because he’s an alpha male”. Wittgenstein has no 
objection to such modes of explanation per se, merely to its being a universal 
explanation of human practices. What he wants to insist on is that it is at least 
possible that striking a table, perhaps in anger at something someone has just said, 
need not be performed in order to get revenge, or to deter the individual from saying 
more, or as an improvement to someone’s character, or as a consequence of his being 
an ‘alpha male’ or whatever. The alternative possibility he proposes is that striking the 
table is simply a spontaneous reaction, e.g. an expression of rage.  
 It is for similar reasons that Wittgenstein rules out attempts to explain freedom 
of the will as, say, decisive decision-making. To begin with, Nielsen’s methodology—
of seeking some cognitive basis for why some people are held responsible and others 
not—presumes that every time (a person acts freely) the motive can be sought. As in 
his own case of explaining punishment as ‘revenge, a deterrent, or improvement’, 
 AWL, p. 33. Cf. LC, p. 50; ‘“Why do we punish criminals? Is it from a desire for revenge? Is it in 112
order to prevent a repetition of the crime?” And so on. The truth is that there is no one reason.’
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Wittgenstein objects to claims, such as Nielsen’s, on the grounds that we ought not to 
unduly disregard spontaneous reaction as a form of free agency. Furthermore, as the 
above passage illustrates, there is no imperative to seek the motive behind a ‘natural 
reaction in rage’; the further implicit suggestion being that the person who strikes the 
table need not seek his antagonist’s motive either. This represents an altogether 
different picture to the one offered by soft-determinists, like Nielsen. 
 At the same time, however, Wittgenstein does not dispense with the picture 
altogether; it is not his wish to see one picture replaced with one other. For instance, 
he does not preclude our explaining spontaneous (re)actions in terms of an underlying 
motive. As Brian Clack observes, with respect to Wittgenstein’s more widespread 
remarks on James Fraser’s tendency to ‘every time seek the motive’, it can hardly be 
denied that often the motive for a given practice is usefulness.  Wittgenstein is 113
perfectly prepared to accept that the burning of an effigy, for example, might be a 
mere remnant of early attempts to punish.  The point, however, is that the 114
‘destruction of an effigy may have its own complex of feelings without being 
connected with an ancient practice, or with usefulness’.  Clack is right, then, to note 115
that where Wittgenstein’s approach can be called anti-intellectualist, he is taking what 
I think we may characterise as a practice-based approach.  In short, he thinks that 116
our actions and reactions can sometimes simply be expressive of our rage, for 
example—or our pain or joy or fear or whatever—and that there is therefore no need 
in general to search for a form of explanation of the practice which explains away the 
 Clack 2001, pp. 13-18. Cf. RFGB, pp. 4, 12.113
 Cf. RFGB , p. 125.114
 AWL, pp. 33-34. Cf. RFGB, p. 106.115
 Clack 2001, pp. 18-21. 116
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phenomena these practices immediately express. As Wittgenstein summarised the 
thought in On Certainty, ‘the practice has to speak for itself’.  117
 This conception of the primacy of practice—and Wittgenstein’s opposition to 
intellectualising accounts of the foundations of our practices—are crucial for our 
understanding of the LFW. Specifically, it illuminates why, in the LFW, statements 
about an individual’s responsibility (e.g. “the man is responsible” or “the man is not 
responsible”) are said not to be substantive claims, i.e. ‘not corrected by 
experience’.  For Wittgenstein, saying “the man is responsible” or “the man is not 118
responsible” cannot be taken solely or primarily as an opinion or reflectively 
endorsed judgement about the individual or the action in question. Generally, what is 
expressed in statements concerning an individual’s responsibility is an attitude toward 
that person; e.g. feelings of love, resentment, remorse, etc. The primacy of these 
attitudes comes out most famously in §178 of the Investigations: 
‘I believe that he is suffering.’——Do I also believe that he isn't an 
automaton? It would go against the grain to use the word in both 
connections … ‘I believe that he is not an automaton,’ just like that, 
so far makes no sense. 
My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of 
the opinion that he has a soul.  119
The difference between an attitude and an opinion is here brought down to a 
difference in the way the word ‘belief’ is used to refer to examples of each. 
 OC, §139.117
 LFW, p. 440.118
 PI, §178.119
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Wittgenstein does not think it is wrong to say, “I believe that P is suffering” or “I 
believe that P is a person”. Rather, in Wittgenstein’s phrase, ‘it goes against the grain 
to use the word in both connections’. I take this to mean that it would be wrong to use 
the word ‘belief’ in the same way in both contexts. That is, we can regard someone as 
suffering, so to speak, ‘just like that’, as a natural reaction, perhaps, to seeing P in 
pain. By contrast, believing that ‘P is a person’ (or that ‘P is not an automaton’) 
cannot occur ‘just like that’. In short, the belief that ‘P is a person’ is not to be 
identified with any specific reaction, e.g. to console, to resent, to flee. Believing that 
‘P is a person’ might instead be thought of as justifying any (or all) of these ‘natural 
reactions’. But Wittgenstein wants to show that there is a certain sense in which our 
natural reactions are, and must be, without justification or ground; for they are 
primitive expressions of our form of life and enter into the conditions for anything 
counting as a justification or ground.  120
 Of course, much more needs to be said about how we can regard someone as 
suffering ‘just like that’. As the above passage attests, the distinction between having 
an attitude towards a soul and having the opinion that someone has a soul is bound up 
with Wittgenstein’s rethinking of, amongst other things, what it means to believe that 
someone is suffering. A full appraisal of Wittgenstein’s well-known arguments in this 
regard is beyond the remit of this thesis. Suffice it to say here that, for Wittgenstein, 
seeing the pain on someone’s face need only involve reacting to the other’s suffering. 
For Wittgenstein, this means that expressions of pain—a grimace, a wince, or 
weeping—and any reaction on the part of another—a kind word, disgust, passivity—
 That is not to say that the attitudes we express towards other human beings cannot be formed, or 120
informed rather, on the strength of a belief, e.g. concerning an individual’s cognitive abilities, only that 
the attitudes themselves should be placed, as David Cockburn puts it, ‘at the centre of the picture.’ 
Cockburn 1990, p. 7.
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are not based on an inference about an inner mental state or metaphysical property. 
Accordingly, statements that express feeling—e.g. “I am in pain”, “I’m no hero”, etc.
—are not descriptions of mental states since they are not describing anything.  121
Saying “my tooth hurts” does not invite, even as a possibility, a dentist (or anyone 
else) responding “maybe, maybe not”.  122
 As I shall argue, it is Wittgenstein’s distinction between an attitude towards a 
soul and an opinion that someone has a soul that relates his overall approach to such 
questions to Strawson’s practice-based approach in FR. For instance, just as a 
reaction to seeing someone in pain does not entail anything beyond a reaction to a 
flinch, a cry, a grimace, etc., neither does the belief that “P is to blame” entail a 
further belief that ‘P is not an automaton’ (or that ‘P is a person’). All it does entail, 
as Wittgenstein elsewhere attests, is a primitive form of agreement, not in opinions, 
but in ‘judgments’. The remark in §178, concerning a primitive attitude towards some 
as suffering, therefore needs to be understood in the light of a more general point 
made later in the Investigations (§241-2). Wittgenstein states that ‘if language is to be 
a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also 
(queer as this may sound) in judgements’.  Very generally, his suggestion that 123
judgements are as essential as definitions in making language possible sounds queer 
because of the worry that, on this picture, the necessary truths of logic turn out to be 
contingent on human consensus; as though the truth of ‘p or not-p’ for example is 
contingent on enough people agreeing with it. Thus, Wittgenstein anticipates the 
concern that this ‘seems to abolish logic’ since ‘human agreement decides what is 
 PI, §304.121
 Cf. PG, p. 220.122
 PI, §242.123
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true and what is false’.  But Wittgenstein goes on to counter this worry by clarifying 124
that the kind of agreement he has in mind is emphatically not agreement in the 
contents of judgements; agreement in definitions, opinions, assertions and the like. 
Rather, he has in mind agreement in a form of life: human beings’ ‘mutual 
attunement’ to the world as this is inflected, first and foremost, in the language they 
share.  Thus: ‘It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in 125
the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.’  126
 In the context of the LFW, I take Wittgenstein therefore to be saying that 
agreements or disagreements in definition, e.g. over what constitutes freedom, cannot 
be divorced from the attitudes and feelings that are constitutive of those definitions, 
e.g. feelings of resentment. What is being talked about is a shared framework which, 
precisely because of its often primitive, non-reflective, and non-rational character, is 
not to be explained in terms of further grounds.  Notably, this is not to say that 127
peoples’ attitudes, feelings etc. are a separate condition for our practices of freedom 
and resentment. Rather, it is to say that these attitudes and feelings are constitutive of 
these practices, part and parcel of them.  
 An important corollary of the claim that agreements in definitions also 
presuppose agreements in (primitive, non-reflective) judgements is that we can more 
readily account for disagreements in opinion than we can disagreements in 
 PI, §241.124
 Cf. Cavell 1979, pp. 32, 79, 115, 168. ‘…Wittgenstein’s relation of grammar and criteria to “forms 125
of life”, and … the sense in which human convention is not arbitrary but constitutive of significant 
speech and activity … depends upon nothing more and nothing less than shared forms of life, call it 
our mutual attunement or agreement in our criteria.’
 Ibid.126
 Rush Rhees notes in this regard that Wittgenstein does not intend that we ask ‘What facts make 127
language possible?’ as if we could determine what facts are unshakeable. Rhees acknowledges rather 
that there are simply some facts that we do not question. 
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judgement. A pertinent example of this is given in On Certainty where it is said that a 
disagreement in judgement might ‘drag everything with it and plunge [everything] 
into chaos.’  The example Wittgenstein uses is my doubting that the person standing 128
before me is my friend whom I have known for years. He contrasts such a doubt with 
the, hardly less baffling, discovery that the pan set on the stove has frozen rather than 
boiled. The reason why, by contrast with the former, the latter sort of doubt does not 
threaten to ‘plunge us into chaos’ is that we are still left with the ‘sureness of the 
game’.  We would, in the case of the frozen pan, ask questions about variables, 129
attempt to recreate the same results, etc. In this case, a scientific or empiricist 
methodology is what constitutes the ‘sureness of the game’. This sureness is ‘torn 
away’, however, in cases where the most primitive expression of an attitude is called 
into question. What is lost in such cases is agreement in form of life.  
 It must be conceded that what it means to agree/disagree in a form of life is 
not captured solely (or exclusively) by the distinction between an attitude towards 
someone (e.g. as a friend) and a reflectively endorsed opinion (e.g. that water boils 
when heated). At most, the distinction between an attitude and an opinion conveys the 
way in which, when disagreements in judgement arise, there is no ready-to-hand 
methodology for coping with the resulting uncertainty.  On the other hand, one’s 130
consternation at finding that a heated pan of water has frozen solid is tempered by an 
expectation, or the hope, that some explanation can be found to explain it. There is 
undoubtedly a connection to be made between this expectation, and any 
accompanying methodology, and what Wittgenstein describes in the LFW as a feeling 
 OC, §613.128
 OC, §617.129
 This is not to say that no methodology can be presented.130
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that “there must be some law” to explain that which is, for all intents and purposes, 
lawless.  In this way, Wittgenstein can be taken to be alerting us to a still greater 131
danger, viz. that in presuming that the only ‘real’ problems are those that involve 
disagreements in opinions, and thereby taking the ‘sureness of the game’ for granted, 
we run the even greater risk of plunging everything into chaos.  
 These general points bear directly on Wittgenstein’s approach to the question 
of the freedom of the will in the following way. The ‘complex of feelings’ associated 
with a belief in freedom of the will, i.e. feelings of rage, resentment, pity, gratitude 
etc., are arguably all a part of the ‘sureness of the game’. The existence of this 
complex of feelings is, in Wittgenstein’s view, constituted by our attitudes towards 
each other, e.g. our holding an individual responsible for their actions (or our not 
holding them responsible) in any given case.  Our ‘natural reactions’ are not, 132
therefore, something that can be doubted, according to Wittgenstein, in the same way 
that we question a practice that is deployed on the basis of a reflective judgement, e.g. 
of its usefulness. That is, the feelings and attitudes concerned have a sureness that is 
bound up with what each is taken to be an expression of.  
 Once again, this is not to say which practices do and do not constitute 
agreement in a form of life. Neither, as we shall see, does Wittgenstein deny that 
reflectively endorsed opinions have a significant, albeit indirect, role to play in 
shaping the attitudes we express towards ourselves and others, i.e. as persons. 
Accordingly, Wittgenstein’s approach to the problem of freedom of the will takes a 
practice-based line in so far as he sets out to show that our practices of holding 
 LFW, p. 430/1.131
 I will say more on the parenthetical possibility, i.e. not holding people responsible, in the next 132
chapter.
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responsible (or our not holding them responsible) are not exclusively, or most 
fundamentally, a matter of our reflectively endorsed judgements. On the contrary, he 
thinks that how we treat others must, to some degree, be expressive of our primitive 
natural reactions.  
 This aspect of Wittgenstein’s thinking is, like his opposition to 
incompatibilism, consistent with certain defences of freedom of the will. 
Nevertheless, as was the case in the preceding chapter, these similarities are 
misconstrued if they are taken as providing evidence in favour of a compatibilistic or 
practice-based defence of freedom of the will. In order to demonstrate that, for 
Wittgenstein, a practice-based approach cannot serve as a defence of freedom of the 
will, I will now introduce P. F. Strawson’s defence of the so-called reactive attitudes 
before contrasting it with Wittgenstein’s approach in the LFW. 
Part Two: P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom & 
Resentment” 
Shortly after the publication of the Investigations, P. F. Strawson sets out, in FR, to 
defend the commitment to the reactive attitudes against a certain tendency to think in 
terms of a single explanation. Strawson, too, is interested in providing an account of 
the ‘sureness’ with which a belief in freedom of the will is expressed. The passage 
from The Yellow Book, in particular, foreshadows Strawson’s defence of a ‘complex 
of feelings’ that he associates with a belief in freedom of the will.  In Strawson’s 133
own terms, this is ‘that complicated web of attitudes and feelings which form an 
essential part of the moral life as we know it’ and that is not founded on a judgement 
 AWL, p. 33.133
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about its usefulness, e.g. in promoting certain behaviour.  For Strawson, as for 134
Wittgenstein, usefulness cannot be the motive, for two reasons. Firstly, the evidence 
speaks against it in many cases. From the outset, Strawson is critical of those who 
defend freedom of the will by appealing to its usefulness as a measure of social 
control, partly because such defences fail to capture all we should have to say 
concerning freedom of the will. It is also partly due to the second reason why 
usefulness cannot be the motive, namely that there is no one, homogeneous 
justification for a commitment; and not one that makes possible a primitive and 
spontaneous commitment, i.e. prior to any opinion. This last corresponds, as we shall 
see, with Strawson’s own defence of the reactive attitudes and is a reply to those who 
object that, since usefulness does not justify a commitment to the reactive attitudes, 
the commitment is unjustifiable.  
 Before considering objections to Strawson’s position, it is worth pausing to 
emphasise further the methodological common ground he shares with Wittgenstein. 
In the LFW, Wittgenstein observes that ‘Normally, unless we philosophise, we don’t 
talk this way’, i.e. we do not talk about a belief in freedom of the will or about 
justifications for such a belief; rather, ‘we talk of making decisions.’  To bring out 135
the implausibility of thinking of our ‘belief in freedom of the will’ purely as a matter 
of ratiocination, Wittgenstein envisages a person coolly walking about a room and 
saying, “yes. I can do this. I can do that”, as if this would prove that they are acting 
freely.  This portrays clearly what both Wittgenstein and Strawson think is lacking 136
from metaphysical attempts to justify belief in freedom of the will; namely, a proper 
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 24.134
 LFW, p. 434.135
 LFW, p. 438.136
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sensitivity to the role that this belief actually plays in our everyday form of life. 
Strawson accordingly calls for a more ‘heated’ discussion, i.e. one that remains in 
close contact with the attitudes and feelings we express everyday: 
[We must] try and keep before our minds something it is easy to 
forget when we are engaged in philosophy, especially in our cool, 
contemporary style, viz. what it is actually like to be involved in 
ordinary interpersonal relationships, ranging from the most intimate 
to the most casual.  137
Strawson’s aim is to stay close to the ‘ordinary interpersonal relationships’ that, for 
him, are inextricably linked with the ‘natural reactions’ (Strawson: ‘reactive 
attitudes’) he defends; ‘being involved in inter-personal relationships as we normally 
understand them precisely is being exposed to the range of reactive attitudes and 
feelings that is in question.’   138
 The interpersonal nature of the reactive attitudes is characterised by the 
demands we impose on others (and ourselves) to demonstrate ‘some degree of 
goodwill’ towards others.  Strawson contrasts the reactive attitudes with an 139
‘objective attitude’ that involves seeing another human being ‘as an object of social 
policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment.’  140
He accepts that we often appropriately treat people objectively, but that we do so ‘in a 
wide range of sense’. Indeed, as we shall see, it is precisely the variety of ways in 
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 3. Cf. LFW, p. 438: ‘If I am quite cool, I am inclined to walk about in my 137
room and move my head in various ways, and say ‘Yes. I can do this. I can do that’ etc. … This is a 
trivial and in a way a stupid case I have described.’
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 12.138
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 3.139
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 4.140
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which we treat people objectively that Strawson thinks gives the lie to the 
‘pessimist’s’ claim that it follows from the supposition that the thesis of determinism 
is true that we ought to adopt—and can therefore make sense of the idea of—a 
universal objective attitude, i.e. that we ought to treat everyone objectively, all of the 
time. 
 Strawson sets himself against not only such a pessimist but also against a 
traditional sort of optimist regarding the prospect of holding onto our practices of 
freedom and resentment even if it turns out that determinism is true.  The traditional 141
philosophical ‘optimist’ in this connection is therefore the soft-determinist who, like 
Nielsen, argues that nothing about our being determined by natural laws gives us 
reason to doubt the freedom of our decisions and that we may therefore defend the 
latter, for example, on the grounds of its utility.  Despite ultimately defending an 142
optimist line, Strawson initially criticises both camps, on the grounds that each 
displays the same tendency to ‘over-intellectualise the facts’.  More specifically, the 143
traditional optimist is criticised for an ‘incomplete empiricism’ or ‘one-eyed 
utilitarianism’ with respect to the utility of the reactive attitudes; i.e. by a ‘one-eyed 
utilitarianism’ Strawson means the belief that holding people responsible for their 
actions is beneficial in curbing undesirable behaviour.  This is markedly similar to 144
the criticism from The Yellow Book, i.e. against usefulness being every time the 
 LFW, p. 441. Wittgenstein also refers to ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’ and in a markedly similar way. 141
Even so, Wittgenstein reverses the definitions; e.g. an ‘optimist’ is someone who thinks that ‘is is only 
a matter of time…’ before we know all the laws of a human being, whereas the pessimists ‘don’t see 
the point of the hypothesis at all’.
 In Nielsen’s case ‘utility’ might be taken to mean its usefulness in diagnosing mental illness, 142
abnormality, etc.
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 25.143
 Ibid.144
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motive.  This is what Strawson’s refers to as the optimist’s and pessimist’s tendency 145
to ‘over-intellectualise the facts’; i.e. to reduce all human behaviour, or a certain kind 
of behaviour, to an explanation in terms of hidden psychological processes.  146
Wittgenstein’s addendum to this—that the same tendency ‘is responsible for people 
saying that punishment must be one of three things, revenge, a deterrent, or 
improvement’ —is equally prescient of Strawson’s condemnation of the optimist’s 147
position as an ‘incomplete empiricism’ or ‘one-eyed utilitarianism’.  Moreover, 148
Strawson maintains that usefulness is not merely an insufficient basis for feeling 
resentment towards someone, it is ‘not even the right sort’ of basis.  The right sort 149
of basis is presented alongside Strawson’s attempt to ‘reconcile’ the optimist and 
pessimist, i.e. his attempt to fill in that which the pessimist rightly finds to be lacking 
from the optimist’s account, namely some account of the first-personal involvement 
of the agent.  
 Having conceded this point to the pessimist, what Strawson asks in return is 
that the pessimist give up the ‘panicky metaphysics’ that is traditionally taken to 
epitomise the first-personal involvement of the agent as a causa sui.  Strawson’s 150
objection again turns on a disagreement with ‘the facts as we know them’. It is not 
only that the definition of ‘freedom of the will’ as the agent’s ability to manifest his/
her actions is overly restrictive. It is also that, like the optimist, the pessimist 
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demonstrates a propensity to ‘over-intellectualise the facts’. That is, the pessimist 
relies on a cognitive explanation, even when confronted with examples of 
spontaneous (in the sense of immediate, non-reflective) action.  Once again, the 151
method is to explain disparate phenomena with reference to a single cause, namely 
the agent. Thus, both the optimist and the pessimist seek (and fail) to grasp, through 
the defence of an opinion, that which we know can also be grasped by the primitive 
and spontaneous expression of an attitude. 
 This brings us close to identifying what is, for Strawson, the right ‘sort of 
basis’ for the maintenance of the reactive attitudes, viz. the reactive attitudes 
themselves:  
Only by attending to this range of attitudes can we recover from the 
facts as we know them a sense of what we mean, i.e. of all we 
mean, when, speaking the language of morals, we speak of desert, 
responsibility, guilt, condemnation, and justice. But we do recover it 
from the facts as we know them. We do not have to go beyond 
them.  152
For Strawson, then, we can recover ‘all we mean’ with respect to freedom and 
resentment without resorting to either the optimist’s or the pessimist’s definitions of 
freedom of the will, as a means of improving society or as the manifestation of a 
causa sui. These definitions do not circumvent or in any way add to an understanding 
of the commitment to ‘that complicated web of attitudes and feelings which form an 
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essential part of the moral life as we know it’.  Certainly, for Strawson, the ‘web of 153
attitudes’ (compare Wittgenstein’s ‘complex of feelings’) can exist without going 
‘beyond them’ to an ‘external, ‘rational’ justification’. This is because we already 
have, at the outset, agreement in a form of life. That is, responsibility is a function of 
the practices of praising, blaming, resenting, etc. which we understand collectively 
and ostensively as being held responsible. As Gary Watson puts it: 
It is not that we hold people responsible because they are 
responsible; rather, the idea (our idea) that we are responsible is to 
be understood by the practice, which itself is not a matter of holding 
some propositions to be true, but of expressing our concerns and 
demands about our treatment of one another.  154
In ultimately siding with the optimist, Strawson does not lessen his opposition to the 
thought that the reactive attitudes are ‘devices we calculatingly employ for regulative 
purposes.’  On the contrary, the ‘radically’ modified optimism he defends is 155
vehemently opposed to this thought.  Strawson is more critical of the pessimist only 156
because the optimist ‘over-intellectualises the facts’ in order to reinforce the 
expression of the reactive attitudes; subtracting the optimist’s ‘external, ‘rational’ 
justification’ does nothing to undermine that expression, therefore.  By contrast, the 157
removal of the pessimist’s ‘external, ‘rational’ justification’ would, at least for the 
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pessimist, remove the only reason we have for expressing freedom and resentment. 
This, I submit, is what Strawson means when he says that ‘[o]ur practices do not 
merely exploit our natures, they express them’; i.e. the reactive practices can often 
come first and are not therefore premised on an ‘external, ‘rational’ justification’.  158
 This last reference to human nature brings me to one final, and most 
important, point I wish to make before assessing the so-called ‘Systematic Concern’ 
regarding Strawson’s defence of the reactive attitudes. The expression of the reactive 
attitudes is, for Strawson, most intimately an expression of human nature; he calls the 
commitment to the ‘framework of attitudes and feelings’ a ‘natural fact, something as 
deeply rooted in our natures as our existence as social beings’.  In FR he makes the 159
further claim ‘that it is, for us as we are, practically inconceivable’ that a ‘general 
theoretical conviction’, such as determinism, could ‘so change our world that, in it, 
there were no longer any such things as inter-personal relationships’.  As indicated 160
by the above analysis, Strawson is not simply making the naturalistic claim that 
human beings just are this way, i.e. reactive members of a moral community; he is 
also, and more specifically, purporting to diffuse any perceived threat to the 
maintenance of the reactive attitudes posed by the thesis of determinism. Yet it is 
Strawson’s seemingly naturalistic claim that draws the most fire from his critics who 
argue that this overlooks the ‘real’ question of whether or not we are actually 
responsible.  
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Part Three: A Systematic Concern regarding P. F. 
Strawson’s naturalistic claim 
In what follows, I will argue that, despite potential misreadings of Strawson’s 
naturalistic claim, there is an intuitive and compelling case to answer associated with 
the Systematic Concern. Later, I shall reassess this concern by demonstrating the 
relative position of Strawson’s naturalistic claim with respect to his overall argument, 
as well as to Wittgenstein’s own account. In the latter case, my aim is to demonstrate 
that the objection raised by the Systematic Concern, that is compelling in Strawson’s 
case, lacks teeth when it comes to Wittgenstein’s own project. 
 For now, however, I shall take Strawson’s naturalistic claim—that the 
attitudes and feelings expressed by human beings are too ‘deeply rooted’ to give up—
at face value. The Systematic Concern this raises is based on a dichotomy between 
the practice of holding someone responsible, which Strawson defends, and the 
knowledge or certainty that the individual in question is actually responsible, which 
he does not defend. Fischer and Ravizza therefore highlight the following:  
Strawson’s theory may reasonably be said to give an account of 
what it is for agents to be held responsible, but there seems to be a 
difference between being held responsible and actually being 
responsible.  161
The dichotomy between being held responsible and actually being responsible 
corresponds to the realisation that, even if the practical inconceivability of ceasing to 
treat one another reactively is assumed, this leaves the ‘real’ question unanswered, i.e. 
 Fischer & Ravizza 1993, p. 18. See McKenna & Russell 2008, p. 18; ‘The problem that [Fisher & 161
Ravizza] are concerned with is the possibility that there could be a systematic lack of correlation 
between our reactive attitudes and their appropriate and legitimate objects.’
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of whether or not we are right to hold people responsible. The implication is that, 
even if successful, Strawson’s naturalistic claim, like the optimist’s appeal to utility, is 
the wrong sort of basis for a defence of our reactive attitudes. The lacuna in the 
optimist’s original position therefore reasserts itself, now with respect to Strawson’s 
‘radically modified’ optimism. This is because the pessimist, far from settling for a 
measure of the first-personal manifestation of freedom, demands instead that the 
manifestation of freedom correspond with ‘actual’ freedom, and that holding people 
responsible be a function of ‘real’ responsibility. Any appeal to that to which human 
beings are, by nature, committed necessarily falls short of answering this concern: 
By understanding responsibility primarily in terms of our actual 
practices of adopting or not adopting certain attitudes towards 
agents Strawson’s theory risks blurring the difference between 
[holding and being responsible].  162
One way in which Fischer and Ravizza make clear this risk is by indicating the 
possibility of error when making judgements based solely on the reactive attitudes.  163
There is no doubt that we can be wrong in judging someone responsible, or in not 
judging someone who is responsible.  The worry at the heart of the Systematic 164
Concern is therefore that our practices of freedom and resentment might, quite 
 Fischer & Ravizza 1993, p. 18.162
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systemically, come adrift from the actual facts about whether or not people are 
responsible for their actions. 
 We must bear in mind that the Systematic Concern, as Fischer and Ravizza 
describe it, has less to do with potential mistakes made in practice, and more to do 
with the theoretical basis for these mistakes. That is to say, the spectre they raise of 
individual mistakes in holding this or that person responsible is but a stepping-stone 
to a wider criticism of Strawson’s theoretical response to the pessimist. Thus, the 
scope of this concern widens with respect to the manifest differences in how the 
reactive attitudes come to be expressed in different communities. Here, the criticism 
is that differences in how the reactive attitudes play out in different communities is 
evidence that at least some communities are largely or wholly mistaken in holding or 
not holding certain kinds of people responsible. The point is not merely that a given 
community may turn out to be wrong with respect to whom they deem responsible or 
not responsible, but in the implication that, because of this possibility, there may be ‘a 
systematic lack of correlation between our reactive attitudes and their appropriate and 
legitimate objects’.  What leads Fischer and Ravizza to wonder about ‘situations in 165
which communities hold people responsible who intuitively are not’ is that there are 
manifest differences in the attitudes expressed by members of a certain community, 
not just with regard to shared linguistic practices themselves, but also with regard to 
who is eligible to participate in them.  166
It could be, for example, that an entire community has its reactive 
attitudes switched on or off in the wrong way and at the wrong 
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times. The very possibility of this suggests that there is more to 
being responsible than what is generally targeted by our reactive 
attitudes and feelings.  167
As in the case of more specific errors of judgement, these wide-scale differences raise 
fundamental questions regarding whether or not there can be such a thing as a 
‘responsible agent’, i.e. an appropriate object for the reactive attitudes. I will come to 
what I take to be the fullest extent of this concern in a moment, since I dispute that 
this ‘systematic lack of correlation’ conveys the full force of Fischer’s and Ravizza’s 
concern. That is to say, I agree with McKenna and Russell that we must be careful 
how we interpret the Systematic Concern, but I do not think that they take sufficient 
care to bring out what surely must be the basis for the concern we began with, viz. the 
dichotomy between holding and being responsible. 
 How, then, should we assess the Systematic Concern as a criticism of 
Strawson? To begin with, we may note that what his naturalistic claim purports to 
immunise from rational criticism is not a certain kind of reactive practice but a 
commitment to those practices. McKenna and Russell are therefore wrong to suggest 
that Strawson makes criticism of existing practices impossible.  It is true that 168
Strawson’s position in FR rules out ‘external’ criticism, but he accepts ‘that there is 
endless room for modification, redirection, criticism, and justification’ from ‘inside 
the general structure or web of human attitudes and feelings’.  By ‘internal’, we 169
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need not, and indeed should not, take him to mean inside a particular community, but 
within shared linguistic practice, i.e. ‘the web of human attitudes’.  
 This helps to downplay the significance of ‘situations in which communities 
hold people responsible who intuitively are not’ since Strawson is in no way 
immunising practices from rational criticism across (or between) communities. We 
might say that the difference involved is as great as the difference between a moral 
disagreement and moral scepticism. That Strawson allows for radical moral 
disagreement is made evident by his acknowledgement that his own account is 
temporally and locally situated, and that the attitudes he describes are those of, what 
he calls, a ‘civilised’ society.  That he opposes moral scepticism is made evident by 170
his opposition to the possibility of a universal objective attitude. Thus, Strawson’s 
defence of the ‘entire web of human attitudes’ is a defence, not of the practices to 
which a certain human being or community is committed, but rather of the 
commitment to a particular set of practices that express human nature. No mention 
need be made, therefore, of communities failing in their ‘approximation’ of ‘true’ 
responsibility. No attempt need be made, either, to promote an idealised community 
in which this dichotomy is resolved. In its most general form, the Strawsonian 
response to McKenna and Russell is that they are wrong where they seek to locate the 
force of Fischer’s and Ravizza’s criticism in the actual application of the reactive 
attitudes with respect to people who intuitively are not responsible. 
 Nevertheless, it can still be objected that Strawson, perhaps unwittingly, 
overlooks the way in which behaviour can, and should, be rationally scrutinised from 
the inside out. Derk Pereboom objects that opposition to racist or sexist behaviour 
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 26.170
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demonstrates just how the reactive attitudes can come to ‘be subject to justificatory 
pressures from highly general theoretical beliefs.’  The thrust of Pereboom’s 171
criticism is that the condemnation of a practice or set of practices can arise out of 
contemplation of those practices. That is to say, the practices are not theoretical to 
begin with but can be set aside in line with a mature view of those practices; not least 
in the guise of a general, theoretical principle, e.g. that it is wrong to discriminate 
against people based solely on their race or sex. What this objection means is that, 
whilst Strawson prevents the move from the theoretical to the practical, he cannot 
prevent the move from the practical to the theoretical.  
 What is more, Strawson can provide no justification of his own—beyond the 
practical inconceivability of the move—to preclude an equally mature view of our 
practices forming on the basis of a general, theoretical belief in determinism. For 
instance, Strawson’s assertion that the pessimist necessarily relies on an ‘over-
intellectualised’ version of the facts (a charge that he says the optimist can avoid) 
loses credibility if it is intended to cover racist and sexist attitudes as well. It would 
be naïve to presume that racist or sexist viewpoints correspond only with an objective 
attitude, and hence that racist or sexist views are never primitively, i.e. reactively, 
expressed. Strawson is perhaps more likely to respond that opposition to racist or 
sexist views is also, and often at the same time, internal to ‘the general structure or 
web of human attitudes and feelings’.  However, such a response does not vitiate a 172
mature view of our web of attitudes and feelings wherein our reactive practices come 
to be subjected to ‘justificatory pressures from highly general theoretical beliefs’.  
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 For this reason, Fischer’s and Ravizza’s initial Systematic Concern can be 
served by looking to specific examples of reactive malpractice; not as evidence of the 
widespread impropriety of reactive attitudes (as McKenna and Russell’s treatment 
shows) but as evidence of the explanatory gap in Strawson’s account. That is, 
Strawson is not committed to defending all instantiations of the reactive attitudes, 
since what he defends is a commitment to the ‘entire web of human attitudes and 
feelings’—that incorporate both civilised and uncivilised elements.  In this, he is in 173
agreement with Wittgenstein’s earlier response to the question of whether ‘human 
agreement decides what is true and what is false’, viz. that ‘It is what human beings 
say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not 
agreement in opinions but in form of life.’  What is lacking from at least Strawson’s 174
version, however, is an understanding of how this agreement in ‘form of life’ comes 
to be altered, quite purposefully, in light of what we can agree is true and false. The 
explanatory debt owed by Strawson, then, is how the reactive attitudes come to be 
altered in light of what we regard to be appropriate and inappropriate feelings (of 
resentment, etc.), i.e. whether or not we ought to think as comes naturally. 
 Given Strawson’s opposition to thinking about human behaviour purely in 
cognitive or motivational terms, we can be sure that any further response to the 
Systematic Concern will avoid the sort of explanation favoured by optimists such as 
Nielsen, i.e. an attempt to explain what it is that makes someone an appropriate target 
for the reactive attitudes, e.g. the ability to make decisive decisions. The pressing 
question, if we are to assess properly the Systematic Concern from Strawson’s point 
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of view is whether, in making his naturalistic claim, he is able to confront the above 
dichotomy. This is, and will remain, a question about whether or not the reactive 
attitudes simpliciter can be disclosed in such a way as to avoid the alleged ‘difference 
between being held responsible and actually being responsible.’   175
 It may be that Strawson confronts the dichotomy by providing an account of 
what he calls ‘self-reactive attitudes’, i.e. personal feelings of remorse or pride.  176
This is not a response Strawson directly offers to resolve this dichotomy, although it 
is commensurate with his naturalistic claim. It might be argued, along these lines, that 
an individual can legitimately be held responsible by virtue of his having 
corresponding feelings of personal responsibility. Upon being pronounced guilty, a 
perpetrator might feel that the outcome is no more than he deserves. It must be 
admitted straightaway, however, that such a self-reactive attitude certainly cannot 
overcome the above dichotomy by itself. Moreover, to no lesser extent than 
interpersonal reactive attitudes, self-reactive attitudes are liable to be incorrect. 
Survivor’s guilt is a definitive example of a self-reactive attitude that need have 
nothing to do with actually being responsible for surviving when others did not. The 
proposal we might consider, however, is that the combination of interpersonal and 
self-reactive attitudes may serve to strengthen the ties between being held responsible 
and actually being responsible in a way that either alone does not.  
 The above proposal fails, however, because it provides no reason to think that 
the combination of interpersonal and self-reactive attitudes would be mutually 
correcting. For instance, there is no reason to think that someone with survivor’s guilt 
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 Cf. ‘Self-reactive attitudes’ see Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 16, 23-24.176
!  of !101 240
will be comforted to know that no-one else holds them responsible, or that someone’s 
self-righteous attitude will be assuaged by being found guilty of a crime. Moreover, 
someone can be held responsible as well as feel personally responsible and 
nonetheless still lack responsibility. 
 As I have said, the appeal to self-reactive attitudes is not a response Strawson 
himself makes to the Systematic Concern. He does, however, directly respond in FR 
to the, at least related, concern that, for some, his naturalistic argument leaves the 
‘real’ question unanswered. He adds that: 
For [those with this concern] the real question is not a question 
about what we actually do, or why we do it. It is not even a question 
about what we would in fact do if a certain theoretical conviction 
gained general acceptance. It is a question about what it would be 
rational to do if determinism were true, a question about the rational 
justification of ordinary inter-personal attitudes in general.  177
Here, Strawson himself raises a similar concern to the Systematic Concern, as I shall 
continue to call it, which is ‘not a question about what we actually do, or why’ but 
about the theoretical basis for the commitment. In short, those with the Systematic 
Concern feel that there is no basis for the commitment, that the commitment to the 
reactive attitudes is a law unto itself. What is disputed is whether something further is 
required to explain or justify that commitment. On the basis of the naturalistic claim 
alone, I should say that more is required. So far, I have limited myself to an analysis 
of Strawson’s naturalistic claim. In what follows, I shall turn to Strawson’s non-
naturalistic arguments which, I shall argue, go some way towards bridging the 
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 14.177
!  of !102 240
explanatory gap between holding people responsible and being responsible; all 
without resorting to an ‘external, ‘rational’ justification’. 
Part Four: An initial response to the Systematic 
Concern based on P. F. Strawson’s explicit 
arguments for the irrationality of repudiating the 
reactive attitudes 
Strawson’s arguments in FR are chiefly directed at the pessimist’s proposed 
repudiation of the reactive attitudes on the basis of a general, theoretical belief in 
determinism. Where Strawson does directly attack the Systematic Concern, he does 
so by alluding to an implicit aspect of these arguments. In what follows, my primary 
aim shall be to make explicit that which remains implicit in Strawson’s arguments 
against the pessimist; and, in particular, against using a general, theoretical belief in 
determinism as a justification for pessimistically denying freedom of the will. 
Crucially, we shall see that what lies implicit in Strawson’s account is wholly 
independent of his naturalistic claim. Strawson writes: 
A sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, and the human 
isolation this would entail, does not seem to be something of which 
human beings would be capable, even if some general truth were a 
theoretical ground for it. But this is not all. There is a further point, 
implicit in the foregoing, which must be made explicit.  178
To determine the extent to which Strawson relies upon the initial naturalistic claim, I 
shall examine two, further arguments, which I propose to call the Quick and Ramified 
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 12. Emphasis added.178
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arguments respectively. I shall then consider a response to the Systematic Concern 
based upon what Strawson says remains ‘implicit’ in these explicit arguments, namely 
the true depth and scope of his opposition to ‘external, rational justifications’ of our 
practices of freedom and resentment. I shall then turn to Wittgenstein’s response to a 
similar objection—that the ‘feeling of freedom’ is an insufficient basis for the belief 
that we are free—and how this prefigures, and at the same time broadens, Strawson’s 
response to the Systematic Concern. 
 By anticipating that there will be those, like Fischer and Ravizza, who will be 
inclined to think that ‘the real question has gone unanswered,’ Strawson concedes 
that, at the very least, his account has the potential to be misunderstood. 
Unfortunately, he offers few directions as to how to respond directly to the Systematic 
Concern. As I hope to show, however, a detailed analysis of Strawson’s arguments 
reveals that the true basis for his opposition to the pessimist’s proposed repudiation of 
the reactive attitudes is far from reducible to what we have called the naturalistic 
claim. These arguments against the supposition that determinism entails the 
repudiation of the reactive attitudes weigh against a purely naturalistic reading of FR.  
 Strawson supposes that, in order to repudiate the reactive attitudes on the basis 
of a general theoretical belief, the pessimist has only two potential strategies: 
1. Scaling up the objective treatment of ‘abnormal’ individuals on the grounds that 
determination by natural laws is a universal form of incapacitation.  
 OR 
2. Scaling up the use of the objective attitude with respect of ‘normal’ individuals, on 
the grounds that any, and therefore all, human behaviour can be objectified. 
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To a certain extent, we are already familiar with these strategies since both are 
considered and responded to by Wittgenstein during the LFW. The phraseology 
employed is different, but the strategies are markedly similar.  
The Quick Argument: 
Strawson’s first line of argumentation comprises what I call the Quick Argument 
against the pessimist’s claim that it follows from the supposition that determinism is 
true that we should suspend the reactive attitudes in the way that we currently 
suspend them in local cases of incapacitation, e.g. upon diagnosis of an underlying 
physical or mental condition, albeit universally. According to Strawson, the pessimist 
maintains that we should treat all behaviour as we currently treat what we take to be 
abnormal cases if the deterministic thesis is true since, if this thesis is true, then all 
human behaviour is arguably a form of physical incapacitation. An individual’s 
behaviour is, in other words, equally (and merely) demonstrative of that individual’s 
underlying physical condition, i.e. the capacity, or incapacity, to act in certain ways. 
As such, there is no difference between a thief whose actions are physically 
determined and the compulsive behaviour of a kleptomaniac.  
  Strawson does not deny that we come to treat specific forms of incapacitation 
in this way, i.e. objectively. What he specifically rules out is the quantitative claim the 
pessimist might make, viz. the scaling up, as it were, of the objective attitude from its 
use in specific cases to a universal application, i.e. to all human behaviour. Strawson 
wants to show that the theoretical basis for adopting the objective attitude in specific 
cases precludes a universal application: 
[T]he personal reactive attitudes in general, tend to give place, and 
it is judged by the civilized should give place, to objective attitudes, 
!  of !105 240
just in so far as the agent is seen as excluded from ordinary adult 
human relationships by deep-rooted psychological abnormality—or 
simply by being a child. But it cannot be a consequence of any 
thesis which is not itself self-contradictory that abnormality is the 
universal condition.  179
The self-contradiction to which Strawson refers is similar to that which both 
Wittgenstein and Nielsen refer: that for a concept to have meaning it must be possible 
to specify conditions in which the term is used correctly as well as incorrectly; to fail 
with respect to the latter is to render the term a pleonasm. Accordingly, a prerequisite 
for deeming any state of affairs ‘abnormal’ is the capacity to judge what states of 
affairs would be considered ‘normal’. This is something the pessimist fails to do 
when entertaining the application of a universal objective attitude. The point is well 
made when we reflect on the kinds of terminology we have already used in 
connection with adopting the objective attitude in specific cases of incapacitation and 
immaturity, all of which involve the manifestation of an abnormality not otherwise to 
be found in participants of inter-personal relationships. To universalise the treatment 
of a condition of being physically determined would, if it mirrors these specific uses, 
appear to lead us to an incoherent idea of ‘universal abnormality’.  
 Even were the pessimist to argue instead that incapacitation by determinism is 
the ‘normal’ condition for a human being, it would come to the same thing. That is, in 
order for it to be said that normally human beings lack freedom of the will it should 
still have to be said in what circumstances human beings are able, perhaps only with 
an extreme effort of will, to act ‘abnormally’, i.e. freely and responsibly. Otherwise, 
 Ibid.179
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we should say that the pessimist gives with the one hand, what he takes with the 
other, viz. the requisite conditions for normality. On the basis of the pessimist’s own 
assessment of the requirements for adopting the objective attitude, then, we must 
recognise the inherent contradiction involved in scaling up the objective attitude from 
its specific everyday use to a universal attitude.  
 To this, the pessimist might respond that, instead of an extreme effort of will, 
what is required for someone not to lack freedom of the will is for their actions to be 
self-determined, i.e. not determined by the laws of nature. In this case, to say, 
“abnormality is the universal condition” means that ‘normality’ is a potential state 
only, that might only be realised if the thesis of determinism is false. The same 
problem persists, however, given that to say, “abnormality is the universal condition” 
cannot explain why we now differentiate between cases, e.g. by not treating children 
in the same way that we do adults. It is this differentiation that makes possible 
treating some people differently; one cannot keep the differentiation and yet treat 
everyone similarly. What is perhaps more pertinent is the fact that, on Strawson’s 
account, children are not treated differently as a result of prior embracing the 
distinction between mature and immature. Rather, maturity and immaturity are 
defined by how human beings treat those around them, i.e. one’s attitude towards 
them. 
 Strawson resolves the difficulty by saying that we do not currently employ the 
objective attitude in specific cases because we think the individuals in those cases are 
determined, in any univocal sense of being determined. Rather, the objective attitude 
is made use of because they are deranged, immature, or generally ill-equipped to 
manage the rigours of the inter-personal relationships we otherwise subject each other 
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to. There is no need for recourse, in other words, to what Strawson calls the 
pessimist’s ‘panicky metaphysics’—e.g. a contra-causal freedom or causa sui—for 
the simple reason that, in order to motivate the move to metaphysics, the pessimist 
must first show that the reactive attitudes can be displaced by a general, theoretical 
belief in determinism.  This is precisely what Strawson denies when he argues that 180
the objective attitude does not correspond with a general, theoretical belief in 
determinism. 
 Strawson’s move is once again reminiscent of what, in The Yellow Book, 
Wittgenstein calls the ‘tendency to explain a phenomenon by one cause’, in this case 
the phenomenon is the objective attitude which Strawson likewise claims to be 
multifarious in its application.  For example, a parent does not refrain from 181
chastisement of a child because s/he suddenly realises that the child’s actions are the 
consequence of an underlying mental condition. More spuriously still, a doctor does 
not treat a patient in a similar fashion because s/he holds the same opinion as the 
parent. There is no one thing, in other words, that explains the use of the objective 
attitude even across these two instances.  
 Strawson makes the further point that an examination of the requisite 
conditions for adopting the objective attitude in most cases of incapacitation evinces a 
simple truth; that the objective attitude is more intimately involved in returning an 
individual to reactive participation than it is to ending that participation. He notes that 
the sort of objective attitude we adopt towards those with ‘abnormalities’ is bound up 
with notions of treatment and care that, wherever possible, are only temporary. In 
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many cases (if not most) the grounds upon which someone is recognised as 
‘abnormal’ presumes, or is directed towards, the possibility of normalising that 
behaviour, i.e. of returning the individual concerned to participation in inter-personal 
relationships. This clearly isn’t merely a reiteration of the points just made, i.e. that 
‘universal’ abnormality is a contradiction in terms or that not all cases of abnormality 
come down to the same thing.  Strawson is also making the point that the strategy 182
proposed on behalf of the pessimist is indicative of the same ‘one-eyed utilitarianism’ 
(or ‘incomplete empiricism’) that the optimist was accused of.  In the pessimist’s 183
case, what is overlooked is the usefulness of the objective attitude and, more 
importantly, what it is used for, namely to further the reactive attitudes. Strawson 
introduces this as a premise in the following argument. 
Whatever sense of ‘determined’ is required for stating the thesis of 
determinism, it can scarcely be such as to allow of compromise, 
border-line style answers to the question, ‘is this bit of behaviour 
determined or isn’t it?’ But in this matter of young children, it is 
essentially a border-line, penumbral area that we move in.  184
That is, if by saying that a given type of behaviour is ‘determined’ we mean that it is 
determined in the same way as all behaviour is determined in virtue of the truth of the 
thesis of determinism, and if, for example, young children are treated objectively 
temporarily, then children cannot count as determined in that same sense. We must 
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think of them, therefore, as treated objectively for another reason, e.g. due to their 
immaturity.  
 Moreover, there is an expectation that the child’s behaviour will come to be 
treated reactively on the basis of our having treated them objectively. Part of the 
suggestion here is that, if there is indeed a tendency for attitudes to ‘migrate’ in one 
direction or the other, i.e. towards or away from the reactive attitudes, then it is 
evidently the opposite direction to the one being proposed on behalf of the pessimist. 
In other words, even when the objective attitude is called for, it is in order that it 
should no longer be called for. Again, this is clear from the kind of counter-examples 
that Strawson is providing, e.g. cases of abnormality, incapacitation, etc. In all these 
cases, the various reasons we might have for adopting the objective attitude all tend 
towards returning the individual concerned to reactive participation.  Thus, the fact 185
that we can adopt an objective attitude in such cases speaks more to the fact that 
human beings are inclined towards reactive participation, than it does the possibility 
of using such cases as a template for treating everyone objectively. This is not to say 
that the Quick Argument simply falls back on the claim that we are naturally 
predisposed towards reactivity (i.e. the naturalistic claim); merely that the reasons 
why we currently adopt the objective attitude speak in favour of the optimist’s 
position rather than the pessimist’s. 
 To pay due diligence to the pessimist’s point of view, however, there are cases 
where the objective attitude comes to be sustained more generally. There are cases, 
that is, which exemplify a tendency to migrate from applying the objective attitude in 
 This is not to say that there are no cases in which someone might permanently adopt the objective 185
attitude. The point is rather that the objective attitude is not meant to last indefinitely, even if it 
sometimes does.
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some cases to using it all the time. For instance, someone who adopts the objective 
attitude, e.g. towards patients, might come to objectify the behaviour of those who are 
not patients, e.g. friends or loved ones. The reproach “are you analysing me Doctor?” 
invokes the image of a medical professional coming home, as it were, with the wrong 
‘hat’ on. This phenomenon is neither a contradiction in terms nor evidence of the 
tendency to give up the objective attitude as soon as possible. As such, examples like 
these demonstrate the opposite tendency indicated by Strawson, i.e. that the reactive 
attitudes can lapse into objectivity in any circumstance—e.g. we needn’t be in a 
doctor-patient relationship in order to adopt a doctor-like relationship to others. 
 What Strawson might say in response is that what often brings the wayward 
professional back from an objective attitude is the reproach just mentioned. In other 
words, it is only if the ‘patient’ is complicit in the treatment that the objective 
relationship can be sustained. There may be a call for an apology and, it is unlikely 
that the wayward professional will, in the cold light of day, defend the objective 
attitude as one that is appropriate, i.e. that the attitude could be adopted towards 
anyone, including one’s spouse. These points I have made all lack the rigidity of 
Strawson’s own arguments, however, and the examples I have listed certainly 
demonstrate that, where complicit, anyone can be an appropriate subject for the 
objective attitude. It may be for this reason that Strawson admits the Quick Argument 
‘might seem altogether too facile’.   186
 That Strawson calls his own argument facile is less a reflection of the 
weakness of the Quick Argument, and more a reflection of the weakness of the 
strategy proposed on behalf of the pessimist, the point being that the Quick Argument 
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rules out only the least plausible of the pessimist’s two potential strategies. In my 
view, however, Strawson’s Quick Argument does have genuine probative force. For 
the argument serves to highlight the essentially temporary nature of the objective 
attitude as it is applied in cases of abnormality. And once we recognise this point we 
are able to appreciate to a far deeper line of reasoning than the self-contradiction 
involved in the notion of ‘universal abnormality’. By highlighting that the objective 
attitude often lapses into, and is meant to lapse into, the reactive attitudes, Strawson 
places significant emphasis on a commitment to the reactive attitudes even when 
asking what it means to be responsible. That is, objective questions of what 
responsibility consists in are held in check by questions of whether or not specific 
individuals should, or should not, be held responsible. The priority of questions about 
whether we should hold or not hold P responsible is not merely incidental, since it 
remains an essential aspect of what it is to ask, objectively, what P’s responsibility 
consists in; at least in cases of abnormality. Moreover, it would be question-begging 
to assume, from the outset, that the objective attitude offers a repudiation of the 
reactive attitudes. Instead, Strawson shows how the objective attitude is instead a 
function of, rather than a threat to, the reactive attitudes. 
The Ramified Argument: 
Strawson’s Quick Argument ought not to be dismissed as simply ‘facile’. 
Nonetheless, he evidently thinks there is a more fruitful, and more plausible, avenue 
for the pessimist to explore. Turning, then, to the Ramified Argument, Strawson 
supposes that the pessimist might respond to the Quick Argument by arguing that, 
whilst ‘abnormality’ presumes ‘normality,’ the term ‘incapacitated’ does not presume 
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a corresponding capacity that one, normatively speaking, should possess.  For 187
example, a dog’s inability to have expectations of what tomorrow may bring, whilst it 
can be called a lack, does not correspond to an abnormality.  For the same reason, a 188
human being can be incapacitated by an abnormality, but all human beings are 
incapacitated in so far as they are subject to the ‘normal’ limitations on human 
capacity. In order to rule out this renewed assault on the reactive attitudes Strawson 
must, as he puts it, show that whatever is ‘too quickly’ dismissed by the Quick 
Argument is also excluded as grounds for adopting the objective attitude. In 
particular, he argues that, whilst anyone can be an appropriate object for the objective 
attitude, it does not follow that everyone can be such an object all the time. As I say, 
Strawson concedes that: 
We can sometimes, and in part, I have remarked, look on the normal 
(those we rate as ‘normal’) in the objective way in which we have 
learned to look upon certain classified cases of abnormality.  189
This concession forces Strawson to consider the second of the two proposals I have 
listed: namely, the proposal to scale up the use of the objective attitude with respect 
of ‘normal’ individuals, on the grounds that any, and therefore all, human behaviour 
can be objectified. Crucially, the above remark frees the pessimist of any obligation to 
say in what way human beings are incapacitated—however, Strawson assumes, quite 
fairly given his working definition of pessimism, that coming to look objectively 
upon those we rate as ‘normal’ involves a general, theoretical belief in determinism. 
 See, Russell, P. 1992 in McKenna & Russell 2008, pp. 153-154.187
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As we shall see, Strawson concedes that, since the pessimist might (and in fact does) 
look upon anyone objectively, it is not self-contradictory to do so.  
 People, of various professions, might objectify a person’s behaviour or 
character in order to better understand what makes them ‘tick’; e.g. an author might 
objectify someone for a character profile, an employer might do so to interview 
prospective employees, or a sportsman might analyse the competition. Moreover, the 
example in the LFW of someone saying ‘“I am no hero” as he might say “this is a 
cake. How could it be anything else?”’  is an everyday example of someone 190
objectively analysing their own character. We can concede along with Wittgenstein, 
therefore, that it does seem that the objective attitude can be taken up with respect to 
anyone, even oneself. This not only overcomes the self-contradiction involved in the 
notion of ‘universal abnormality,’ it also demonstrates that the objective attitude need 
not be aimed towards rehabilitation, i.e. towards reactive re-engagement. 
 Of course, granting that we can adopt an objective attitude towards anyone is 
some way from admitting that we can adopt the objective attitude towards everyone. 
As in the Quick Argument, it is this remaining quantitative gap in the pessimist’s 
proposal that once more leads Strawson to develop the second of his two explicit 
arguments against the pessimist which is presented in two parts. The first, and to my 
mind least, part of this Ramified Argument is the naturalistic claim that closes off the 
‘practical space’ available to the pessimist. Strawson argues that, whilst ‘it is not 
absolutely inconceivable’ that we should adopt the objective attitude universally, such 
an eventuality is ‘practically inconceivable.’  As we have seen, it is this claim, in 191
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particular, that gives rise to the Systematic Concern that what matters is not whether 
or not we happen to hold people responsible, but whether we are right to do so.   
Fischer and Ravizza are not wrong to argue that the practical inconceivability 
Strawson is referring to corresponds with the act of holding people responsible. They 
are also right to say that there is a clear dichotomy between holding someone 
responsible and their being responsible. They are wrong, however, in thinking that 
Strawson fails to recognise this dichotomy by defending a belief in freedom of the 
will on the basis of the practical inconceivability of ceasing to hold people 
responsible. As I have said, Strawson does respond directly to the Systematic Concern 
and he does so principally by arguing against the rationality of the pessimist’s claim. 
This takes place in the second, and more fruitful, part of the Ramified Argument.  
 Strawson goes on to argue that, whilst it is not self-contradictory to defend a 
universal objective attitude on the basis that anyone can be treated objectively, he 
nonetheless maintains that we can have no coherent grasp on what it would mean to 
adopt such a stance and that, even granted the truth of determinism, we have no good 
reason to try to take it up. Strawson objects that the many and varied reasons there are 
for choosing to look at someone objectively preclude, by virtue of being multifaceted, 
there being a single, unitary reason for looking at everyone in this way. He argues 
that, because it is true that we can look upon anyone in this way, and for many 
different reasons, this indicates that ‘there is something else which, because this is 
true, is equally certainly not true’: 
And that is that there is a sense of ‘determined’ such that (1) if 
determinism is true, all behaviour is determined in this sense, and 
(2) determinism might be true, i.e. it is not inconsistent with the 
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facts as we know them to suppose that all behaviour might be 
determined in this sense, and (3) our adoption of the objective 
attitude towards the abnormal is the result of a prior embracing of 
the belief that the behaviour, or the relevant stretch of behaviour, of 
the human being in question is determined in this sense.  192
Strawson’s argument is that a general, theoretical belief in determinism cannot be 
taken to uniformly stand in for the many other reasons someone might have for taking 
up an objective attitude, i.e. that there is, and can be, no one explanans, common to 
all instantiations of the objective attitude, that justifies banding them together under 
the standard of a general, theoretical belief in determinism. Even allowing that which 
we already have been given reason to doubt, viz. that these rationalisations are all 
aimed at the repudiation of the reactive attitudes, it misrepresents the phenomena to 
say they all come about for the same reason. Most importantly what rules out a single, 
unitary reason for repudiating the reactive attitudes is that this one reason does not 
encompass all the others. In order to undermine the proposed strategy, Strawson need 
only identify a single reason for taking up the objective attitude that does not 
correspond to a single, unitary sense of ‘determined’. In both abnormal and normal 
cases, this point has already been made: that the kinds of abnormalities that might 
reasonably be appealed to by the pessimist are such things as immaturity, 
derangement, or temporary insanity. With regard to normal cases, Strawson is served 
by the example Wittgenstein gives of the man who says “I am no hero” as he might 
say “this is a cake. How could it be anything else?’’ As he says at the time, saying 
‘What do you want? He just is this way’ fails to specify anything—‘He is what 
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 13.192
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way?’  Far from expressing a general, theoretical belief, saying ‘I just am this way’ 193
is a way of managing people’s expectations, avoiding blame, etc. As such, 
Wittgenstein would no doubt agree with Strawson that there is nothing in the ‘facts as 
we know them’ to indicate there is, or could be, a single, unitary sense of 
‘determined’ such that ‘all behaviour might be determined in this sense’. To suggest 
otherwise, and to attempt to explain the facts by reference to a single cause or reason, 
gives a false account of the ‘facts as we know them’. 
 According to Strawson’s overall argument, then, in neither of the proposed 
strategies can the pessimist hope to find amongst the ‘facts as we know them’ some 
practice or attitude that, by envisaging a scaling up to a global deployment of this 
practice or attitude, we can make sense of the idea of a universal objective attitude. 
This is not because our nature happens to be such that it is practically impossible for 
us to adopt such an attitude; or rather, it is not simply because of this. Rather it is, 
more fundamentally, because we lack any coherent idea of what it would actually 
mean to sustain an objective attitude towards everyone, all of the time; and because, 
even granted the truth of determinism, we lack univocal grounds for doings so.  
Part Five: A final response to the Systematic 
Concern based on what is implicit in P. F. 
Strawson’s arguments 
As noted earlier, Strawson does not directly raise the Systematic Concern until after 
introducing the Quick and Ramified Arguments. At this juncture, however, Strawson 
 LFW, p. 440.193
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redirects us back to what he has already said about the concern (sic. ‘question’) about 
‘what it would be rational to do if determinism were true’.  194
Such a question could seem real only to one who had utterly failed 
to grasp the purport of the preceding answer, the fact of our natural 
human commitment to ordinary inter-personal attitudes. This 
commitment is part of the general framework of human life, not 
something that can come up for review as particular cases can come 
up for review within this general framework.  195
It may be thought, especially by those with the Systematic Concern, that ‘the 
preceding answer’ Strawson is referring to is his naturalistic claim. After all, this 
would tie in with his saying that ‘our natural commitment’ is ‘not something that can 
come up for review’. But if this is so, why does Strawson consider the above to be a 
response to those who feel the ‘real’ question has gone unanswered by what has gone 
before? The answer to this question comes with what Strawson says concerning the 
rationality of the question: 
If we could imagine what we cannot have, viz, a choice in this 
matter, then we could choose rationally only in the light of an 
assessment of the gains and losses to human life, its enrichment or 
impoverishment; and the truth or falsity of a general thesis of 
determinism would not bear on the rationality of this choice.  196
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Strawson is clear that a general, theoretical belief ‘would not bear on the rationality’ 
of a choice between maintaining and jettisoning our practices of freedom and 
resentment, supposing—from Strawson’s point of view, per impossible—that we can 
make sense of such a choice. This, I take it, is why, whilst ‘a sustained objectivity of 
inter-personal attitude … does not seem to be something of which human beings 
would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for it’, he is 
keen to stress that ‘this is not all’.  The ‘further point, implicit in the foregoing’ is 197
rather that ‘a sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude … does not seem to be 
something of which human beings would be capable’ especially if ‘some general truth 
were a theoretical ground for it.’  Strawson’s position must therefore be that the 198
pessimist’s ‘choice’ is both inconceivable from the practical point of view and that, 
were it conceivable, it would be without basis from a theoretical point of view. 
Neither of these claims can be reduced to the naturalistic claim, viz. that human 
nature happens to be such that we are incapable of living out a universal objective 
attitude. As I hope to have shown, the Systematic Concern, by focusing on Strawson’s 
naturalistic claim, misses the place of this claim in his overall account. 
 Returning, then, to Strawson’s assertion that we can ‘recover from the facts as 
we know them a sense of what we mean, i.e. of all we mean, when, speaking the 
language of morals’, we can perhaps see more clearly what it is that he thinks fills in 
the lacuna in the optimist’s account.  I noted earlier that the intention behind this 199
statement was to fill the lacuna in the optimist’s account by introducing some 
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measure of first-personal freedom. This is true, and yet the lacuna reappears in 
connection with the Systematic Concern that what is in fact required is for 
manifestations of first-personal freedom to correspond with ‘actual’ freedom and with 
‘real’ responsibility. That is to say, there must be more to an individual’s 
responsibility than whether or not s/he is held responsible, be it inter-personally or 
self-reactively. Strawson’s real response, as we are now in a position to see, is that 
there is more to these attitudes than is accounted for by the naturalistic claim alone:  
These practices, and their reception, the reactions to them, really are 
expressions of our moral attitudes and not merely devices we 
calculatingly employ for regulative purposes. Our practices do not 
merely exploit our natures, they express them. Indeed the very 
understanding of the kind of efficacy these expressions of our 
attitudes have turns on our remembering this.  200
By saying that ‘these practices do not merely exploit our natures, they express them’, 
Strawson means that any attempt to explain the reactive attitudes in terms of an 
underlying instrumental motive—in Wittgenstein’s phrase, ‘to show the phenomenon 
to be “really” another’—must premise itself upon the expression of those attitudes. 
Failure to appreciate this point is, for Strawson, the fundamental mistake that is 
common to both pessimists and (unmodified) optimists.  
 The full force of Strawson’s arguments against the pessimist do, therefore, lie 
in his demonstrating the impracticality of the pessimist’s position. That is, despite 
emphasising the impracticality of the pessimist’s position Strawson does not, whether 
intentionally or by accident, concede rationality to the pessimist. On the contrary, it is 
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by demonstrating the impracticality of the pessimist’s position that Strawson makes 
his strongest case against the rationality of repudiating the reactive attitudes. 
 The problem for Strawson is that, in showing that there is no imperative to 
provide any intellectual foundation for the reactive attitudes, he still does not 
demonstrate the impracticality of repudiating the reactive attitudes. Whereas 
Strawson is successful in undermining intellectualist demands for an external 
justification for holding people responsible, he does not succeed in presenting a 
practice-based defence of the reactive attitudes. This is similar to the point I made in 
the preceding chapter, that it is wrong to equate anti-incompatibilism with a 
compatibilist defence of freedom of the will. In this case it is equally mistaken to 
presume that undermining the optimist’s and pessimist’s tendency to ‘over-
intellectualise the facts’ shows the facts as they must be; to do so is to conflate 
opposition to intellectualism with a practice-based defence of the reactive attitudes. 
This is most clear in relation to Pereboom’s aforementioned criticism, viz. that the 
lack of an intellectualist foundation for the reactive attitudes does not rule out our 
repudiating ex post facto the reactive attitudes on the basis of a general, theoretical 
belief.  The most we can say is that it need not be on the strength of any such belief 201
that we come to express attitudes of freedom and resentment to begin with. 
Strawson’s explicit and implicit arguments therefore fail to eliminate altogether the 
Systematic Concern. 
 In the final part of this chapter, I shall begin to explain why it is that the same 
failure cannot be as easily assigned to Wittgenstein's LFW. 
 Pereboom 2008, pp. 153-154.201
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Part Six: Wittgenstein’s response to a version of 
the Systematic Concern 
I have shown that the marked similarities between the LFW and FR most 
fundamentally reflect opposition to a pessimistic denial of freedom of the will; a 
denial that is rooted in the natural (i.e. primitive) way in which our attitudes of 
freedom and resentment are expressed. That is, both Wittgenstein and Strawson 
maintain that it is mistaken to presume that holding someone responsible, i.e. praising 
and blaming them, etc., requires an intellectual foundation, i.e. an ‘external, ‘rational’ 
justification’. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Wittgenstein also faces a version of the 
Systematic Concern during the LFW. Toward the end of the second lecture, Cassimir 
Lewy asks ‘Is the feeling of being free a sufficient ground for saying you are free?’  202
The question appears to be a response to the following example. 
Suppose I were about to do something of great consequence to 
myself and to someone else. I may get a very strong sense of what I 
may call freedom of will. I may say: ‘I can’t say that I am forced to 
do this or not to [do] it. I choose freely to do it if I do do it.’ … what 
actually am I saying to myself? Am I saying something about 
scientific law, or about what will probably be found when they 
discover more about the human mind?  203
The above exemplifies Wittgenstein’s opposition to thinking that a ‘very strong sense’ 
of freedom of will necessarily involves making claims about ‘scientific law’ or the 
‘human mind’. The question he asks vis-à-vis the suitability of any scientific 
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interpretation of these words is therefore meant to be rhetorical. Rather than 
constituting a substantive statement, the affirmation expresses a feeling; a feeling that 
coincides with doing ‘something of great consequence’; i.e. it is one of those 
propositions which, in the LFW, Wittgenstein is inclined to say express a feeling, and 
which are generally ‘said with feeling’.  204
 Lewy takes Wittgenstein to be saying that this ‘very strong sense of freedom 
of the will’ thereby provides the justification for thinking ‘I choose freely to do it if I 
do do it’.  This, I suggest, is his reason for asking whether or not ‘the feeling of 205
being free [is] a sufficient ground for saying you are free’.  In responding to this 206
question, however, Wittgenstein seems to anticipate, what I take to be, Strawson’s 
own response to the Systematic Concern. Wittgenstein replies to Lewy’s question by 
asking what ‘feelings’ Lewy is talking about; the implication being that Wittgenstein 
alluded to no such feelings. Wittgenstein qualifies this response by adding that, 
‘instead of these words “He had the feeling” I might just as well say “he had the 
thoughts”.’  In the first instance, Wittgenstein’s response indicates that we needn’t 207
interpret a ‘very strong sense’ of what we might call freedom of will as an expression 
of a background of ‘inner sensation’. Indeed, Wittgenstein is careful, following 
Lewy’s question, to criticise Bishop Barnes’ thinking that ‘constant and inevitable 
experience [e.g. of making conscious decisions] teaches me that I have freedom of 
choice’.   208
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 A second, important upshot of this response is that any such ‘feeling of 
freedom’ need provide us with no more suitable a basis for thinking that we are free 
than would any statement concerning scientific law. Following his exchange with 
Lewy, Wittgenstein points to various cases where an individual’s behaviour 
contradicts what s/he has said; for instance, it is here that Wittgenstein brings up the 
example of a man who makes a resolution to be more charitable and yet throws the 
next person he sees through a window.  The relevance of these examples to a ‘very 209
strong sense’ of freedom of the will can be seen through the same practice-based lens 
that I employed in analysing FR. This becomes evident in the LFW when Lewy 
makes one last attempt to secure an answer from Wittgenstein—‘Suppose I ask: what 
are the grounds for his conviction of being free?’  Here, the emphasis is on there 210
being some ground, any ground, to the conviction. Wittgenstein’s response has a note 
of finality to it. He responds, ‘There are no grounds. And as for feelings, you can 
choose whatever you consider most interesting.’  On Wittgenstein’s view, saying “I 211
choose freely to do it if I do do it” is not necessarily supported by anything beyond 
the phenomena itself—no general, theoretical belief or justification and no special 
feeling of freedom. For this reason, we might as well specify those thoughts and 
feelings that appear to us to be ‘most interesting’.  
 This captures, the sentiment at least, of Strawson’s closing remarks in FR, i.e. 
that our attitudes express, and do not merely exploit, our natures. Wittgenstein’s 
response indicates a certain level of agreement for Strawson’s further claim that, if 
the pessimist wants there to be more to freedom than the expression of a reactive 
 LFW, p. 439. See also, Chapter I, Part Two of this thesis.209
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attitude, then he should look more closely at the attitudes themselves, at the form of 
life of which they are an essential part. By denying that there are grounds for 
believing (or denying) that you are free Wittgenstein also rules out our identifying 
any one kind of explanation as the ground for thinking that you are free, which in turn 
reiterates his opposition to the ‘tendency to explain a phenomenon by one cause’.  212
The central importance of this idea to the LFW cannot be underestimated, and I 
suggest that it is this idea which underlies Wittgenstein’s only avowed aim in the 
LFW ‘to impress upon you that given a certain attitude, you may be, for reasons 
unknown, compelled to look at it a certain way.  By adding that ‘it is one of the 213
most important facts of human life that such impressions sometimes force themselves 
on you’, Wittgenstein evidently wishes to make room for multiple impressions.  For 214
both Wittgenstein and Strawson, therefore, it is wrong to insist upon there being an 
external, ‘rational’ foundation for our thoughts and feelings concerning freedom and 
resentment. But more than this. It is also right that we should allow to be expressed 
more than those attitudes and feelings that might otherwise be given an external, 
‘rational’ foundation.  
 Nevertheless, this shared opposition to imposing only one way of thinking 
also helps to explain why, ultimately, the two come apart. This comes out most 
clearly in the way each thinker responds to the question of whether or not the reactive 
attitudes might, at some future time, come to be repudiated. For Wittgenstein, the 
impressions he speaks of above specifically include the impression ‘that you are not 
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free; or that you are compelled’. In addition to his prior acknowledgements, in LFM 
and the LFW, that we might give up the distinction between free and compelled, this 
last suggests that we might come to do so, not on the basis of a general, theoretical 
belief (e.g. in determinism) but simply by being compelled to look at things a certain 
way, i.e. in accordance with a forceful impression and given a certain, pessimistic 
attitude. With regards his prior acknowledgements in LFM and the LFW, 
Wittgenstein seems already to deny the suggestion that repudiating the reactive 
attitudes is ‘practically inconceivable’.  Moreover, the simultaneous suggestion that 215
this might come about due to an increased awareness of the causes of our actions 
indicates that a general, theoretical belief in determinism has some role to play in 
undermining the reactive attitudes.   216
 In fairness to Strawson, it is not immediately clear as to whether or not he 
takes the practical inconceivability of repudiating the reactive attitudes on the basis of 
a general, theoretical belief in determinism to be a blanket imposition on repudiating 
the reactive attitudes. As well as the possibility of internal redirection, modification 
and change within the framework of attitudes and feelings, Strawson also 
acknowledges the locality and temporality of the attitudes he defends.  Strawson is 217
willing, at least, to concede that the framework itself might change beyond all 
recognition, or at least to some significant degree. However, he denies that anything 
we might call human beings could exist ‘in the absence of any forms of these 
attitudes’.  This last certainly conflicts with Wittgenstein’s claim that, not only 218
 LFM, p. 242.215
 LFW, p. 443; see also LFW, pp. 431, 440.216
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 26.217
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 36.218
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might we come to play the game differently, but that we might stop playing 
altogether.   219
 A more promising way to reconcile the LFW and FR, therefore, would be to 
say that Wittgenstein and Strawson both maintain that ending the game is altogether 
unlikely.  This is not to say that Wittgenstein contradicts Strawson’s opposition to a 220
general, theoretical belief in determinism forming the basis for denying freedom of 
the will. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein evidently denies that this opposition constitutes 
grounds for an optimistic defence of the reactive attitudes, even if such optimism is 
radically modified. Thus, for much the same reason that I said Wittgenstein does not 
defend freedom of the will by opposing incompatibilism, neither can it be said that he 
defends the reactive attitudes by opposing demands for an external, ‘rational’ 
foundation for their practice. As such, it cannot be said that the LFW support 
Strawson’s ‘radically’ modified optimism. 
 The question I wish now to ask is whether, by neither defending nor denying 
freedom of the will (or the reactive attitudes), Wittgenstein is better placed than 
Strawson to incorporate the Systematic Concern. At the very least, it seems as that 
Wittgenstein looks with greater sensitivity upon the criticism that any practice-based 
defence of the reactive attitudes fails to come to terms with the ‘real’ question, i.e. of 
what one ought to say concerning freedom and resentment. This, I suggest, is a direct 
consequence of his remaining alive to the possibility that human beings might one 
day cease to behave reactively towards each other and that such a change can be 
 The difference, I should say, is not simply that Wittgenstein concedes the possibility of forsaking 219
these attitudes altogether. Unlike Strawson, Wittgenstein emphasises the change in relation to changes 
made to the “rules of the game”; as opposed to changes that might or might not be made to human 
nature itself.
 Cf. LFW, p. 430: ‘we may, though it is most misleading and out of the question in fact, forecast a 220
man’s actions’. 
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affected, if only indirectly, by a heightened awareness of the causes of our actions. I 
shall discuss these elements of the LFW in the next chapter. 
 I have shown that, in the way that they anticipate and seek to diffuse ‘the 
Systematic Concern’, Wittgenstein and Strawson remain in close alignment. 
However, what has yet to be considered is a crucial respect in which Strawson’s 
approach diverges from that pursued by Wittgenstein. This divergence emerges most 
clearly in the light of the observation made a moment ago: that a defence of a 
practice-based approach need not equate to a defence of the reactive attitudes. As was 
the case in Chapter One, we need to confront Wittgenstein’s acknowledgement that, 
at some future time, human beings might forsake the reactive attitudes and no longer 
hold each other responsible. Furthermore, Wittgenstein remains sensitive to the way 
in which the pessimist’s position too can express as well as exploit our natures. As 
shall become clearer in the next chapter, this last point renders questionable whether 
Wittgenstein can be said to offer a practice-based defence of the reactive attitudes. 
The question I shall answer in the next chapter is whether or not Wittgenstein thinks 
that non-reactive attitudes, i.e. attitudes towards others which preclude holding each 
other responsible, are also primitively expressed, and can be therefore equally 
expressive of human nature. Importantly, Strawson clearly does not contemplate this 
eventuality.  
 Nevertheless, it is important to note that this does not detract from what I have 
so far established concerning Wittgenstein’s opposition to an incompatibilist or 
pessimistic denial of freedom of the will, i.e. a denial founded on a general theoretical 
belief in determinism. In this respect, as we have emphasised, Wittgenstein’s 
approach is mirrored by Strawson’s own. But as I have also shown, the reason the 
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two come apart is due to the additional steps taken by Wittgenstein that 
simultaneously cast doubt on the extent to which he relies on the practice-based 
approach to the question of the freedom of the will as a defence of the reactive 
attitudes. My forthcoming analysis of these steps will take us up to and beyond 
contemporary discussions of freedom of the will.  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Chapter III 
Non-Reactive Attitudes in Wittgenstein’s 
“Lectures on Freedom of the Will” 
————————————— 
Each of us, in our own personal Factory, may believe we have stumbled down 
one corridor, and that our fate is sealed and certain (dream or nightmare, 
humdrum or bizarre, good or bad), but a word, a glance, a slip—anything can 
change that, alter it entirely, and our marble hall becomes a gutter, or our rat-
maze a golden path. Our destination is the same in the end, but our journey—
part chosen, part determined—is different for us all, and changes even as we 
live and grow.  
 —Iain Banks, The Wasp Factory 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Having established the important ways in which P. F. Strawson’s Freedom & 
Resentment (FR) emulate Wittgenstein’s “Lectures on Freedom of the Will” (LFW), 
my aim now is to clarify the differences in their respective approaches, in particular 
the way that Wittgenstein treats the pessimist’s attitude as equally expressive of 
human nature. I will do so by outlining what I take to be a forceful objection to P. F. 
Strawson’s position that, as I shall argue, Wittgenstein is better placed to respond to. 
The objection comes from Galen Strawson who argues that what is overlooked by 
any practice-based defence of the optimist’s affirmation of our practices of holding 
responsible is the equally natural way in which the pessimist’s denials of 
responsibility come to be expressed.  At first glance, Galen Strawson’s objection 221
does not appear to contradict the approach taken by P. F. Strawson, or those elements 
of the LFW that can be considered practice-based. Instead, the objection broadens the 
framework of attitudes and practices so as to incorporate the pessimist’s, as well as 
the optimist’s, attitudes. As we shall see, however, this broadening of the framework 
leaves open the possibility of a more sustained attack on the justificatory value of the 
practice-based approach, as providing a defence of our practices of holding 
responsible. 
 In the first part of this chapter, I will refine and defend Galen Strawson’s 
objection to P. F. Strawson’s defence of the optimist’s position on the grounds that it 
is equally natural, i.e. no less primitive, to take up a pessimistic, i.e. non-reactive, 
attitude towards oneself and others. I shall then consider the extent to which this 
broadening of the practice-based framework can be considered an objection to any 
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, pp. 85-114.221
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practice-based approach. In Part Two I shall turn to those aspects of the LFW that 
support Galen Strawson’s substantive claim that the pessimist’s attitude too, 
expresses human nature; in particular, Wittgenstein’s references to ‘fatalism’ as a 
‘peculiar’ but eminently human attitude. Having explored these aspects in detail, I 
will conclude that the LFW are not open to the same objection(s) as FR. On the 
contrary, I will show that Wittgenstein offers us an interpretation of the ‘major 
tensions’ of which Galen Strawson speaks that allows us to incorporate them into a 
significant, and more ethically nuanced, understanding of our attitudes to freedom 
and resentment.  
Part One: Galen Strawson and the possibility of 
a global non-reactive attitude 
In “On Freedom & Resentment” Galen Strawson objects to the claim that a 
commitment to the reactive attitudes is the only conceivable outlet for human 
thoughts and feelings concerning freedom of the will. He argues that, by P. F. 
Strawson’s own lights, the pessimist can be equally committed to refusing to hold 
people responsible, and therefore that a denial of freedom of the will can be no less 
expressive of human nature. The crux of Galen Strawson’s objection is that, contrary 
to P. F. Strawson’s Ramified Argument, it is practically conceivable for the pessimist 
to cease behaving reactively towards others and thereby to adopt, what I shall call, a 
global, non-reactive attitude without the necessity of an external, ‘rational’ 
justification. I will say more on this in due course, but by ‘non-reactive’ attitudes I am 
referring to those thoughts and feelings which, rather than bolster a commitment to 
holding others responsible, give rise to a non-committal or detached way of treating 
others. This is not simply a negation of feelings like resentment. The non-reactive 
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attitudes can also be positively expressed, e.g. through pity, and such attitudes can 
take a global form, e.g. someone can express an attitude in line with thinking of 
human beings as essentially frail or wretched. 
 The expression of such attitudes is explicitly ruled out by P. F. Strawson’s 
denial of the practical conceivability of repudiating the reactive attitudes; and 
whatever else the non-reactive attitudes are they do at least negate the reactive. By 
offering a competing account of human nature and human possibilities, Galen 
Strawson outwardly denies naught but this injunction. His objection is not therefore 
merely a reiteration of the Systematic Concern.  No doubts need be raised as to 222
whether Galen Strawson accepts the claim that human beings are primitively 
committed to expressing certain attitudes and feelings, and that it is practically 
inconceivable to imagine forsaking these commitments (whatever they may be) on 
the basis of a general, theoretical belief. What he does dispute, however, is the 
further, substantive claim that what human beings are committed to are a set of 
reactive practices only, e.g. feelings of resentment, gratitude, etc. that have, 
irrespective of their primitive expression, come to be associated with belief in 
freedom of the will.  
 The specific target of Galen Strawson’s criticism can be clarified if we 
distinguish between the following two claims advanced by P. F. Strawson: 
(S1) Human attitudes to freedom and responsibility are expressive of 
human nature and therefore ‘neither call for nor permit external, rational 
justifications.’ 
 Galen Strawson does come close to raising this concern by suggesting that no commitment can fill 222
the ‘lacuna’ in the optimist’s position. This particular argument is not fully realised, but can be 
responded to as before, by pointing out that a practice-based approach need not take the form of a 
naturalistic defence of primitive commitments. Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p. 88.
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(S2) Human nature is evidently such that what is expressed is, at the most 
primitive level, a reactive engagement with other persons. 
These two claims are indeed distinct—accepting S1 does not commit one to S2. S1 
establishes the anti-intellectualist principle that often one can be committed to the 
expression of a certain attitude towards others that is prior to any reflectively 
endorsed belief or opinion about freedom of the will. S2, on the other hand, 
demonstrates the optimistic view that human nature is such that, prior to any 
reflectively endorsed belief, human beings are committed to treating one another 
reactively.  
 An important strand of Galen Strawson’s criticism can concede for the sake of 
argument the truth of S1; the focus is on S2. That is, it is open to him to argue that, if 
S1 commits us to the principle that, prior to a general theoretical belief, we must be 
committed to a certain attitude, then the simplest way to account for the pessimist’s 
own attitude is by way of a similar commitment. This step is explicitly laid out in 
Galen Strawson’s response: 
The fact that the incompatibilist intuition [that determinism is 
incompatible with freedom] has such power for us is as much a natural 
fact about cognitive beings like ourselves as is the fact of our quite 
unreflective commitment to the reactive attitudes.  223
In P. F. Strawson’s view, the strongest evidence in favour of the optimist’s position 
being the ‘right one’ is the optimist’s own primitive reactions, i.e. that these reactions 
do not merely exploit, but also express, the optimist’s nature.  But there is no reason 224
 Ibid.223
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 27.224
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to assume that this is any different in the pessimist’s case where an expression of an 
attitude in accordance with S1 results in a commitment to the non-reactive attitudes. 
According to P. F. Strawson, what may well differentiate the pessimist’s attitude is 
that its expression is premised upon a general, theoretical belief; i.e. the pessimist’s 
attitude may be affected only on the strength of an endorsed opinion or belief about 
freedom of the will. Unlike the reactive attitudes, then, the non-reactive are a 
negation after the fact, i.e. the general fact given with the existence of human society. 
But it remains to be shown that the pessimist’s commitment to the non-reactive 
attitudes is not, as Galen Strawson says, ‘as much a natural fact’ as is a commitment 
to the reactive attitudes. We are obliged, therefore, to consider a contradictory 
substantive claim as an alternative to S2, namely: 
(S3) It is evidently no more natural to express a commitment to 
interpersonal, reactive attitudes than it is to express a commitment to non-
reactive attitudes.  
To determine which of these substantive claims, S2 or S3, is correct, I will first test 
the suitability of S3 as a potential counter argument to both P. F. Strawson’s Quick 
and Ramified arguments. Whilst this will not prove conclusively that S2 is false, it 
will enable me to consider evidence in favour of S3. For my own purposes, I do not 
need to demonstrate that Galen Strawson succeeds in proving the falsity of S2 since 
my aim is to show that, according to Wittgenstein, S3 is true. 
 Regarding P. F. Strawson’s claim that a universal objective attitude is 
‘practically inconceivable’ Galen Strawson is able to offer not one, but two lines of 
response, corresponding to P. F. Strawson's Quick and Ramified arguments 
respectively. In the first instance, it is crucial to explain the difference between what I 
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am calling a global non-reactive attitude and what P. F. Strawson calls a ‘universal 
objective attitude’. The latter is what, in the Quick Argument, P. F. Strawson 
introduces as resulting from the repudiation of the reactive attitudes. He argues that 
since the objective attitude (i.e. treating others as objects of social policy) is, for the 
pessimist, the appropriate attitude to take towards someone who is physically 
determined, and since the pessimist maintains a general, theoretical belief in 
determinism, it follows that a universal objective attitude is the only appropriate 
attitude. A global, non-reactive attitude is really quite different in the first instance 
because a non-reactive attitude can be, like a reactive attitude, primitive and 
unreflective; it is therefore unlike the objective attitude which involves a suspension 
of the reactive attitudes. Secondly, a global attitude is, for both the reactive and non-
reactive attitudes, characteristic of an attitude an individual might adopt towards 
everyone, but not necessarily as one that everyone ought to adopt, e.g. by externally, 
rationally justifying that attitude as appropriate. The difference between these two is 
akin to the difference between an unconditional outpouring of sympathy and an 
endorsement of something like the categorical imperative (to treat others as you 
would like to be treated); i.e. one person can express the former without endorsing the 
latter. In light of the differences between a universal objective attitude and a global, 
non-reactive attitude, the Quick Argument (i.e. that not everyone can be ‘abnormal’) 
cannot but fail to engage with a potentially unreflective commitment to not holding 
others responsible. 
 Turning to the Ramified Argument, P. F. Strawson appears to have a much 
stronger case against a global, non-reactive attitude. His naturalistic claim that it is 
‘practically inconceivable’ for human beings as they are to repudiate the reactive 
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attitudes directly contradicts the claim that we can express a global, non-reactive 
attitude; even if, a temporary or partial suspension of those attitudes can be 
accommodated by his naturalistic claim. To begin with, we might see P. F. Strawson’s 
naturalistic claim as a symptom of his juxtaposition of reactive and objective, i.e. his 
denial of the possibility of our repudiating the reactive attitudes is premised on his 
understanding that which he supposes must replace a global, reactive attitude, viz. a 
universal objective attitude. This amounts to no more than saying that the repudiation 
of any primitive, i.e. natural and unreflective, commitment on the basis of a general 
theoretical belief is ‘practically inconceivable’. We might suppose, then, that P. F. 
Strawson defends S3 all along, or that the two Strawsons can be reconciled to each 
other. The problem with this supposition is that the claim that human beings as they 
are cannot refrain from holding each other responsible rules out both a universal 
objective attitude and a global, non-reactive attitude. Galen Strawson certainly 
presumes that his alternative claim (S3) is inconsistent with P. F. Strawson’s (S2), 
since he evidently entertains the weaker claim that both reactive and non-reactive 
attitudes can be primitive and natural. 
One thing that someone who adopts [P. F. Strawson’s] position may 
simply underestimate, however, is the equal naturalness of the pessimist’s 
position, when they insist that determinism is incompatible with freedom. 
Secure in theoretical indefeasibility, the reconciler may tend to mistake 
for a failure of subtlety in his opponent what is in fact a proper sensitivity 
to the basic power of the incompatibilist intuition that determinism is 
incompatible with freedom.  225
 Ibid.225
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In my view, Galen Strawson’s objection is better formulated as a claim not about the 
power of the pessimist’s theoretical intuitions but about the possibility of there being 
primitive attitudes which, as global, non-reactive attitudes, underwrite the pessimist’s 
theoretical stance. So construed, the criticism appears to have real force.  226
 With regards the second part of the Ramified Argument—that there can be no 
one explanans for the suspension of the reactive attitudes consistent with a general, 
theoretical belief in determinism—it is evident that, here too, Galen Strawson’s 
objection has teeth. He maintains that, not only do (what I am calling) the non-
reactive attitudes not rely on the maintenance of a general, theoretical belief tying 
them all together, but they arise in a similar, even identical, way to the reactive 
attitudes. 
The roots of the incompatibilist intuition lie deep in the very reactive 
attitudes that are invoked in order to undercut it. The reactive attitudes 
enshrine the incompatibilist intuition.  227
Galen Strawson’s own explanation of this statement, whilst brief, suggests that what 
he has in mind is that the reactive attitudes are themselves grounded in an 
understanding of ‘true responsibility’, by which he means the kind of moral 
responsibility that underwrites the reactive attitudes themselves. Were this to be his 
suggestion, the obvious flaw in it would be that, in accordance with S1, the reactive 
attitudes need be no more beholden to a general, theoretical belief in ‘true 
responsibility’ than the non-reactive attitudes need be beholden to a general, 
theoretical belief in determinism. Given his earlier appeal to a more charitable and 
 I return to Galen Strawson’s own motivations towards the end of Part 1 of this chapter.226
 Ibid.227
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subtle interpretation of the pessimist’s attitude, however, it is important not to get 
sidetracked by this issue. By saying that the pessimist’s attitude is ‘enshrined’ in the 
reactive attitudes that are ‘invoked to undercut it’, Galen Strawson already indicates a 
more subtle origin of non-reactive attitudes than a general, theoretical belief in 
determinism.  As was mentioned earlier, it is not implausible to suppose that a 228
global, non-reactive attitude might result either i) from a profound sense of pity for 
the weaknesses of character that human beings, according to their nature, are 
susceptible to, or ii) from a fatigue brought about by a kind of over-exposure to 
reactive feeling. i) is perhaps more understandable than ii)—even if it is not a 
successful excuse for misbehaviour, we understand what it means to say, “He’s only 
human”. I am aware that neither of these strategic steps are explicitly taken by Galen 
Strawson, and yet either might suggest itself as a way of articulating a more 
charitable and subtle interpretation of the pessimist’s attitude that is also indicative of 
how the non-reactive attitudes might ‘enshrine’ the reactive.  I will say more on this 229
later since, whether or not i) and ii) fit in with Galen Strawson’s citing the reactive 
attitudes as a potential source for the non-reactive, both are influential in the LFW. 
 By interrupting both the Quick and Ramified arguments, Galen Strawson also 
casts doubt on P. F. Strawson’s reason(s) for favouring the reactive attitudes. One of 
these is that the pessimist, unlike the optimist, actively undermines an existing set of 
practices. This is similar to the compatibilist’s assumption that the ‘burden of proof’ 
rests with the incompatibilist, i.e. to prove conclusively that we lack freedom. It is 
also to think on the pessimist as, in some way, the antagonist in the debate, as 
 Ibid.228
 Ibid.229
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threatening the status quo of the established, and entirely reactive, practices. In its 
simplest form, Galen Strawson’s response on behalf of the pessimist is an objection to 
this unguarded and undefended assumption. Far from presenting a threat to the 
existing status quo, the ‘equal naturalness’ of the non-reactive attitudes demonstrates 
either that the status quo is as much in their favour as the optimist’s or else that no 
status quo exists. Given what Galen Strawson says elsewhere, the suspicion must be 
that he favours the latter.  
 It is crucial to realise that what Galen Strawson establishes, first and foremost, 
is not what human beings do by default but rather that human beings can, 
spontaneously and non-reflectively, express non-reactive attitudes. A defence of S3, 
for instance, does not imply that human beings are committed to expressing non-
reactive attitude but that, given the right circumstances, anyone, or indeed everyone, 
is capable of adopting a global, non-reactive attitude. For Galen Strawson, that these 
circumstances already pertain in the pessimist’s case can be taken as conclusive 
evidence that anyone can adopt such an attitude and, as we know, he also argues 
elsewhere that everyone ought to adopt a global, non-reactive attitude (or something 
like it). We also know, or have strong cause to believe, that Wittgenstein also 
envisages a time when all people might ‘give up’ the distinction between freedom and 
compulsion and cease holding people responsible. 
The possibility of a global, non-reactive attitude 
Despite his agreement with Wittgenstein that people may ‘give up’ the reactive 
attitudes, Galen Strawson accepts that adopting a global, non-reactive attitude is a 
feat which, for the vast majority of human beings, would be practically inconceivable. 
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Perhaps because of this, the only example he gives of a global, non-reactive attitude 
in practice refers to a small, and devout, group of individuals. 
Consider certain Buddhist philosophers who argue, on a variety of 
metaphysical grounds, that our natural notion of the persisting individual 
self is a delusion. Having reached this conclusion, they set themselves a 
task: that of overcoming the delusion.  230
The example is premised on an understanding of the Buddhist doctrine of 
satkāyadrsti—the denial of self through recognising the self as delusion—which 
presumably he thinks bears comparison with the pessimist’s ‘intuition’. In truth, the 
denial of self provides a more than suitable comparison for the pessimist’s 
repudiation of the reactive attitudes; at least part of what is involved in overcoming 
the self is relinquishing one’s sense of personal responsibility as well as any 
expectation one might have for being treated reactively. As such, it is clear that the 
‘task’ in each case is similar: i.e. to overcome a primitive commitment to, amongst 
other things, the reactive attitudes.  
 For Galen Strawson, there is perhaps a further similarity between the two 
tasks that relates to how the monks’ overcome their commitment to self, by turning 
inward. This connects with the priority he gives to the commitment to the self-
reactive attitudes, as opposed to any commitment to the framework of attitudes and 
feelings common to the moral community at large—something he thinks P. F. 
Strawson underestimates.  This is another way in which Galen Strawson’s focus on 231
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p.111.230
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, pp. 85, 86, & 94-97. A second line of Galen 231
Strawson's argument is that P. F. Strawson ‘mislocate[s] the true centre of our commitment in our inter-
personal rather than in our self-regarding attitudes’.
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‘true responsibility’ ceases to be a question of a general, theoretical belief, but rather 
a matter of feeling the reactivity of one’s own actions. By reflecting on the monks’ 
overcoming of self, we are reminded forcibly of the natural way in which one already, 
i.e. primitively, thinks of oneself as a self. That we would not call this non-reflective 
commitment to self-hood a belief in ‘true self’ only serves to bolster my interpretation 
of his references to ‘true responsibility’ as implying nothing more nor less than a 
primitive commitment to the reactive attitudes, in particular self-reactive attitudes. 
This is the more important point from Galen Strawson’s perspective: that by 
associating the pessimist’s task with the monks’ self-directed task, we avoid the 
mistake, made by P. F. Strawson, of underestimating the importance of the self-
reactive attitudes. This is less of a motif in the LFW, but it will be worth considering 
this point from Wittgenstein’s perspective in the next chapter. 
 But this raises an obvious initial difficulty in taking the monks’ denial of self 
as an instantiation of the pessimist’s similarly motivated denial of responsibility. It 
may appear that Galen Strawson has inadvertently undermined his appeal to the 
‘equal naturalness’ of the pessimist’s attitude by insinuating that, like Buddhist 
philosophers, philosophers in general have a rationally motivated duty to take steps in 
overcoming the non-reactive attitudes. This would imply, not only that the rational 
motivation (external, ‘rational’ justification) is once more key, but also that it is only 
through the denial of S1 that S3 can be achieved. Moreover, even were we to forgo 
acceptance of S1, it is not clear that the example provides sufficient evidence for a 
denial of S2 since what the monks’ overcome is a primitive commitment to the 
reactive attitudes; if anything, this would prove S2 correct by rendering a 
commitment to the non-reactive attitudes posterior and reflective.  
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 In fact, Galen Strawson does not overlook these dangers and emphasises that 
‘one cannot simply abolish one’s sense of individuality, by some sort of effortless, 
rationally motivated, self-directed intellectual fiat’.  In acknowledging that the 232
monks too are beholden to this as much as anyone, Galen Strawson looks elsewhere 
for an explanation of the monks’ practiced denial of self. By focusing instead upon 
the monks’ practice of meditation he thinks he can show that, whilst the ‘adoption of 
the practice of meditation was rational…, it is now (practically speaking) non-
rational, and it is so as a result of that practice’.   233
 It might still be felt, wrongly as I shall argue, that since the practice was 
rational to begin with, it cannot now be said to be entirely primitive or natural. This is 
wrong for the reason that the rationality in question need not be the monks’ own, or if 
it is (or rather was), then this was a pre-meditative state.  Saying that the ‘practice 234
of meditation was rational’ can be taken literally to mean that, when the practice was 
first adopted, it may have been because the monks thought they had good reasons to 
do so, but that now we just point to their practice of meditation. Galen Strawson can 
be open about the rational basis for the monks’ practice of meditation, because he 
wants to hold onto the idea that the pessimist, like P. F. Strawson’s optimist, can have 
his position sufficiently, that is to say ‘radically’, modified. That is, P. F. Strawson 
says the optimist holds people responsible by default, but goes wrong in seeking to 
legitimise that behaviour via an ‘external, rational justification’. Conversely, the 
pessimist, whom he says upholds an ‘external, rational justification’ for not holding 
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p.111.232
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p.112.233
 I am aware that the term ‘own’ is problematic in this context, but in any case I use it here to signify 234
their pre-meditative, i.e. rational, state.
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people responsible, might instead, on Galen Strawson’s view, forsake the rational 
motivation but keep the practice.  
 Rather than a rational motivation, it is in-keeping with a practice-based 
approach, as well as S1, that the non-reactive attitudes should arise unreflectively; 
e.g. through a fatigue resulting from overexposure to the reactive attitudes. This 
possibility, more than any ‘intuition’, makes up for any possible ‘failure of subtlety’ 
in Galen Strawson’s account of the pessimist’s position. That is, whether through 
fatigue or some equally unreflective nullification of the reactive attitudes, it can be 
accepted that a lack of commitment to the reactive attitudes can be considered, 
minimally at least, as a commitment to non-reactivity; we can simplify this by saying 
that someone must either be committed to interpersonal reactive attitudes or not. This 
might be taken to imply an absurdity. For example, I do not express reactive attitudes 
while sleeping, but then neither am I expressing a non-reactive attitude. However, I 
am not saying that all human behaviour is either reactive or non-reactive, merely that 
someone must either hold or not hold people responsible for their actions. In fact, the 
suggestion of the absurdity is itself evidence that not expressing the reactive attitudes 
is a necessary requirement for expressing a non-reactive attitude; it is just not a 
sufficient requirement for doing so.  
 It is worth remembering that when Wittgenstein says, with regards to cases 
where one can say either “the man is responsible” or “the man is not responsible”, 
that ‘In this case, an argument is alright if it converts you’ he means that whether 
someone defends or denies freedom of the will is a function of whether or not they 
hold people responsible.  Furthermore, he means that one can fail to be ‘converted’ 235
 LFW, p. 437.235
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by either being unwilling or unable to ‘convert’. This explains why Galen Strawson 
need not argue in favour of a commitment to non-reactivity, i.e. a failure to be 
‘converted’ is enough. In order to invalidate S2 and advance S3 all he need do is 
demonstrate that an individual need not be committed to expressing the reactive 
attitudes, i.e. that there are equally primitive attitudes and feelings that do not commit 
someone to holding people responsible. For this reason, the intimation that non-
reactivity is ‘enshrined’ within—i.e. might primitively, and naturally, arise together 
with—the reactive attitudes is worthy of serious consideration.  I shall return to this 236
point later, and in connection with the LFW. 
 Another way in which Galen Strawson ingratiates the non-reactive attitudes 
into P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes is by arguing that the pessimist’s 
‘notion of true responsibility comes easily to the non-philosophising mind, and is not 
found only in (or behind) what Strawson calls the ‘panicky metaphysics’ of 
philosopher libertarians.’  To begin with, this demonstrates clear opposition, on 237
Galen Strawson’s part, to thinking of the pessimist’s attitude in terms of the ‘cool’ and 
‘contemporary’ style of philosophy that P. F. Strawson argued leads philosophers to 
forget ‘what it is actually like to be involved in ordinary interpersonal 
relationships’.  Furthermore, it may well be these aspects of the pessimist’s attitude 238
that are overlooked by P. F. Strawson, and which may therefore lead him to 
incorrectly associate the pessimist’s attitude solely with objectivity. 
 This leads me back to Galen Strawson’s suggestion that non-reactivity is not 
so much a suspension of reactivity, so much as ‘enshrined’ therein. Another way to 
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p. 88.236
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couch this is to say that, whereas resentment, gratitude, praise and blame, etc. 
correspond to the expression of the reactive attitude, pity, benevolence, humility, etc. 
correspond to the expression of a non-reactive attitude. The former group of feelings 
are typified by an interpersonal engagement with others, whilst the latter group 
indicate an estrangement or detachment with regards the actions or attitudes of others. 
Crucially, taking pity on someone (or everyone) in response to a perceived frailty or 
weakness is not, initially at least, a cool or contemporary way to treat others; even if 
it involves a similar degree of detachment seen in the utilisation of the objective 
attitude. The suggestion here is that resentment, gratitude, praise and blame, etc. can, 
through fatigue of these emotions, ‘spill over’ or ‘lapse’ into non-reactivity; such an 
outpouring of feeling need not conflict with the Quick or Ramified arguments since it 
is neither a universal attitude—i.e. one can feel pity without expecting others to do so
—nor does it constitute a single explanans for not holding people responsible—i.e. 
even if someone were to pity another person based on their frailty as a human being, 
this would not imply that this is their sole reason for pitying other people.   239
 This last, i.e. an appreciation of the frailty of human beings generally indicates 
one way in which non-reactivity might ‘come easily to the non-philosophising 
mind’.  This is important since, Galen Strawson admits, that in his own example of 240
the monks’ denial of self, their behaviour is ‘certainly inhuman, in some way’.  He 241
means by this merely that the denial of self would, for most human beings, be 
 Neither can frailty be attributed to a single human trait whether it is being egocentric, short-sighted, 239
or determined by natural laws.
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p. 88.240
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‘practically inconceivable’.  What would be more conceivable would be an account 242
of the monks’ denial of self as owing to a primitive attitude or feeling; e.g. the denial 
of self may be a reaction, like shutting one’s eyes in fear, to the responsibility, felt as 
a burden, of being absolutely responsible for one’s own actions.  This is just more 243
grist to Galen Strawson’s mill, however, and I need not speculate about which 
specific feelings or attitudes give rise to any specific course of action. The point is 
that the mere possibility of this range of expression demonstrates the falsity of S2. 
Accepting this possibility and the further truth of S3, requires only that we agree with 
the following: that the framework of attitudes and feelings, whether reactive or non-
reactive, need not result in holding people responsible. That is, it cannot be the claim 
of anyone, who is not unduly biased in favour of reactivity, that these attitudes and 
feelings necessarily perpetuate holding people responsible.  
 Whatever scope remains for human beings to express other attitudes must, 
therefore, fall outside the scope of the reactive and inevitably fall into the non-
reactive. Again, this does not mean that all human attitude and feeling is either 
reactive or non-reactive, merely that, in so far as the reactive attitudes correspond 
with a particular ‘way of acting’, it is a way of acting that human beings need not be 
committed to. Accepting this, and hence accepting the truth of S3 is not the end, 
either for myself or for Galen Strawson. With regards the latter’s account of the 
pessimist’s equally natural attitude there is one final aspect that must be taken into 
account. 
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 12.242
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Galen Strawson on the existence of ‘major tensions’ 
In setting out to demonstrate the truth of S3, I have so far avoided drawing attention 
to Galen Strawson’s ‘more general point’: that this claim threatens to overturn the 
claim made in S1. This ‘more general point’ could not be made earlier since, in order 
to demonstrate the truth of S3, it was necessary to presuppose the truth of P. F. 
Strawson’s principle S1. With this now clearly demonstrated, we are in a position to 
reflect on Galen Strawson’s real reason for arguing this point. 
A more general point is this. There appear to be powerful lines of 
reasoning available, within what Strawson calls our ‘general framework’ 
of attitudes and ideas, which question the correctness of the framework—
or of paramount aspects of it—from within. There are, to say the least, 
some major tensions in it.  244
The ‘more general point’, then, is this: that any view that takes account of the truth of 
S3, and therefore supports a practice-based approach broad enough to incorporate 
both the reactive and non-reactive attitudes, must thereby incorporate tensions 
between those attitudes. At their highest point these tensions, he says, ‘question the 
correctness of the framework’. At the least, these tensions threaten ‘paramount 
aspects of it’—and make the expression of either attitude questionable, even 
dubious.  It is not just that questioning the framework, to which we are primitively 245
committed, from within appears to be self-contradictory; i.e. that we cannot ‘question 
the correctness of the framework’ since it is from within the framework that such 
questions arise. It is rather that to ‘question the correctness of the framework’ as a 
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p.112.244
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whole, yet from within, is to sacrifice the accusation of self-contradiction levelled at 
P. F. Strawson. The strength of Galen Strawson’s objection derives, at least in part, 
from its acceptance of P. F. Strawson’s methodology, including his claim that 
‘questions of justification are internal to the structure or relate to modifications 
internal to it’.  It is the internal modifications, and not the internal questions that 246
press in upon this ‘more general point’, narrowing its focus and dulling its point.  
 Yet the weaker ‘more general point’—i.e. that these inherent tensions threaten 
‘paramount aspects’ of the framework—can be objected to on similar grounds. As the 
above shows, P. F. Strawson already acknowledges the possibility of ‘internal 
modification, redirection and change’, which may or may not include the 
modification of ‘paramount aspects’ of the framework.  In either case, it is not clear 247
that he fails to anticipate this objection. What he does not, and indeed cannot, 
anticipate is the broader framework upon which this internal modification appears to 
be based. It is this broadening of the framework, and the ‘major tensions’ that result, 
that connects both the stronger and the weaker points being made. It is also these 
tensions which most threaten P. F. Strawson’s position, in particular his conclusion 
that a ‘radically’ modified optimism is the ‘correct’ position. As Galen Strawson 
demonstrates, not only can we reach a similar conclusion vis-à-vis the pessimist’s 
position (provided it too is ‘radically’ modified), but since both the optimist and the 
pessimist are secured in ‘theoretical indefeasibility,’ a lasting commitment to either 
attitude is rendered, not just indefeasible, but ‘practically inconceivable’ as well.  248
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 25.246
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Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that either attitude is mutable, and hence 
practically untenable. It is this mutability that leads to the tensions described. 
 What the objection demonstrates is that, on P. F. Strawson’s account, an 
individual can never be certain of whether or not to hold someone responsible since 
whichever way s/he is committed, s/he could be committed otherwise. Galen 
Strawson seems, in part, to be objecting that it is impractical to imagine someone 
taking up two contradictory attitudes or ways of acting simultaneously, e.g. both 
holding and refusing to hold people responsible. Even if the expression of the 
reactive and non-reactive attitudes is not simultaneous, there is no means of resolving 
the tensions that must exist between two equally natural, but directly contradictory, 
attitudes; that is perhaps instead experienced as an endless vacillation between the 
two viewpoints. In any case, he says, ‘Our commitments are complex, and 
conflict’.  What is perhaps more damaging is that these tensions are there ‘in the 249
beginning’—they are a primitive expression of human nature.  There is therefore no 250
possible way to resolve the tensions without exploiting, as opposed to expressing, 
one’s nature. This is what leads Galen Strawson to conclude that, at a methodological 
level, the practice-based approach of FR leaves us, at best, uncertain and, at worst, 
hopelessly confused about how to treat others.  
 In what follows I shall argue that, whilst these ‘major tensions’ do indeed 
undermine P. F. Strawson’s defence of a modified optimism, the same need not be 
said of Wittgenstein’s position in the LFW. Like Galen Strawson, Wittgenstein readily 
accepts the possibility of one’s primitively expressing a non-reactive, pessimistic 
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p. 89.249
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world-view. Moreover, he is well aware of the tensions arising from the defence of a 
framework of attitudes and feelings that incorporates both reactive and non-reactive 
attitudes. Yet, his acknowledgement of the tensions is accompanied by a 
comprehensive account of how these tensions come about; something that is 
conspicuously absent from Galen Strawson’s own account. It is notable that the only 
concrete example of non-reactive attitudes to come from him so far is less preferable 
to one which I myself have suggested, i.e. a feeling of pity for the frailty of human 
beings generally. As we shall see, this suggestion gains added veracity from a reading 
of the LFW, wherein Wittgenstein shows due deference to the fact that holding people 
responsible, or not doing so, can be ‘the result of a struggle’.  This he says in light 251
of the fact that life itself is precarious, and that human beings are susceptible to 
falling, in an ethical sense, through no fault of their own. Accepting these tensions, 
then, may well be a means of greater understanding concerning, not just the 
pessimist’s attitude, but the optimist’s as well.  
Part Two: Wittgenstein’s Broader Framework of 
Attitudes 
In light of the success Galen Strawson has in giving equal priority to the non-reactive 
attitudes, my aim now is to establish Wittgenstein’s defence of the same. I will argue 
that Wittgenstein is not susceptible to the same challenge as P. F. Strawson because he 
is willing and able to concede the possibility of a global, non-reactive attitude. 
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s defence of the equally natural way in which both a 
global, reactive attitude and a global, non-reactive attitude are expressed is due to his 
defending a broader framework than either P. F. Strawson or Galen Strawson. 
 LFW, p. 439.251
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Moreover, by giving a phenomenological description of the optimist’s/pessimist’s 
different ways of looking at things, Wittgenstein is able to give a more complete 
description of the ‘major tensions’ that Galen Strawson has said exist between them. 
Far from undermining the defence of a broader framework of reactive and non-
reactive attitudes, however, I will consider the suggestion, implicit in the LFW, that 
the tensions are essential to the expression of any attitude.  
 There is strong evidence in favour of thinking that Wittgenstein supports the 
claim made in S3: that a global, reactive attitude and a global, non-reactive attitude 
are equally natural. This evidence comes, not from the LFW, but from a comparable 
remark written less than a decade later, in 1947.  252
Life is like a path along a mountain ridge; to left and right are slippery 
slopes down which you slide without being able to stop yourself, in one 
direction or the other. I keep seeing people slip like this and I say “How 
could a man help himself in such a situation!” And that is what ‘denying 
free will’ comes to. That is the attitude expressed in this “belief”. But it is 
not a scientific belief and has nothing to do with scientific convictions. 
Denying responsibility is not holding people responsible.  253
This remark is central to Wittgenstein’s recognition, not just of the possibility of a 
global, non-reactive attitude, but also to his own practice-based approach more 
generally. I shall expand on my reasons for thinking this as we progress, but in the 
first instance I will limit my focus to Wittgenstein’s recognition of the possibility of 
what I am calling, a global, non-reactive attitude. It is this attitude which, I contend, 
 See, fn. 3 of this thesis. 252
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distinguishes Wittgenstein’s approach from P. F. Strawson’s. The view Wittgenstein 
embodies is that ‘denying free will’ is above all else a certain way of acting, a certain 
practice—‘not holding people responsible’. This view is entirely consistent with my 
earlier account of the similarities between Wittgenstein’s and P. F. Strawson’s 
respective accounts since all that is being added to this account is the further claim 
that it need be no less expressive of human nature to repudiate the reactive attitudes.  
 To begin with, it may not be clear at first glance that the embodied view 
sketched above constitutes a defence of a global, non-reactive attitude. By speaking 
of certain situations—“How could a man help himself in such a situation!”—
Wittgenstein seems to be referring to specific instances of his own non-reactivity. 
That he keeps ‘seeing people slip like this’ merely contributes to the idea that people 
do not always slip, i.e. that he is simply describing a reaction to those particular 
‘circumstances by which people are defeated’.  And yet, his saying that the attitude 254
expressed by this reaction ‘is not a scientific belief and has nothing to do with 
scientific convictions’ might be taken to suggest that his own non-reactive attitude 
might otherwise be mistaken for the theoretical views held by incompatibilists/
pessimists. That is, we are evidently meant to take it that we are dealing with the 
expression of an ‘attitude’ that can be mistaken for a ‘scientific belief’, e.g. in 
determinism.  However, Wittgenstein also argues, as P. F. Strawson does, that 255
‘denying free will’ is not a hypothesis, and therefore that it is not a hypothesis that 
 Rush Rhees, who may or may not have attended the LFW, but who was nonetheless influenced by 254
discussions he had with Wittgenstein on this topic, gives an account of just such a view in precisely 
these terms. Rhees 1997, p. 149. 
 The use of scare quotes around the word “belief” is yet a further indication that Wittgenstein thinks 255
the pessimistic denial in question is something other than a general, theoretical belief.
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can be universalised.  For this reason, we need not assume, from the existence of 256
such an attitude, that all people slip in this way. 
 Despite, or rather in light of, the above arguments against taking the above 
denial to be constitutive of a universal denial of free will, it remains a possibility that 
‘Denying responsibility [by] not holding people responsible’ might still involve 
denying responsibility globally. I am not denying that Wittgenstein is, in his own 
case, describing specific instances of non-reactivity. The question is rather whether or 
not, in words I used in the preceding chapter, we might “scale up” these specific 
instances Wittgenstein is describing so that they are seen to be constitutive of a 
person’s world-view (Weltbild), i.e. a view which inclines one to look at ‘a given case 
differently’ but which nevertheless conveys one’s view of “it all”.  Certainly 257
nothing prevents a person from maintaining the non-reactive towards every other 
person; i.e. it is a view that a person can maintain towards everyone without it being 
seen as a view that everyone must adhere to.  That is, P. F. Strawson’s Quick and 258
Ramified arguments against scaling up the objective attitude do not apply if we 
consider the attitude Wittgenstein is describing to be constitutive of non-reactivity—
and not objectivity. That is, the non-reactive attitudes skirt the Quick and Ramified 
arguments against a universal objective attitude by corresponding more closely to the 
reactive attitudes inasmuch as they might provide a way of acting in the vast majority 
 This interpretation is corroborated by Wittgenstein’s (CV, p. 63.) use of scare quotes around the 256
word “belief”; the insinuation is that what is often worked up into a system of belief is, on the contrary, 
simply part of the framework of human attitudes and feelings.
 Cf. Z, §461. 257
 It worth noting a parallel with the asymmetry between a hard determinist’s belief that it is mistaken 258
to hold anyone responsible, and a soft-determinist’s belief that a person can be held responsible. I 
noted this asymmetry in Part One of this chapter. We can say that a global, non-reactive attitude differs 
from the hard determinist’s belief in the same way, i.e. it is not contradictory for an individual who is, 
on the whole, pitying to, at some point, hold someone responsible. 
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of cases. That is, when Wittgenstein says in the LFW that ‘propositions of which one 
is inclined to say that they express feeling are generally said with feeling’, he is not 
limiting the description to reactive statements.  He is referring equally to 259
propositions such as ‘How could a man help himself in such a situation!’  That is, 260
provided both kinds of statement are ‘said with feeling’, it can be understood that 
they are, in fact, the same kind of statement.  
 This is not to say that statements of this kind are, in all cases, attributed to a 
particular ‘feeling’. Whilst it may be that sometimes one’s attitudes concerning 
freedom of the will can be explained by reference to a feeling, such attitudes are not 
just feelings, they are actions, e.g. holding (or refusing to hold) people responsible. 
The fact that these statements are sometimes ‘said with feeling’ can be adduced 
further to explain what Wittgenstein means when he says that ‘these statements are 
not used as scientific statements at all, and no discovery in science would influence 
such a statement.’  That is, the non-scientific character of propositions that ‘express 261
feeling’ (and not how often they are expressed) is what serves to distinguish a global, 
non-reactive attitude from a theoretical belief in determinism or from the defence of 
incompatibilism. Wittgenstein at no point rescinds his theoretical opposition to 
incompatibilism, but neither does he make a further theoretical claim, e.g. that, 
without exception, (not) holding people responsible expresses a particular feeling. At 
most, we can take it that ‘not holding people responsible’ need be a no less primitive 
practice than holding people responsible.  
 LFW, p. 441.259
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 What ultimately explains this equally natural expression of feeling is that both 
attitudes belong to the same framework of attitudes. For this reason, we might 
reconsider Wittgenstein’s statement—that he is neither defending nor denying 
freedom of the will —as being in favour of the potential to either defend or deny 262
freedom of the will. That is, whilst he remains opposed to any theoretical defence or 
denial of responsibility—i.e. on the basis of a general, theoretical belief—practically 
speaking, he makes no declaration concerning the range of feeling that is to be 
considered expressive of human nature.  
 At the same time, the non-reactive attitude described above differs from the 
mere negation, or non-expression, of the reactive attitudes. This was a criticism I 
levelled at Galen Strawson’s example of the Buddhist monks who more accurately 
represented what it would be like to suppress, rather than express, an attitude; or else 
the monks resent what it is to express an indifferent attitude. For the same reason, as I 
have said, a person can be said to be ‘not holding people responsible’ without their 
‘denying free will’, e.g. whilst asleep I am ‘not holding people responsible’ and yet it 
is absurd to suggest that I am also ‘denying free will’. This is clearly different from 
the description Wittgenstein offers of his own attitude towards people: as susceptible 
to ‘falling’ or as ‘helpless’. Saying ‘How could a man help himself in such a 
situation!’ is clearly a heartfelt expression of pity or sympathy for the one who has 
‘fallen’. That the upshot of this expression of pity is that one ceases to express other 
kinds of attitudes towards that person is altogether innocuous; in so far as the 
expression of almost any attitude can be accounted for in terms of the negation of its 
opposite. For instance, against a feeling of pitiless resentment, can be juxtaposed a 
 LFW, p. 436.262
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feeling of unresentful, pitying, forbearance, etc.  It is a simple move to make, 263
therefore, to subsume the non-expression of an attitude or an expression of non-
feeling under the blanket term of a non-reactive attitude; an attitude that is still 
expressive of human feelings including, but not limited to, feelings of pity.  
 Problems arise for Wittgenstein only when we, as it were, introduce into this 
broader framework of attitudes the ‘major tensions’ to which Galen Strawson refers. 
By ‘introduce’ I do not mean that the tensions are not already part of this broader 
framework; neither, as we shall see, is Wittgenstein unaware of this fact. On the 
contrary, alongside the equal priority given to reactive and non-reactive statements, 
he gives an account of the manifest ways in which scientific discoveries indirectly 
influence the expression of these attitudes, i.e. incline one towards denying freedom 
of the will by not holding people responsible. Before I consider what impact this has 
on the broader framework of attitudes, it is necessary to understand how this 
influence is made manifest.  
The indirect role scientific discoveries play in influencing a global, non-reactive 
attitude 
On two subsequent occasions in the LFW, Wittgenstein qualifies his claim that 
statements concerning responsibility ‘are not used as scientific statements at all’ by 
reflecting that ‘this is not quite true’.  264
 It is noteworthy that P. F. Strawson makes no mention of pity in giving an account of the reactive 263
attitudes, or indeed in giving an account of the objective attitude.
 LFW, pp. 440-441.264
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What I mean is: we couldn’t say now ‘if they discover so and so, then I’ll 
say I am free’. This is not to say that scientific discoveries have no 
influence on statements of this sort. 
Scientific discoveries partly spring from the direction of attention of lots 
of people, and partly influence the direction of attention.  265
The above qualification is not a retraction of his arguments against incompatibilism 
since Wittgenstein maintains his opposition to thinking that any statement concerning 
responsibility must follow from any particular discovery, i.e. there is no circumstance 
in which freedom of the will could be either proven or disproven. What the 
qualification in fact concedes is that a change in attitude (e.g. no longer holding 
people responsible) can result indirectly from a change in the ‘direction of attention 
of a lot of people’. This is not to suggest that it is only through prolonged or repeated 
exposure to scientific discoveries that one gains a scientistic outlook. 
 For this and other reasons, we must resist the temptation to associate this 
remark too closely with Wittgenstein’s now famous assertion in the Blue Book that 
‘philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes’.  This is not 266
simply because Wittgenstein would likely agree with Galen Strawson that pessimistic 
thoughts ‘come easily to the non-philosophising mind’.  On the contrary, 267
Wittgenstein states in the LFW that it is a ‘fact of psychology’ that people (generally) 
are inclined to think that you can’t be held responsible for one’s actions if those 
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actions follow natural laws.  Nevertheless, that Wittgenstein thinks this inclination 268
has an adverse influence on philosophers (if indeed he does think this) in no way 
implies that the influence is adverse in the case of non-philosophers. For instance, 
Carl Elliott infers that, since ‘for Wittgenstein, philosophical confusion is not 
something that afflicts only philosophers’, that the LFW are therefore part of a more 
general attempt to prevent ‘the method of science’ from getting before everyone’s 
eyes.  The problem remains a ‘philosophical disease’, but one affecting everyone. 269
 Elliott is mistaken if he assumes that Wittgenstein treats philosophers and 
non-philosophers alike in this regard. That is, we can interpret his warning to 
philosophers (if that is what it is) as a specific requirement to recognise that there are 
different ways of looking at things, e.g. that both the reactive and non-reactive 
attitudes are equally natural. That is, constantly seeing ‘the method of science’ before 
one’s eyes would be objectionable for the philosopher, according to Wittgenstein, 
because it prohibits, or at least hinders, a full and complete description of all points of 
view. The same requirement does not impose itself on the ‘direction of attention of a 
lot of people’, where there is (currently) no requirement to recognise different 
viewpoints.   270
 Moreover, were this requirement to apply specifically to philosophers it would 
be further evidence in favour of presuming Wittgenstein’s support of Galen 
Strawson’s objection to P. F. Strawson’s defence of a suitably modified optimism. On 
these terms, it would be wrong for philosophers to presume, as P. F. Strawson and 
 LFW, p. 433.268
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Elliott both seem to, that we must employ the ‘method of science’ only in exceptional 
cases.  I shall say more on this in the next chapter but, presumably, the same 271
objection can then be adduced in support of the claim that Wittgenstein has no 
objection to scientific discoveries directing the ‘attention of a lot of people’ provided 
i) there is no specific requirement on those people to go beyond a scientific way of 
looking at things and that, ii) those people do not seek an external, rational 
justification and thereby seek to directly influence the ‘direction of attention’ of 
everyone. 
 A further reason not to associate Wittgenstein’s defence of a global, non-
reactive attitude with seeing ‘the method of science’ before one’s eyes, is that it is not 
only scientific discoveries that influence the ‘direction of attention of a lot of 
people’.  Wittgenstein’s analysis includes economic, historical and statistical 272
discoveries, e.g. ‘What the newspapers now say is nothing at all. It is the economic 
condition of the people which is important’, as well as observations of patterns of 
behaviour, e.g. ‘[c]old nearly always produces a reaction of wanting to get warm’.  273
By offering such examples Wittgenstein is not simply reiterating that there is a 
‘tendency to explain a phenomenon by one cause.’  Although this is the purpose of 274
his saying that it is ‘very natural to think that all explanations should be given like 
economic explanations of historical states of affairs’.  More importantly, he is 275
describing a tendency to think that a particular discovery has ‘explained 
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everything’.  As was clearly demonstrated in my first chapter, Wittgenstein’s typical 276
refrain to those with this tendency is to deny that there is any good reason (i.e. 
external, rational justification) for thinking this way. For instance, he dispels the 
illusion that everything is explained by pointing out that ‘all that you have done is get 
hold of an explanation which may not have explained anything at all’.   277
 By saying that, in getting hold of a particular explanation, you ‘may not have 
explained anything at all’, Wittgenstein is not downplaying the significance of these 
discoveries. On the contrary, it is discoveries just like these which incline even 
Wittgenstein to feel that ‘life is like a path along a mountain ridge’.  At the same 278
time, however, Wittgenstein denies that these discoveries justify feeling this way. It is 
this subtlety that escapes Lewy when he asks Wittgenstein whether or not ‘the feeling 
of freedom’ is ‘a sufficient ground for saying you are free’.  Wittgenstein’s response279
—that ‘There are no grounds. And as for feelings, you can choose whatever you 
consider most interesting’—indicates that, whilst these discoveries are not grounds 
for ‘denying free will’, they do express feelings that might otherwise be overlooked 
or else attributed to a general, theoretical belief, e.g. in determinism. I should say that, 
for Wittgenstein, by no longer thinking of the feelings as grounds the philosopher, in 
particular, opens up to the full range of feelings that can be expressed. It is wrong, 
then, to impose restrictions on the range of ‘interesting’ feelings that might otherwise 
be expressed. 
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 Having ruled out one mistaken way of thinking about the indirect role 
(scientific) discoveries play in repudiating the reactive attitudes, I must now do more 
to clarify the partial role scientific discoveries play in influencing, what Wittgenstein 
calls, the ‘direction of attention’ of lots of people. I will do so now through several 
related remarks from a series of Wittgenstein’s notes entitled “Cause & Effect: 
Intuitive Awareness” (CE).  As with other sources I have made use of in carrying 280
out a comparative analysis of the LFW, the notes were written around the same time 
as the LFW. The main reason for this comparative analysis, however, is that in the 
LFW we get only a very brief account of the pessimist’s ‘way of acting’, e.g. ‘looking 
for the cause’, and we understand even less about how this way of acting contributes 
to not holding people responsible.  The closest we have come to an analysis of the 281
different ways that optimists and pessimists act is Wittgenstein’s analogy of the 
Driverless Car; i.e. the pessimist resembles someone who might go on looking for a 
regularity in the car’s erratic movements, whereas the optimist will simply give up 
and say it moves freely. During CE, however, Wittgenstein elaborates on what he 
takes to be the difference between speculating as to the cause of a particular 
phenomenon by looking for the cause, and giving up this practice entirely.  282
Today, in case we actually discovered two seeds which we could not 
distinguish, but one producing a poppy and the other rose, we should look 
frantically for a difference.—But in other circumstances we might give 
 CE, pp. 371-426.280
 Brenner 2001a, p. 54. Brenner makes use of a similar comparison in his analysis of the LFW.281
 Once again, ‘primitive’ here refers to a reflexive or immediate way of acting. Cf. ‘Suppose someone 282
said: “I’m immediately aware of the cause of lifting my arm when I will to do it.”—No one ordinarily 
says he “wills” to do something. He lifts his arm, that’s all. But one can generally predict the 
movements of one’s body.” CE, p. 410.
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this up—give up looking for a difference. This would be a tremendous 
thing to do—as great as recognising indeterminacy. We would no longer 
look for the difference, and so we would no longer say there must be a 
difference. Now (today) we would have every reason to say there must be 
a difference. But we can imagine circumstances where we would break 
with this tradition.  283
The above prefigures still another illustration in the LFW that Wittgenstein uses to 
clarify why it is that the pessimist is inclined to seek a causal explanation of a 
person’s actions, rather than simply ask the person concerned for their reasons.  
Had the case always been that of the apple tree with the leaves dancing 
about, don't you think we would have had a different idea?—As things are 
now, you might say: if only we knew the velocity of the wind, the 
elasticity of the leaves etc. then we could forecast the movement of the 
leaves. But we would never dream of saying this if we hadn't already been 
successful, and colossally so.  284
Aside from the obvious similarities in each case—the references i) to natural 
phenomena, ii) to how things stand today/now, and iii) to similar methodologies, 
measuring, experimenting, etc.—there are less obvious similarities. In both cases, for 
instance, no longer looking for the cause/difference is associated with ‘recognising 
indeterminacy’. In the LFW, shortly after the above passage, Wittgenstein conjectures 
that we might ask “Why don’t we regard it in the light of indeterminism? Why do we 
 CE, p. 411.283
 LFW, p. 431.284
!  of !163 240
still stick to determinism?”  In asking this, his point is not, pace certain Libertarian 285
incompatibilists, that indeterminism can serve as an external, rational justification for 
our reactive attitudes.  Rather, Wittgenstein is impressing on us that the indirect 286
influence scientific discoveries have over these practices can be reversed, and in 
precisely the same way, viz. by subtly influencing the ‘direction of attention’. This is 
the significance of his suggesting that we might ‘regard it in the light of 
indeterminism’. That is, assuming that certain discoveries have such an influence, it 
can be of the greatest import whether we ‘look at it from the point of view of the 
bronchial hair or from the point of view of the falling stone’—i.e. from the point of 
view of indeterminism or determinism.  Wittgenstein’s point, as ever, is that we 287
learn more about the attitude of the individual who makes use of the example than we 
do about that which the example is intended to show.  288
 It is worth noting that in the above instances the more active role is given to, 
what I am assuming we should call, the pessimist/incompatibilist, i.e. looking for the 
cause/difference is associated (indirectly) with recognising determinism whereas 
giving up looking is associated with recognising indeterminism (again, indirectly). 
Whilst the context of the earlier statement calls for just such an emphasis, i.e. on 
looking for the cause, the same need not be said of the later discussion in the LFW. 
As a result, this adds to the response I gave to the potential objection that, in defining 
a global, non-reactive attitude in negative terms (as not holding people responsible), 
 LFW, p. 432.285
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Wittgenstein is describing the non-expression of the reactive attitudes, or else an 
expression of non-feeling. However, it might be suggested that what he is in fact 
describing is the act of looking for the cause, which, for reasons yet to be explained, 
results in not holding people responsible; conversely, and for the same reasons, 
holding people responsible results in not looking for the cause. 
 Most importantly, both the LFW and CE relate the subtle influence scientific 
discoveries have over different ways of looking at things. Nevertheless, in both cases
—looking for the difference in the two seeds or for the cause of the leaves’ 
movements—Wittgenstein anticipates circumstances in which we might ‘break with 
this tradition’ or, as he puts it in the LFW, ‘change the business’.  By ‘change the 289
business’, Wittgenstein actually has in mind the opposite move—that knowledge of 
natural laws might lead us to no longer ‘play the game’, i.e. of giving and asking for 
reasons, holding people responsible, etc. Nevertheless, that he recognises the 
potential to move in both directions is demonstrated by how he responds to the above 
examples. Shortly after describing the situation with the apple tree, he makes the 
elliptical remark that ‘If the exceptions were the rule…’—to which we are now able 
to interpolate the conclusion—‘[then] we would no longer look for the difference’. 
For all these reasons, the description Wittgenstein offers of the practice of ‘looking 
for the difference/cause’ is a sound basis for our understanding of the indirect 
influence scientific discoveries have in bringing it about that we no longer see the 
leaves as ‘dancing’ or, as the illustration is intended to represent, the pessimist’s no 
longer holding people responsible.  
 LFW, p. 443.289
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 Before I consider the pessimist’s attitude in particular, however, I wish to 
briefly explain a distinction Wittgenstein draws between the ‘practice’ or ‘method’ of 
‘looking for the cause’ and what we might call doubt or uncertainty. 
The game of ‘looking for the cause’ consists above all in a certain 
practice, a certain method. Within it something that we call doubt and 
uncertainty plays a role, but this is a second-order feature. In an analogous 
way, it is characteristic of how a sewing machine functions that its parts 
may wear out and get bent, and its axles may wobble in their bearings, but 
still this is a second-order characteristic compared with the normal 
workings of the machine.  290
The analogy of a machine’s malfunction appears to coincide with what P. F. Strawson 
has said is the most natural reason for treating human beings objectively, i.e. instances 
of abnormality.  That is, we might come to associate a global, non-reactive attitude 291
(or what P. F. Strawson calls the ‘objective attitude’) with a ‘second-order 
characteristic’ of the machine, i.e. with the ‘doubt and uncertainty’ that the individual 
is truly responsible. However, in order to continue the analogy with P. F. Strawson’s 
account we would have to assume that this ‘second-order characteristic’ is to be 
contrasted with the reactive attitudes, i.e. with the ‘normal workings of the 
machine’.   292
 CE, p. 395.290
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 12.291
 This is true despite P. F. Strawson’s recognition that we can take up the objective attitude towards 292
anyone, since in accordance with the Ramified Argument this rules out doing so both in every case and 
‘in the light of’ determinism.
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 For Wittgenstein, however, the above analogy is intended to show how 
‘looking for the cause’ might itself be attributed to the ‘normal workings of the 
machine’. That is, ‘the game of looking for the cause’ does not always, or even in 
general, involve ‘something that we call doubt and uncertainty’. One way of putting 
this is to say that, whether or not the machine is working normally, it is still a 
machine. Consequently, Wittgenstein shows his support for Galen Strawson’s 
objection to P. F. Strawson’s Ramified Argument: that the pessimist’s way of looking 
at things, e.g. ‘looking for the cause’, is no less natural than holding people 
responsible.  293
 Saying this, however, does not, by itself, demonstrate conclusively that 
‘looking for the cause’ coincides with the expression of a global, non-reactive 
attitude. Nevertheless, the two coincide when, having looked for the cause, we latch 
onto a specific cause as being the cause. As Wittgenstein puts it: ‘calling something 
“the cause” is like pointing and saying: “He’s to blame!”’  The two actions are alike 294
in so far as ‘calling something “the cause”’ involves (in most cases) exaggerating a 
particular discovery; this is what Wittgenstein means when he says that there is a 
tendency to be ‘dazzled’ by a particular discovery when ‘all that you have done is get 
hold of an explanation which may not have explained anything at all’.  In such 295
cases, the denial of responsibility is affected by latching onto a particular explanation/
cause as, not just the only kind of explanation/cause, but as the explanation/cause. 
 More generally, ‘looking for the cause’ coincides with the expression of a 
global, non-reactive attitude when it comes to cases in which no cause or law of 
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p.88.293
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nature can be identified to explain a certain behaviour; whether it is the erratic 
movements of a Driverless Car or the actions of a human being.  In such cases, 296
Wittgenstein says that we ‘might go on looking’ for some law or else ‘give up entirely 
and say [it] is free’.  The former precludes the latter in the way that looking for the 297
cause of the leaves’ movements precludes seeing the leaves as dancing; or that we 
might look for the cause of a person’s actions and yet continue to hold that person 
responsible. Neither can any limit be set on how long, or in what circumstances, an 
individual could or should go on ‘looking for the cause’ (or resist doing so). 
Preserving a broader framework of attitudes despite the ‘major tensions’ within 
it 
I have outlined one way in which the act of holding people responsible, and by 
extension the reactive attitudes, come to be conflicted, viz. via an equally natural 
tendency to ‘look for the cause’. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s account of a global, 
non-reactive attitude is already more comprehensive than anything we find in Galen 
Strawson’s account of the ‘major tensions’ that exist ‘within’ a broader framework, of 
reactive and non-reactive attitudes. Nevertheless, what Galen Strawson does say, 
appears at least, to be consistent with the account I have given of different ways of 
looking/acting. For instance, Galen Strawson recognises that, in the case of the 
Buddhist monks, the denial of self cannot be affected ‘by some sort of effortless, 
rationally motivated, self-directed intellectual fiat’; instead it follows, as he puts it, 
‘non-rationally’ and ‘as a result of [a] practice’ of meditation.  Conspicuously 298
 LFW, p. 433.296
 Ibid.297
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p.112.298
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absent from Galen Strawson’s account of this transition, however, is any mention of 
the ‘major tensions’ that he later says are inherent ‘within’ the monks’ framework of 
attitudes. Therefore, whilst Galen Strawson maintains that such tensions exist, he 
does not connect either the reactive attitude or a global, non-reactive attitudes with 
the ‘major tensions’ at their heart.  
 In giving an account of the same ‘major tensions’ that, for Galen Strawson, 
threaten to undermine this broader framework, Wittgenstein not only demonstrates 
the relevance of these tensions to the expression of the reactive and non-reactive 
attitudes, he also demonstrates the resilience of a broader framework to those 
tensions. Central to Wittgenstein’s demonstration of both of these points is his 
analysis of those cases in which holding someone responsible (or not holding 
someone responsible) is ‘the result of a struggle.’ 
If you want to characterise the meaning of these words (‘I am responsible’ 
etc.), you’ve got to say, for one thing, whether the words are the result of 
a struggle. Isn’t this part of saying what the meaning of these words is?  299
To augment his account of this ‘struggle’, Wittgenstein outlines several cases in 
which, to understand what is being said, it is necessary to give an account of this 
‘struggle’. Wittgenstein imagines hearing a man, who has been ‘brooding about 
something he had done’, and, ‘to dispel his discomfort say “My God, I am like a 
falling stone”.’  Here, the expression of a non-reactive attitude is a salve to his 300
otherwise reactive feelings. Wittgenstein says the same of the struggle to affect a 
reactive attitude in the case of a man who, having ‘been under a pressure’, exclaims 
 LFW, p. 439.299
 Ibid.300
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‘Now I am free to do what I want’ and ‘I shall do what I choose myself’. Here also, 
Wittgenstein wants to say that the meaning of the words cannot be conveyed by a 
purely declarative understanding of the words, i.e. the man is not ‘giving himself the 
information that he is free’.  The man is expressing, rather than declaring, that, like 301
the brooding man, he is no longer discomforted. It might even be said that the 
expression itself lessens the discomfort, that the statement is performative; although, 
this last is perhaps more the case with the brooding man who is affecting his change 
in attitude through or via the exclamation itself. 
 Having established that the brooding man’s statement is not declarative, but 
performative, Wittgenstein shows that he is no longer interested in what way(s), if at 
all, a man (sic. ‘thief’) is ‘like a falling stone’.  On the contrary, Wittgenstein is only 302
interested in asking what the point of the man’s words is, to which the answer is ‘to 
dispel his discomfort’; having gone through this ‘process of describing what he 
means in this case’, Wittgenstein states simply ‘I see exactly what he means’. This 
explains why the principal reason Wittgenstein gives for someone’s making use of 
analogies like that of the falling stone is ‘not to be made responsible’.  I shall turn to 303
the second reason Wittgenstein gives in a moment, namely ‘a particular attitude of 
seeing what is tragic in a human being’.   304
 Before I come to this, however, the important point to grasp about the first 
reason he gives is that it shows that a commitment to either the reactive or non-
 Ibid.301
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reactive attitudes is not diminished by its being conflicted. On the contrary, at least 
‘part of saying what the meaning of these words is’ involves saying whether or not 
they are so conflicted. The upshot being that the expression of either attitude can be 
made more acute by the lack of its opposite, i.e. a yearning for the pressure to be 
lifted deepens the discomfort, and therefore the relief, involved. Logically, this 
implies that the expression of either the reactive or non-reactive attitudes is not 
always the result of a struggle. Only part of what it means to say the words (‘I am 
responsible’ etc.), is conveyed by ‘whether [or not] they are the result of a 
struggle’.  At the other end of the spectrum from the brooding man, Wittgenstein 305
muses that saying ‘I am responsible’ might simply be a turn of phrase, i.e. the 
repetition of something one heard as a child.  Again, Galen Strawson seems willing 306
to make the same concession when he says that, rather than ‘question the correctness 
of the framework’ as a whole, the tensions threaten only ‘paramount aspects of it’.  307
As he puts it: ‘There are, to say the least, some major tensions in it’. Even if this is 
‘the least’ we might say, the concession might be enough to downplay the 
significance of these tensions. 
 What Wittgenstein indicates is wrong with Galen Strawson’s assessment of 
the tensions lies in the latter’s thinking that the tensions weaken, or diminish, our 
commitment to either the reactive or non-reactive attitudes; since one cannot be 
committed to both. For Wittgenstein, the expression of either the reactive or non-
reactive attitudes is, if anything, made more vital by these tensions. That is, to the 
objection that the tensions threaten a broader framework from ‘within’, Wittgenstein 
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 Ibid.306
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p. 112.307
!  of !171 240
is able to respond by demonstrating that far from undermine the expression of either 
attitude—i.e. saying ‘I am responsible’ or ‘I am not responsible’—the tensions are 
responsible, at least in part, for the meaning we attribute to either utterance. Despite 
the boldness of the claim being made—i.e. that the tensions strengthen, rather than 
weaken, commitment to the reactive or non-reactive attitudes—we are not asked to 
concede anything that has not already been conceded. What it does ask for is an 
appropriate modification of how these tensions are to be interpreted. To that end, I 
shall now turn to a more ethically nuanced understanding of how the reactive 
attitudes ‘enshrine’ the non-reactive. 
Understanding the ethical character of tensions through an account of ‘fatalism’ 
As well as failing to connect the tensions with the expression of either the reactive or 
non-reactive attitudes, Galen Strawson also fails, for the same reason, to explain how 
a global, non-reactive attitude comes to be expressed. That is, just as P. F. Strawson 
rejects the optimist’s ‘one-eyed utilitarianism’ for not being the ‘right sort’ of basis 
for expressing the reactive attitudes,  Galen Strawson fails to draw upon the ‘right 308
sort’ of basis for the non-reactive attitudes; despite having argued, quite convincingly, 
that the reactive attitudes ‘enshrine’ the non-reactive attitudes.  In Part One, I 309
argued that a better way to understand the way in which a global, non-reactive 
attitude might come to be enshrined in the reactive, is through a profound sense of 
pity for the weaknesses of human beings. This is very similar to the second reason 
Wittgenstein gives, in the LFW, for appealing to the analogy of the ‘falling stone’—
aside from ‘not to be held responsible—viz. ‘a particular attitude of seeing what is 
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 4.308
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tragic in a human being.’  This attitude, I shall argue, connects with what, in the 310
LFW, Wittgenstein calls ‘fatalism’. I shall conclude that it is through his account of 
fatalism, that Wittgenstein is better able to capture that which Galen Strawson does 
not, viz. how a global, non-reactive attitude comes to be expressed. 
 By introducing Wittgenstein’s account of fatalism here my aim is to 
supplement my analysis of what, in Culture and Value, Wittgenstein says ‘denying 
free will’ comes to. That is, in respect to the description Wittgenstein gives of his own 
attitude towards life—as ‘like a path along a mountain ridge’—it is evident that, 
whatever cannot be accounted for by the indirect influence scientific discoveries have 
over the expression of this attitude, can be accounted for by ‘seeing what is tragic in a 
human being’.  For instance, in saying ‘How could a man help himself in such a 311
situation!’ Wittgenstein is not stating an opinion, i.e. that the man is incapable of 
altering his circumstances; rather he is emphasising the precariousness of the man’s 
existence, without making any specific factual claim.   312
 But what is ‘fatalism’, as it is understood in the LFW? To begin with, 
‘fatalism’ ought not to be conflated with a stoic resignation to those things that lie 
outside of our control. As his remarks in the Tractatus show, for instance, 
Wittgenstein is opposed to the idea of resignation to fate on the grounds that a belief 
that inaction leads to harmony with reality presumes knowledge of future events—our 
ignorance of the future is, on the contrary, our basis for thinking that we have 
 LFW, p. 440.310
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freedom of the will.  Equally, the early Wittgenstein’s emphasis on agreement with 313
the world—in the Notebooks, ‘doing the will of God’—is not conditional upon our 
choosing to act or not to act.  Unlike the stoics, then, Wittgenstein would say that 314
any happiness derived from contracting one’s will (i.e. to those things over which one 
has control) would be, no less than its opposite, a ‘gift of fate’.  Wittgenstein does 315
not reverse this position in the LFW. That is, the incompatibilist’s/pessimist’s attitude, 
in so far as it is referred to as fatalistic, is not a resignation to that upon which we are 
dependent; neither is it necessarily directed towards a surmounting of that 
dependency. On the contrary, a fatalistic attitude is, for Wittgenstein, a primitive way 
of acting in the light of certain images, e.g. of natural laws as rails. 
 For instance, Wittgenstein’s only other reference to ‘fate’ (outside of the 
LFW) identifies it as ‘the antithesis of a natural law’.  This is in some way closer to 316
what, in the LFW, Wittgenstein calls ‘fatalism’ since, in both contexts, fate (and 
fatalism) are linked with the image of natural laws as ‘laid down by Deity’.  Any 317
apparent inconsistency in Wittgenstein describing, on the one hand, fate as the 
antithesis of a natural law and his describing, on the other hand, a view of natural 
laws as fatalistic is accounted for by his opposition to treating the latter as a 
meaningful hypothesis. As we have seen, however, Wittgenstein’s opposition to 
incompatibilism is limited to identifying the incompatibilist’s ‘peculiar way of 
 TLP, 5.1362.313
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looking at things’, which includes shedding light on the tendency to ‘bring in the 
notion of compulsion’ when discussing natural laws.  This tendency does not 318
exhaust what Wittgenstein has to say concerning an attitude of fatalism, however. 
That is, just as the belief that ‘some law of nature forces the thing to go as it does’ is 
incidental to the expression of a global, non-reactive attitude, so too is any appeal to a 
divine will, or to an ethereal book in which all future events are recorded.  That is, 319
the form a belief takes does nothing to impinge upon the principle, employed by 
Wittgenstein, that ‘denying free will’ is not a belief but a way of acting, e.g. ‘not 
holding people responsible’. That is, a belief in fate, like a belief in ubiquitous natural 
laws, is not grounds for denying free will; rather, each belief is, in its manner, 
expressive of a pessimistic attitude towards the sustainability of our practices of 
holding responsible. Wittgenstein’s references to fatalism need not, therefore, imply a 
return to the Compatibility Question or to the search for an ‘external, ‘rational’ 
justification’.  
 Alternatively, the answer to the question of what an ‘attitude of fatalism’ 
consists in—i.e. aside from resignation or inaction in the face of those things we 
cannot change, and beyond a belief in ubiquitous natural laws or a divine book or 
deity—could well lie in what, in the LFW, Wittgenstein calls ‘a particular attitude of 
seeing what is tragic in a human being.’  We have, or so it seems, already 320
encountered just such an attitude in Wittgenstein’s account of situations in which he 
 LFW, p. 431.318
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has seen people ‘slip’ and said, “How could a man help himself in such a situation!” 
In the LFW, as we have seen, Wittgenstein offers the example of a man who describes 
himself as being “no hero” in the same way that he might say “this is a cake.”  This 321
example is, perhaps, not as clear about what is ‘tragic in a human being’, but it does 
at least show how a global, non-reactive attitude might come to be expressed without 
any need to appeal to natural or divine laws. The alternative conception is instead one 
of appreciation for the helplessness of the individual, which can be as much a part of 
the individual’s own frailty, including (but not limited to) a weakness of character. 
 Understanding this, it might begin to be understood how the reactive attitudes 
might be said to ‘enshrine’ the non-reactive attitudes. One tentative suggestion is that 
a fatalistic attitude is one way of responding to the fear and trepidation accompanying 
a profound sense of angst concerning one’s responsibility. The suggestion comes 
from the LFW where Wittgenstein suggests that his having the idea that ‘[w]hat will 
happen is laid down somewhere’, or ‘written down’, is simply an ‘expression of my 
lack of fear.’  In saying this, Wittgenstein is not describing the act of mentally 322
steeling oneself to some perceived danger—hence why ‘it isn’t necessary that the 
picture of its being written down should be connected with courage’.  Instead he is 323
inferring that a lack of fear can be affected by simply having the thought. Again, it is 
unimportant whether or not the thought constitutes a declarative statement; it is 
enough that, like the brooding man who says to himself “My God, I am like a falling 
stone”, the idea relieves one’s discomfort.  324
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 To further understand how the reactive attitudes might be said to ‘enshrine’ 
the non-reactive attitudes, it is important to realise that Wittgenstein’s various 
references to fatalism refer not just to the act of not holding oneself or others 
responsible, but also to a way of living life generally. This explains why he refers to 
thinking of natural laws as compelling events as a ‘certain kind of fatalism’, i.e. it 
participates in (shares a family resemblance towards) a broader, or at least more 
varied, web of attitudes and feelings.  The suggestion is, in other words, that there 325
are can be other kinds of fatalism, or different ways in which a fatalistic attitude can 
come to be expressed. The tableau of non-reactive attitudes may be, therefore, just as 
rich as any reactive form of life.  
 For instance, in the same way that P. F. Strawson exemplifies the reactive 
attitudes through a feeling of resentment, it is possible to exemplify the non-reactive 
attitudes—or fatalism—through a feeling of pity.  As has been attested already, pity 326
is consistent with a primitive reaction, e.g. to seeing someone in pain, and is therefore 
to be contrasted in this context with forgiveness, i.e. to express a pitying attitude one 
does not, first, have to feel resentment. Moreover, a primitive reaction to someone as 
frail and wretched seems to involve just the kind of commitment to not holding them 
responsible that is characterised in the LFW and elsewhere as ‘seeing what is tragic in 
a human being’. Finally, a feeling of pity fulfils the potential to be expressed globally, 
i.e. towards everyone, without it simultaneously being expected that everyone should 
feel that way. Again, this should not be taken to mean that the expression of a global, 
non-reactive attitude (or any attitude) is conditional upon one’s feeling pity (or any 
 LFW, p. 430. Emphasis added.325
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feeling). Rather, it is to say that it is part of what it means to express a global, non-
reactive (or fatalistic) attitude that one should feel pity for the frailty, wretchedness, 
tragedy, etc. of a human being. 
 For this reason, the expression of a fatalistic attitude is, for Wittgenstein, 
engrained in an altogether more human form of life than has hitherto been considered. 
This goes some way to explaining the problem I experienced with Galen Strawson’s 
account of the Buddhist monks’ expression of a non-reactive attitude, viz. that the 
monks’ practice was described as being ‘inhuman, in some way’.  As I said earlier, 327
Galen Strawson means that the practice is inhuman only in the way that it can be 
contrasted with our existing, reactive practices; at least, he rules out any ‘pejorative’ 
use of the term ‘inhuman’.  Nevertheless, he is admitting that it no longer ‘comes 328
easily to the non-philosophising mind’ to imagine what it might be like to adopt a 
global, non-reactive attitude.  Through an account of fatalism, Wittgenstein 329
describes an altogether more human form of life in which ‘denying free will’ is no 
less fitting of the description used in Philosophical Investigations §178 of an ‘attitude 
towards a soul’; merely that it is a soul that is only too human, i.e. frail, weak, and 
susceptible to falling. To my mind, there is no clearer way in which, as Galen 
Strawson puts it, the reactive attitudes already ‘enshrine’ the non-reactive’ attitudes. 
 At the same time, it is important not to overlook the ethical or religious 
significance of Wittgenstein’s references to fatalism. His analogy of a ‘slip’ (from ‘a 
path along a mountain ridge’) conjures easily to mind the idea of a ‘fall’ in an ethical 
sense; as does the analogy of the falling stone. During his analysis of the LFW, Ilham 
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, p. 112.327
 Ibid.328
 Strawson, G. 1986, in McKenna & Russell 2008, pp. 88 & 113.329
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Dilman argues that Wittgenstein’s insistence that the use of these analogies is nothing 
other than a way of comparing oneself to a falling stone in no way inhibits a more 
ethically nuanced understanding of this ‘fall’.  We may go further and observe that, 330
especially when speaking in his own voice in Culture and Value, the ethical 
significance of the picture Wittgenstein offers is heavily implied. This is why the 
passage is so central to my attempt to disclose how this ethical dimension completes 
Wittgenstein’s account of the pessimist’s global, non-reactive attitude.  
 In order to supplement my claim that there are other kinds of fatalistic 
attitude, and also in order to draw a line between ‘an attitude of seeing what is tragic 
in a human being’ and the apparent role resignation or inactivity can play in 
expressing such an attitude, I shall consider briefly the way in which Wittgenstein 
elsewhere uses the term ‘fate’ to refer to an ‘attitude’ to the future and the past. In this 
case, Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘fate’ does impinge upon our understanding of 
fatalism and, more importantly, shows how someone can express a fatalistic attitude 
by resigning oneself to those things one cannot change. More specifically, 
Wittgenstein gives an account in Culture and Value of not seeking an explanation for 
events, but accepting them for what they are. When referring to a use of the word 
‘fate’ in relation to ‘our attitude to the future and the past’, Wittgenstein asks: 
To what extent do we hold ourselves responsible for the future? How 
much do we speculate about the future? How do we think about past and 
future? If something unwelcome happens:--do we ask “Who's to blame?”, 
 Dilman 1999, p. 252. Dilman compares Wittgenstein’s use of the analogy with similar analogies 330
used by Plato, Spinoza and Simone Weil to covey precisely this ethical sense of ‘a fall’; what Weil 
calls ‘moral gravity’. 
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do we say “Someone must be to blame for it”?,--or do we say “It was 
God's will”, “It was fate”?   331
Wittgenstein is seeking to capture a sense of acquiescence in the face of what can’t be 
changed. For example, in situations where we are brooding about a past misdeed or 
anxiously facing an uncertain future, we might understandably want to dispense with 
futile thoughts about who is (or will be) to blame. In words reminiscent of, but 
unconnected with, his early comments on fate, Wittgenstein says that we can do this 
by appealing to fate or to God’s will. In this case, whilst the statements—“It was 
God's will”, “It was fate”—have the appearance of declarative sentences that are 
aimed at explaining events in terms of a divine will, the same effect of the words can 
be had by a ‘command’ one gives oneself, e.g. “Don’t be resentful” or “Don’t 
grumble”.  332333
 William Brenner captures something of what it means to express a fatalistic 
attitude to the past and future—i.e. the removal of discomfort—when he highlights 
the ethical significance of Wittgenstein’s words.  Brenner maintains that 334
Wittgenstein’s appeal to ‘fate’ (or to a fatalistic attitude) is an attempt to curb, what in 
the revised edition of Culture and Value, is (tentatively) called ‘the over-estimation of 
science’.  That is, Brenner interprets the remarks in both Culture and Value and the 335
LFW, as a wish not to set limits on the variety of language or on the extent to which 
 CV, p. 69.331
 CV, p. 61.332
 However, it should not be understood from this that Wittgenstein is, after all, aligning himself with 333
Epictetus and the stoics. He does not, in specifying a role for these commands, encourage or in any 
way promise their success. It is rather that an examination of the pessimist’s/fatalist’s words uncovers a 
more accurate description of them as consolatory. 
 Brenner 2001a, p. 62.334
 CV (1998), p. 70.335
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we can express different attitudes.  Brenner is right to do this, and yet it must not go 336
unnoticed that the variety of attitudes is made possible in connection only with the 
fatalist’s own ‘peculiar’ attitude. That is, we must not overlook those aspects of the 
fatalist’s attitude that differentiate it from any other attitude. Wittgenstein says as 
much in highlighting ‘the way in which asking a question, insisting on an answer, or 
not asking it, expresses a different attitude, a different way of living’ which, in the 
fatalist’s own case, is exemplified by the declaration “We are not masters of our 
fate”.   337
 From this, however, I do not wish to give the impression that differentiation 
between attitudes, and the variety of attitudes it is possible for someone to express, 
come to an end at ‘asking a question, insisting on an answer, or not asking it’. For 
instance, Peter Winch recognises that an utterance like “It was God's will” or “It was 
fate” ‘neither pretends to provide any explanation … nor seeks to find one’ but he 
also manages to convey a more positive, life-affirming possibility. He maintains that, 
for Wittgenstein in particular, such utterances convey ‘an attitude of gratitude for 
life’.  This understanding of fatalism, as ‘an attitude of gratitude for life’, might 338
appear to contradict my own analysis of what Wittgenstein calls fatalism; as 
involving, at one time, a tendency to explain events by ‘looking for the cause’ and, at 
other times, ‘a particular attitude of seeing what is tragic in a human being’. 
However, whilst I recognise the difficulty (though not the impossibility) of 
 Brenner 2001a, p. 62.336
 CV (1998), p. 70. In the earlier iteration of Culture and Value this same remark less clearly discerns 337
asking a question from not asking it; CV, p. 61.
 Winch, P. in Malcolm 2002, p. 113.338
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harmonising these various accounts of fatalism, neither Wittgenstein nor myself have 
a wish to.  
 Like Brenner, my principal aim in reconstructing Wittgenstein’s account of 
fatalism is ‘to keep the variety of language in view’; as well as to demonstrate the full 
scope of attitudes and feelings that are to be associated with fatalism itself; and 
thereby to avoid limiting, without excluding, the indirect influence scientific 
discoveries—and ‘looking for the cause’—have on a global, non-reactive attitude.  339
What is most germane about Brenner’s interpretation of fatalism, in particular, is that 
he links it with the kind of ‘struggle’ that, for Wittgenstein, is a prerequisite for 
staying ‘within the religious sphere’.  Furthermore, Brenner maintains that it is 340
evidently ‘a distinctly philosophical struggle’ ‘to keep the variety of language in 
view’.  This includes ways of acting that Brenner calls ‘paltry and neglected’; to 341
which we might also add those ways of acting that Wittgenstein calls ‘peculiar’ or 
‘ugly’.  The more general point is this, however: that in order to come to terms with 342
the broader framework Wittgenstein defends, we must struggle come to terms, 
ethically, with the full range of attitudes available to us; this might involve our seeing 
what is tragic in a human being even as we express gratitude for life. Connected with 
this struggle, I suggest, is Wittgenstein’s account in the LFW of the ‘struggle’, in 
certain cases, to come to terms with the responsibility we have for our actions—that it 
 LFW, p. 440.339
 CV, p. 86.340
 Brenner 2001a, p. 62.341
 The former, ‘peculiar’ way of acting I have already referred to, viz. refusing to hold people 342
responsible on the basis of a fatalistic understanding of natural laws. I shall introduce, in the next 
chapter, a further way of acting that Wittgenstein described as ‘ugly’, viz. blaming people despite, or 
even because, of their inherent weakness.
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is ‘part of saying what the meaning of the words [“I am responsible”] is’ to say 
whether or not they are ‘the result of a struggle.’   343
 As I shall show, the idea of a ‘struggle’ indicates one potential line of response 
to the objection that, since the optimist’s and pessimist’s positions are equally natural, 
we must either be committed to taking up two contradictory attitudes or ways of 
acting simultaneously, e.g. both holding and refusing to hold people responsible, or 
else we are doomed to vacillate between the two viewpoints; the objection being that 
little or nothing is gained by keeping ‘the variety of language in view’. It is not 
altogether clear whether or not this objection is implicit in Galen Strawson’s 
opposition to P. F. Strawson’s defence of the reactive attitudes. Nonetheless, the wider 
inference is that a description of our attitudes, no matter how detailed, fails to 
establish what it is we ought to say concerning freedom and responsibility. In the next 
chapter, I will demonstrate the extent to which Wittgenstein’s treatment of this ethical 
struggle undermines the supposition that, in giving a highly detailed description of 
our attitudes, Wittgenstein overlooks the more pressing question of how we should 
act. This will involve taking a closer look at how Wittgenstein’s ideas about freedom 
of the will and his treatment of some key themes in the philosophy of religion speak 
to, and exemplify, his wider, methodology.  
 LFW, p. 439.343
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Chapter IV 
Freedom & Fatalism in Wittgenstein’s 
“Lectures on Freedom of the Will” 
————————— 
Do I contradict myself? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I am large, I contain 
multitudes.) 
 — Walt Whitman, Song of Myself. 
A picture that is firmly rooted in us may indeed be compared to superstition, but it 
may be said too that we always have to reach some sort of firm ground, be it a 
picture, or not, so that a picture at the root of all our thinking is to be respected & not 
treated as a superstition. 
 — Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, (revised edition). 
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I have argued so far that Wittgenstein’s “Lectures on Freedom of the Will” (LFW) 
ought not to be read as putting forward either a compatibilist or a practice-based 
defence of freedom of the will. Instead, the LFW can be taken as defending a broader 
framework of attitudes and feelings that encompass both reactive and non-reactive 
attitudes. I have further argued that this enables Wittgenstein to provide a 
descriptively richer account of our ethical practices than can be provided by a 
compatibilist like Nielsen or an optimist like P. F. Strawson. In addition, I have 
demonstrated that Wittgenstein is able to provide a descriptively richer account of 
how tensions in a broader framework of attitudes and practices come about. However, 
further questions remain about what, if anything, Wittgenstein can provide in this 
connection beyond a mere description of the difference between reactive and non-
reactive attitudes and of the fundamental tensions that exist between them. Any mere 
description of our actual practices, however rich, looks to fall short of an answer to 
the question of how one should respond to these tensions as they arise. Here, the 
question is not whether or not one can say that ‘the decision of a person is not free 
because it was determined by natural laws’; rather, the question is of what one ought 
to say. I have argued that, for Wittgenstein, this question presents us with a distinctly 
ethical problem, rather than a primarily metaphysical or theoretical one.  
 In what follows, I will maintain that this ethical problem is best understood as 
arising from the forcefulness of certain pictures or images; images that Wittgenstein 
is himself impressed by; images such as the image of life as a path along a mountain 
ridge.  I shall also show how Wittgenstein’s endorsement of different modes of 344
 CV, p. 63.344
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representing freedom of the will contribute towards a more complete, and less 
problematic understanding of our practices. Wittgenstein’s own practice-based 
approach can therefore be seen as part of a wider methodology aimed at preventing us 
from thinking in terms of only one mode of representation, e.g. in terms of either 
images of freedom or images of determination.  
 Furthermore, I shall show that a similar response can be offered to the ethical 
problem of freedom of the will as it arises in our own lives. By exposing our 
susceptibility to fatalistic and non-fatalistic images as images, Wittgenstein’s helps us 
work through the tensions in our ethical practices. Specifically, I want to show how 
Wittgenstein advances two strategies for loosening the grip these images have over 
our attitudes and thereby over our ethical practices. The first strategy is to expose the 
way in which, in our thought and talk about freedom of the will, we find ourselves 
gripped by certain absolute or unqualified images or similes: the image, for example, 
of the events in one’s life moving inexorably, i.e. ‘as if on rails’, or the image of one’s 
being damned.  By exposing these images qua images, and placing alongside them 345
‘intermediate cases’, the strategy is to free up our thinking from simply being in the 
grip of a false dichotomy: between unqualifiedly fatalistic pictures and unqualifiedly 
non-fatalistic pictures. This strategy fits within Wittgenstein’s broader aim to bring to 
light the typically unnoticed metaphors by which, he thinks, we are always in danger 
of being bewitched; and to provide ‘perspicuous representations’ of various domains 
of our discourse. But I want also to explore the way in which Wittgenstein begins to 
take up a further and rather different aim. On this second strategy, the aim is to make 
it intelligible how we can continue to find a use in our lives for the pictures associated 
 E.g. LFW, pp. 429, 439; 'How would you characterise the meaning of "I am damned if I shall do 345
such and such"?'
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with both an unqualified freedom and an unqualified fatalism. In particular, I will 
draw in this connection on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion, focusing especially 
on his response to St. Paul. 
 This chapter is divided into four sections. The first two sections demonstrate 
the therapeutic and ethical dimensions of Wittgenstein’s wider methodology. The 
third and fourth sections deal, respectively, with the first and second strategies. 
Part One: Understanding the LFW in the Context 
of Wittgenstein’s Wider Methodology 
It is part of Wittgenstein’s express aim in the LFW to impress on us the fact that 
‘given a certain attitude … a certain image can force itself upon you’.  In order to 346
better understand this aim, we need an account of why this fact is, for Wittgenstein, 
‘one of the most important facts of human life’.  I shall argue that this aim is central 347
to the LFW because it is part of a methodology that is to some extent therapeutic. 
That is, it is Wittgenstein’s express aim to disclose to us that we are in the grip of 
certain images, and through this disclosure, loosen their grip. To begin with, I shall 
demonstrate how this therapeutic arm of Wittgenstein’s wider methodology is related 
to his opposition to incompatibilism; doing so will help us to better situate his 
suggestion that incompatibilist responses to the problem of freedom of the will may 
rest on a ‘blunder’, i.e. by conflating the notions of cause and constraint. 
 In calling a certain aspect of Wittgenstein’s methodology ‘therapeutic’, I am 
not suggesting that the LFW seek to provide ways of coping with psychological 
problems. Neither are the LFW an attempt merely to outline the peculiarities of our 
 LFW, p. 435.346
 Ibid. 347
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thought. That we might come to think this is what Wittgenstein is doing might well be 
due to his identifying specific inclinations or tendencies—e.g. to say either that one is 
responsible or else that one’s choices follow natural laws but not both—as ‘facts of 
psychology’; facts which, I have said, are indeed nothing more or less than 
observations of human behaviour.  At no point, however, does Wittgenstein work up 348
any such ‘facts of psychology’ into a methodology for dealing with, or resolving, the 
tensions in our own attitudes. On the contrary, Wittgenstein actively undermines any 
attempt to fit all relevant cases into any particular mode of representation; he does 
not, therefore, maintain that a particular mode of representation, e.g. the facts of our 
psychology, captures all that we might say about a phenomenon.  I suggest that this 349
is why Wittgenstein advances many different modes of representation in the LFW as 
objects of comparison, including (but not limited to) ‘facts of psychology’, which he 
uses to bring into sharper focus the relevant cases under examination. 
 Notably, Wittgenstein’s examination of the incompatibilist’s grammatical 
‘blunder’, i.e. the unjustified conflation of natural and legal laws, is, in the LFW, 
juxtaposed with a description of the same behaviour as expressive of a ‘peculiar’, yet 
not unjustified, ‘attitude of fatalism’, i.e. one in which natural laws are associated 
with the image of events moving ‘as if on rails’.  He goes on to say that it is ‘one of 350
the most important facts of human life’ that such an image should ‘force itself upon 
you’; in particular (albeit not exclusively) the image ‘that you are compelled’.  As 351
 LFW, p. 433. See, Chapter One, Part II: v).348
 Immediately after describing the inclination to say either that one is responsible or else that one’s 349
choices follow natural laws as ‘a fact of psychology’ he goes on to say that ‘for reasons unknown … a 
certain image can force itself upon you’. LFW, p. 435. Emphasis added.
 LFW, p. 430.350
 LFW, p. 435.351
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such, Wittgenstein’s methodology has rather more to it than that he should avoid 
passing ‘ridicule’ on the incompatibilist’s ‘tendency’, i.e. to think that natural laws are 
like rails.  That we (i.e. Wittgenstein’s students) should be impressed by this 352
‘important’ fact is no less a central (and perhaps a rather more central) component of 
his methodology. We can suppose, then, that Wittgenstein’s aim in exposing the 
incompatibilist’s ‘blunder’ is also to highlight this ‘important fact’, the true 
significance of which is not made explicit in the LFW.  
 The general methodology at work here is perhaps first made explicit, and is 
said to be of critical importance for philosophy in The Blue Book, where Wittgenstein 
explains that a certain picture holds sway over our understanding of time. 
Wittgenstein writes: 
When people talk of the direction of time, precisely the analogy of a river 
is before them. Of course a river can change its direction of flow, but one 
has a feeling of giddiness when one talks of time being reversed. The 
reason is that the notion of flowing, of something, and of the direction of 
the flow is embodied in our language.  353
In saying that our understanding of time is, in words he uses on another occasion,  354
‘indissolubly linked’ with the picture of an ‘ethereal river’ (e.g. ‘the flow of time’, 
‘time passes by’, etc.) Wittgenstein draws attention to a typically unnoticed aspect of 
our language—something so engrained in our ways of talking that it passes 
undetected—namely the propensity to extend the use of certain pictures (similes, 
 LE, p. 12. Cf. the section on The Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics in Chapter One of 352
this thesis.
 AWL, §13. Cf. EPB, p. 156; BB, p.107f.353
 EPB, p. 156. Cited in Schroeder 2006, p. 159.354
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allegories, metaphors, and so forth) beyond their practical application. It is the 
bringing to light of this undisclosed “grammar” of our thought that corresponds with 
what, in the LFW, is less obviously being aimed at, viz. that we should be mindful 
that our own thinking is bound up with certain images, and that these images are 
embodied in what we have to say concerning, amongst other things, freedom of the 
will. For instance, the LFW disclose the way in which concepts associated with 
freedom of the will are ‘indissolubly linked’ with other similes, e.g. of natural laws as 
rails along which events move.  
 Wittgenstein does not think that the fact that these images, similes, metaphors, 
etc. are ‘embodied in our language’ is, by itself, problematic. A remedy must be 
sought, however, when we ‘extend’ the similes beyond any ‘practical use’, i.e. when 
they come to ‘captivate our thinking’.  For instance, whilst it makes sense to ask 355
how fast a river flows and in what direction, it is a mistake to think that the same 
questions can be asked about time; more precisely, it is a mistake to ask these 
questions merely on the strength of the simile.   356
 The same form of criticism can be seen in Wittgenstein’s opposition to what 
has come to be known as incompatibilism, i.e. where the simile of natural laws as 
rails is extended so that natural laws come to be thought of as the causes of events 
(‘compelling events’) or as already in existence (‘laid down’)—neither of which need 
enter into our conception of natural laws, given that natural laws are the sorts of 
things that are corrected by new evidence, that they do not proscribe certain events 
(like legal laws might be said to), and that saying natural laws are ubiquitous fails to 
 AWL, §13; ‘Philosophical troubles are caused by not using language practically but by extending it 355
on looking at it. We form sentences and then wonder what they can mean.’ 
 Cf. PI §109.356
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say anything beyond ‘it goes as it goes’.  That is, just as the simile of time as a river 357
is extended by asking in what ‘direction’ time flows, so too the incompatibilist 
extends the simile of natural laws as rails by stipulating that, where no law has yet 
been found, ‘some law of nature forces the thing to go as it does’—as Wittgenstein 
says, this would be to compare a natural law ‘with a rail which had changed its 
shape’.  What difficulty we have in imagining this has little to do with what we 358
know about natural laws and more to do with thinking about natural laws through the 
fatalistic picture of life moving on rails. Yet again, the methodology employed by 
Wittgenstein is to use other modes of representation as points of comparison between, 
say, the incompatibilist’s thinking and someone else’s—not so as to refute or remedy 
the incompatibilist’s thinking, but rather to clarify it, as much as for the 
incompatibilist as for anyone else.  
 It is for this reason that the LFW highlight mistaken ways of thinking on both 
sides of the debate over freedom of the will. The compatibilist too unduly extends 
those pictures associated with non-fatalistic notions of freedom and responsibility. In 
the same way that he draws attention to the largely unnoticed simile of time as a river, 
Wittgenstein casts light on the, not false so much as extended, representation of 
freedom of the will through a ‘freedom of choice’.  As Wittgenstein points out, 359
saying that I have freedom of choice amounts to no more than saying that I make 
choices. For this reason, ‘the idea of someone deciding for themselves’, i.e. of 
making a conscious decision to act, is also extended beyond its practical use by being 
 LFW, p. 430.357
 LFW, p. 429.358
 E.g. Nielsen 1971, p. 61; Nielsen speaks in a similar way of a person’s decisions being decisive.359
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thought to apply in all cases of responsible action.  What is overlooked is the ability 360
to act freely without a prior act or volition, such that ‘when I raise my arm, I do not 
normally try to raise it.’  In both cases, then, the error lies in ‘extending [the simile] 361
on looking at it’; i.e. in coming to think a certain way in light of the simile and 
without appreciation for, what he calls, its ‘pictorial character’. 
 In a pivotal section of the Investigations, Wittgenstein explains that ‘our 
failure to understand’ is the result of our not having a ‘clear view’ of our words 
generally. This is particularly relevant to the way in which we fail to take heed of the 
essentially ‘pictorial character’ of many of our expressions. Famously, Wittgenstein 
writes:  
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a 
clear view of the use of our words–Our grammar is lacking in this sort of 
perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding 
which consists in ‘seeing connexions’. Hence the importance of finding 
and inventing intermediate cases.  
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental 
significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we 
look at things.  362
The difficulty Wittgenstein is describing is, once again, not a difficulty that has to do 
with the fact that certain similes come to be ‘embodied in our language’, but that they 
captivate our thinking. In order that we should no longer be captivated by these 
 LFW, p. 442.360
 PI, §622. It should not be overlooked that simply raising one’s arm, i.e. without trying to raise it, is 361
another image or picture.
 PI, §122.362
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similes, Wittgenstein introduces what he calls a perspicuous representation to do the 
work of shedding light on the underlying grammar of our words; i.e. the connections 
which, if unseen, provide the meaning but not the understanding of our words but 
which, if seen, provide both meaning and understanding. In due course I will explain 
why it is that ‘finding and inventing intermediate cases’ should, for Wittgenstein, 
provide us with a ‘clear view of the use of our words’. In doing so, however, I shall 
rely largely on what Gordon Baker has to say concerning the central importance of 
section §122 of the Investigations in coming to understand the therapeutic aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s methodology.   363
 Baker notes, with a due sense of irony, that the idea of a perspicuous 
representation is itself less than entirely perspicuous. Very roughly, Baker determines 
that ‘the defining characteristic’ of a perspicuous representation is that it ‘condense 
something complex into a simple and manageable symbol’ that can then be 
‘reproduced’.  Nevertheless, Baker is quick to distinguish a perspicuous 364
representation from either a definition or an analogy and settles instead for a 
definition of the term as ‘anything which has the function of introducing ‘perspicuity’ 
into some aspects of the use of some of ‘our words’’.   365
 Baker’s functional definition is, in part, due to a lack of direction on 
Wittgenstein’s part—the only definitive example of a (more or less ) perspicuous 366
 Baker 2004, pp. 22-52.363
 Baker 2004, p. 31.364
 Baker 2004, p. 23.365
 PR, §1; ‘An octahedron with the pure colours at the corner-points e.g. provides a rough 366
representation of colour-space, and this is a grammatical representation, not a psychological one.’
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representation Wittgenstein offers explicitly is the colour-octahedron.  As Baker 367
puts it, ‘the colour-octahedron is a representation (or even ‘picture’) of the 
grammatical rules’ surrounding colour relationships, i.e. ‘what ‘red’, ‘green’, ‘yellow 
etc. mean’; so that, whilst ‘reddish-blue’ is seen to make grammatical sense, we can 
see that ‘reddish-green’ does not. By stressing the representational character of the 
example, Baker concludes that any perspicuous representation (or ‘picture’) of 
grammatical rules ‘must have the characteristic that the representation is distinct from 
what is represented’.  Nevertheless, a perspicuous representation remains distinct 368
from an analogy or metaphor since, as in the case of the colour octahedron, the 
perspicuous representation is intimately related to what is being represented; i.e. they 
are metonymic or synecdochical representations.  
 One upshot of Baker’s functional definition of perspicuous representations is 
that one can only make use of perspicuous representations where our grammar is 
unclear. That is, a perspicuous representation is meant to make plain the usefulness 
and, more importantly the dangers, involved in using other images, metaphors, 
similes, etc. That is, just as the colour octahedron gives us a perspicuous 
representation that exposes the confusion involved in ‘reddish-green’, so too a 
perspicuous representation of the grammar of temporal concepts makes clear the 
inherent, and unnoticed dangers of thinking that time flows, that something is 
flowing, and that it flows in a particular direction. Baker therefore maintains that just 
as the colour octahedron gives us a perspicuous representation of the grammar of 
 Baker (2004, p. 23-24) acknowledges that the paucity of explicit examples of perspicuous 367
representations presents a quandary, viz. that Wittgenstein’s use of perspicuous representations can 
hardly be fundamental if it is so rare. Baker responds, however, by saying that, once alert to their 
presence, we can locate perspicuous representations throughout the Investigations, and in 
Wittgenstein’s other writings.
 Baker 2004, p. 24.368
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colours so we need, for philosophical purposes, a perspicuous representation of the 
grammar of temporal concepts. It is for this reason that Baker focusses on the 
specialised function to which these perspicuous representations are put.  
 For the same reason, I am principally interested in Baker’s analysis of 
perspicuous representations for the way it serves to perspicuously represent 
Wittgenstein’s methodology in dealing with philosophical problems in general. Of 
particular note is Baker’s acknowledgement that, for Wittgenstein, ‘The tyranny of a 
system of expression is to be broken … by our affecting a change of aspect through 
juxtaposing … other systems of expression’.  The ‘tyranny’ referred to is any 369
system of expression that, due to its ‘simplicity and familiarity’, remains 
‘imperceptible’ due to its being ‘unacknowledged’.  It is this ‘tyranny’, notes Baker, 370
that leads to philosophical disputes taking the form, cited in Investigations §112, of 
‘But this isn’t how it is!’ versus ‘Yet this is how it must be!’  371
 This form of dispute is, I suggest, what leads Wittgenstein, in LFM, to 
compare a mathematician’s pleonastic use of the word ‘necessary’ with a certain use 
of the term ‘compulsion’, that is used by the incompatibilist to deny belief in freedom 
of the will if human beings are physically determined.  That is, Wittgenstein 372
supposes that, by denying a belief in freedom of the will on the grounds that we are 
determined, it is necessary to be tyrannical in one’s use of the term ‘compulsion’; to 
think of compulsion only in terms of being pushed, i.e. against one’s will. The 
 Baker 2004, p. 33. 369
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 PI §112; ‘A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false 371
appearance, and this disquiets us. "But this isn't how it is!”—we say. "Yet this is how it has to be!”.’
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response Wittgenstein gives—‘this is not how we use the expression “he can’t do 
anything else”’—mirrors that of the compatibilist in so far as it takes the form of 
responding, “But this isn’t how it is!” However, where Wittgenstein differs from the 
compatibilist is in criticising this response for overlooking the possibility that ‘how it 
is’ could change if we were to adopt another system of expression, e.g. by giving up 
the distinction between freedom and compulsion altogether. In both instances, what is 
‘neutralised’ is the inclination to say how things must be.  For Wittgenstein, this 373
inclination is the result of seeing things in only one way, i.e. thinking in terms of just 
one picture or analogy.   374
 Furthermore, this is why, in the LFW, Wittgenstein finds and invents various 
‘intermediate cases’, such as the Downstairs Crank and Driverless Car analogies, viz. 
in order to perspicuously represent the kinds of pictures that captivate our thinking.  375
In addition, the cases are aimed at preventing us from thinking that only one way of 
looking at things is possible, even if the intermediate cases include, as in the second 
Downstairs Crank analogy, ‘such a very special case’; or rather especially if they 
include very special cases.  That is, in specifying its very special character, 376
Wittgenstein is able to ask rhetorically why it is that anyone should be ‘inclined to 
compare ordinary cases with such a very special case’. Here, ‘seeing the connexion’ 
means recognising the peculiarity of its being used at all. That is, the connection, 
whilst not a ‘blunder’, is nonetheless shown to be a ‘very special case’, i.e. it is not 
 Baker 2004, p. 34.373
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merely a reiteration of the first Downstairs Crank example involving compulsion 
against one’s will. 
 For this reason, Baker’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s methodology is 
entirely consistent with what the latter goes on to say immediately after his remarks 
about perspicuous representations—that ‘in the end’ philosophy can only describe the 
language we use, and that it ‘leaves everything as it is’.  That is, it is wholly 377
compatible with ‘finding and inventing intermediate cases’, i.e. interposing ‘other 
systems of expression’, that the systems of expression themselves should remain 
unchanged. This is because Wittgenstein is ‘teaching us to understand the concepts 
we have’ by ‘constructing fictitious ones’.  At its most general, then, Wittgenstein’s 378
claim is not merely that certain pictures, metaphors, analogies, etc. are ‘embodied in 
our language’ but that our ways of thinking are unnecessarily dogmatic in the way 
that they adhere blindly to these modes of representation.  Most importantly, it is by 379
making visible these modes of representation (similes, metaphors, pictures, etc.)—
and the way in which they come to be extended—that we have the chance to loosen 
their grip, the purpose of which is to make plain the analogies that we unconsciously 
buy into in order that we should enjoy making use of, what Baker calls, ‘conscious 
analogies and comparisons’.  380
 For this reason, ‘extending [the picture] on looking at it’ is not the only, nor 
even the most common, mistake we can make—there is a more persistent failure we 
 PI, §124.377
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must respond to as well, namely the failure to recognise these images as images. The 
threat posed by this failure is that we will remain, as Baker puts it, ‘blind to “the 
philosophically most important aspects of things” because of their simplicity and 
familiarity.’  To be aspect-blind is to be unawares to the fact that a picture can serve 381
as the expression of an attitude without revealing the ‘essence of things’; that not all 
images are employed to justify a claim.  To illustrate this fact, Wittgenstein provides 382
a further perspicuous representation of how, with particular attention paid to our 
ethical practices, an image associated with the expression of a particular attitude can 
unconsciously be mistaken for a justification of that expression. 
Rules of life are dressed up in pictures. And these pictures can only serve 
to describe what we are to do, not justify it. Because they could provide a 
justification only if they held good in other respects as well. I can say: 
"Thank these bees for their honey as though they were good people who 
have prepared it for you"; that is intelligible and describes how I should 
like you to conduct yourself. But I cannot say: “Thank them because, 
look, how kind they are!”—since the next moment they may sting you.  383
For Wittgenstein, thanking the bees ‘as though they were good people’ is an 
expression of thanks. This is contrasted with thanking the bees on the basis of how 
kind they are, in which case the image is serving as a putative justification for one 
particular way of thinking about the bees’ behaviour; a way of thinking that obscures 
other, less gratifying, aspects of the bees’ behaviour (which in turn refutes any such 
 Baker 2004, p. 34. Baker is paraphrasing PI §129. Cf. LFW, p. 435; ‘it is one of the most important 381
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justification). The above passage relates, once again, to Wittgenstein’s express aim in 
the LFW: to impress on us ‘that a certain image can force itself upon you.’  By 384
saying that the ‘rules of life are dressed up in pictures’ Wittgenstein is impressing on 
us the forcefulness of images that are, in their everyday way, abundantly familiar and 
yet, due to this familiarity, unnoticed. The perspicuous representation of the honey 
bees is, in Baker’s vernacular, a ‘conscious analogy’ that can be used to make 
apparent both the forcefulness and limitations of these images. This also explains why 
Wittgenstein concludes his point about the forcefulness of certain images by asking, 
and negatively responding to, the question: ‘Must you look at [things] in this way?’  385
His denial that we must look at things according to a specific image, is a denial that a 
certain image justifies a particular way of looking at things; if this were not the case, 
then we would be unable to understand the limitation Wittgenstein imposes on the 
image being used to make claims about the bees’ kindness.  
 As well as avoiding unconscious analogies, we must therefore also avoid 
turning them into conscious justifications. As Baker explains, Wittgenstein’s 
proposed alternative is that we make conscious use of these images as images, i.e. 
that we make conscious the otherwise unconscious steps taken when looking at things 
through these images (similes, metaphors, etc.). This understanding serves also to 
loosen the grip these images have over our ways of thinking. Consequently, this 
explains why Wittgenstein’s only stated aim in the LFW is to ‘impress’ on us that 
certain images sometimes ‘force themselves on you’; his ‘wish’ being for us to 
 LFW, p. 435.384
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consciously acknowledge the otherwise unconscious influence these images have 
over our ways of thinking.  
 It might be objected that using perspicuous representations to make conscious 
the analogies to which we are already committed may well give us a clear view of 
‘our words’, but it gives us no clear sense as to their value—the objection being that 
we are still no closer to answering the question of what one ought to say concerning, 
amongst other things, freedom of the will. I should say that what this objection fails 
to take into account are the practical uses to which perspicuous representations can be 
put. That is, getting a ‘clear view of the use of our words’ is not simply in aid of 
freeing us from the ‘blunders’ that inevitably follow from being tethered 
unconsciously to certain images; understanding that one is thanking the bees as 
though they were kind people wards off thanking the bees for their kindness despite, 
or oblivious to, the fact that they may just as soon sting you. Yet, the principal reason 
in favour of making these images (similes, metaphors, etc.) conscious, is in order that 
it should serve as a first step towards a deeper ethical self-understanding. One may, 
for instance, too quickly overlook that the image serves as a description of how to one 
ought to conduct oneself.   386
 Even so, describing how one thinks one ought to conduct oneself, i.e. offering 
‘rules for life’, does not appear to provide us with anything like a justification for 
thinking or acting a particular way. Wittgenstein offers no guidance as to whether the 
picture presented above is true or false. This is hardly surprising, of course, since it is 
precisely this kind of unintelligibility that he wishes to turn us away from. That is, 
Wittgenstein’s opposition to both incompatibilism and compatibilism, as well as his 
 CV, p. 29. 386
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defence of both reactive and non-reactive attitudes, are an attempt to evince in us the 
fragility of our attitudes to freedom and responsibility and thereby to demonstrate the 
essentially ethical character of the problem at hand. The alternative methodology 
outlined above—of describing how to conduct oneself through different modes of 
representation—can be fully appreciated only in the light of a profound uncertainty 
over how one ought to think or act, i.e. as ‘the result of a struggle.’  For these 387
reasons, the LFW are part of a philosophic traditional stretching back to Socrates, the 
aim of which is not merely to dispel illusions but to grant insight into our immediate 
involvement in the images and ideas that contribute to the meanings of what is said 
concerning freedom and responsibility.  
 The two strategies I shall consider in the final sections are both attempts to 
negotiate our way around the fragility, and resilience, of these images and ideas; to 
thereby provide the basis for an ethical self-understanding; and to ultimately divulge 
ways of taking up, first-personally, agreement in a form of life that comprises both 
reactive and non-reactive elements. In the next section I will disclose more fully, what 
Wittgenstein takes to be the ethical nature of the problem—as owing to a familiar 
sense of uncertainty arising from the tensions in our attitudes to both freedom and 
fatalism—and why it remains a problem that we must respond to first-personally. 
Part Two: The ethical character of the problem 
of freedom of the will 
In order to demonstrate the distinctly ethical nature of the problem for Wittgenstein, I 
will examine his last recorded remarks on freedom of the will made during a 
conversation with Norman Malcolm and O. K. Bouwsma in August 1949; the latter’s 
 LFW, p. 439.387
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journal comprising the only extant record of what was said. During their 
conversation, Wittgenstein gives what we might call a crystallised account of his 
views on freedom and responsibility.  What strikes one first is how closely the 388
conversation follows the line of the LFW—the conversation moves from talk of 
familiar and unfamiliar usages of phrases (e.g. ‘he can’t help it’ etc.) to talk of 
attitudes (e.g. ‘holding oneself responsible’, praising, blaming, etc.), and finally to a 
profound ‘uncertainty’ or ‘agony of spirit’.  It is this last which speaks to the roots 389
of the distinctly ethical character of the problem at the heart of the LFW, but which is 
otherwise left implicit in the LFW.  
 We may speculate that this difference in emphasis reflects Wittgenstein’s 
expectation, in the context of the LFW, that his students must glean for themselves 
the deeper significance of his ‘finding and inventing intermediate cases’. This 
pedagogical aspect carries through into his 1949 conversation with Bouwsma but here 
the effort to understand this deeper significance is made visible to us. In addition, the 
uncertainty that is represented, in the LFW, as a doubt as to whether or not knowledge 
of the causes of our actions will eventually mean that we ‘play a different game’ is, in 
the 1949 conversation, expressed as a more personal sort of anxiety around one’s own 
status as an ethical agent. Recalling the conversation, Bouwsma describes the 
profound sense of jeopardy that he comes to feel concerning his own freedom. 
W. said, I think, that the problem is crucial—he maybe, [sic.] meant 
serious and not simply speculative—when in respect to something which 
you yourself have done, you cannot now make up your mind whether you 
 The informal nature of the conversation makes it a far more tendencious source of information than 388
the LFW. However, the informal and heavily abridged nature of the conversation serves to highlight 
what are, for Wittgenstein, the most important aspects of the LFW.
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could help it or not, whether you were responsible. In this case your 
attitude towards your own self as, I suppose, a small horror, might make 
you anxious. Here the uncertainty, the problem, invades one’s own 
personality. But I do not now understand this. I need some illustrations. 
Ivan doesn’t know whether he is guilty or not. He decides. I suppose that 
in respect to the universe or in respect to another human being this 
question may be left in suspense. But in respect to oneself the issue is 
suffered, is an agony of spirit. Am I a living horror?  390
Bouwsma is safe in assuming that in calling the problem ‘crucial’ Wittgenstein means 
that it is not a merely speculative question, that it is existentially ‘serious’. What 
seriousness this problem has can, I think, be connected with a distinction Wittgenstein 
makes elsewhere between important problems and trivial ones; the key difference 
being that an important problem cannot be dissolved simply by being ‘trained in 
abstruse matters’.  As in the preceding section, it is not a question of discovery, e.g. 391
of indeterminism or of an as yet unknown or elusive formula, but of overcoming 
one’s unconscious attachment to a way of acting, i.e. in accordance with a certain 
picture. Bouwsma is right, then, to suppose that the ‘agony of spirit’ invades one’s 
personality in such a way that no speculative answer, such as whether freedom of the 
will is metaphysically possible, could fully resolve it. 
 Bouwsma also identifies rightly the locus of this ‘agony’ in the self, i.e. 
‘spirit’. Any response to this agony must therefore originate from this first-personal 
perspective. This is what Bouwsma means when he says that, ‘in respect to something 
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which you yourself have done’, the problem ‘invades one’s own personality’.  In 392
making this claim, it seems to me, Bouwsma is suggesting that the simplest 
expression of the problem can be whether or not I ought to hold myself responsible 
for my own actions. This is not to say that I ought to suspend my uncertainty over the 
responsibility of others. Rather it is to say that, since the problem is self-contained 
and self-directed, I am uniquely placed to alleviate my own suffering, i.e. I can 
unilaterally decide to take responsibility for my actions (or not to do so).   393
 William Brenner is also quick to suggest that the problem being ‘crucial’ 
relates, in particular, to one’s sense of personal responsibility. Brenner points to 
William James’s suggestion that even a very strong religious duty to ‘judge not’ must 
be applied sparingly, if at all, to one’s own case.  He argues, in agreement with 394
Bouwsma, that this is not because, in my own case, I know that I am responsible, but 
because I take responsibility and do not hold myself responsible as I might (or might 
not) hold others responsible.  The point here is not that one can be made certain of 395
one’s own responsibility but not of the responsibility of others. To presume this would 
be to overlook why the problem is felt as ‘an agony of spirit’ and why, in my own 
case, the problem is ‘crucial’. Moreover, whilst the problem being ‘crucial’ means 
Brenner is right to say that any uncertainty with regards one’s sense of personal 
responsibility ‘will have to be resolved’, there is no reason why this imperative does 
not also extend to our inter-personal attitudes. One might argue that the New 
Testament (Matthew 7:1) imperative Brenner appeals to, i.e. to ‘Judge not!’, is 
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already self-regarding since the biblical reference continues ‘lest ye be judged’. 
Therefore, the command not to judge others is as much a warning not to judge others 
too harshly, to cast them in an unfavourable light, or to think that one is immune to 
the same treatment. 
 It is worth pausing to reflect on the deeper significance of this example. In 
particular, the common standing between “sinners” from a religious point of view—
i.e. as all equally liable to be judged—does not give rise to the non-reactive attitudes 
only.  Wittgenstein demonstrates the reverse view in the LFW where the same 396
picture serves to describe reactive feeling: “Yes, he is a rascal and so am I. I am to 
blame and so is he.”  In taking responsibility for our own actions, therefore, we do 397
not remove the tensions or resolve the problem. On the contrary, the persistence of 
the tensions, between reactive and non-reactive attitudes, is what appears to make the 
problem ‘crucial’ for Wittgenstein. That is, in emphasising that the problem is 
‘crucial’, he is surely drawing attention to the need to properly engage with it as a 
problem. That is, in order to take seriously the problem as an existential one, we must 
be engaged in taking up both sides. The problem is crucial, in other words, precisely 
because one can be made acutely aware of one’s guilt and innocence.  
 In a remark written shortly after his 1949 conversation with Bouwsma, and 
suggestive of the same ‘agony of spirit’, Wittgenstein describes this sense of aporia.  
Look at human beings: one is poison to the other. A mother to her son, 
and vice versa, etc. But the mother is blind and so is her son. Perhaps they 
have guilty consciences, but what good does that do them? The child is 
 As was discussed in the preceding chapter, the images associated with not judging others are non-396
reactive in that they encourage one to think that human beings are sinful by nature, i.e. prone to falling.
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wicked, but nobody teaches it to be any different and its parents spoil it 
with their stupid affection; and how are they supposed to understand this 
and how is the child supposed to understand it? It’s as though they were 
all wicked and all innocent.  398
From the above it is clear that, for Wittgenstein, there is no possibility of the parent(s) 
or child deciding to look at things a certain way, since their innocence derives from 
their being ‘blind’ to those aspects of themselves that, for those who can see, lead to 
an aporia. It may be unclear, therefore, in what sense I can possibly engage, first-
personally, with the problem, i.e. as a problem.  
 Baker’s analysis of Wittgenstein’s method once again helps to explain why the 
problem being ‘crucial’ should mean that it is a problem that must be taken up first-
personally and, at the same time, what Bouwsma means by saying that we must 
respond to our ‘agony of spirit’ by deciding.  According to Baker, there is a 399
commonplace sense in which the response to the problem can be said to be 
‘voluntary’.  
The point of calling aspect-seeing ‘voluntary’ (and in this respect 
contrasting it with perception) is not to claim that it can be brought about 
on a whim, but rather that it makes sense to ask somebody to look at 
things differently, to say that a person has complied with this request, or 
equally that he has refused to see an aspect which is perfectly visible to 
others. We might say that changing one’s way of seeing things is difficult 
 CV, p. 86.398
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because it is voluntary, because one has to surrender what one has always 
wanted to see.  400
For Baker, the purpose of making the analogies conscious, is not to weigh up which 
analogies, or aspects of analogies, we make use of; e.g. by deciding to think of life as 
‘a path along a mountain ridge’.  On the contrary, the purpose is to disclose the full 401
range of available images (similes, metaphors, etc.) and to thereby avoid thinking in 
terms of only one analogy. For this reason, it would be wrong to think that we can 
choose, i.e. ‘on a whim’, which analogies we are conscious of. Baker’s account is 
therefore consistent with the Wittgenstein’s statement in the LFW that ‘you may be, 
for reasons unknown, compelled to look at it a certain way’.  Moreover, given the 402
primitive way in which an attitude comes to be expressed, we cannot speak of 
deciding to express (or not to express) a certain way of looking at things; even if one 
could make a decision not based on one’s existing way of looking at things, any 
response to the problem would be contiguous with the tensions under discussion. That 
is, any decision not to see aspects would be just another form of ‘aspect-blindness’ 
and would therefore constitute a failure to come to terms with the problem.  
 In her introduction to the French translation of the LFW, Antonia Soulez 
argues similarly that the sense in which it is up to us to perspicuously represent to 
ourselves our attitudes to freedom and responsibility is not about making choices.  403
On the contrary, she argues that ‘conversion’ (to a new way of seeing things) is, for 
Wittgenstein, made possible by a contraction of one’s will. For Soulez, the problem 
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 See my earlier point in Chapter One, Part Two, p. 49 concerning LFW, p. 431.401
 LFW, p. 435.402
 Soulez 2000, pp. 131-134.403
!  of !207 240
being ‘crucial’ means that we should eschew ‘a theoretical overcoming leading to a 
synthetic neutralization of opposing forces’.  Instead, the existential problem calls 404
for ‘surmounting’ what, in Culture and Value, Wittgenstein calls the ‘resistances of 
the will’.  For Wittgenstein, we are already engaged in a process of willing to see 405
things a certain way, and that, as a result, we actively resist other ways of looking at 
things. It is therefore ‘up to us’ to lower that resistance. For this reason, Soulez’s 
interpretation is conducive to the methodology under examination, viz. to make 
conscious those images (similes, metaphors, etc.) to which we are already committed 
and thereby take on both sides of the existential problem at once. Soulez formulates 
her own understanding of the therapeutic aspects of this methodology as follows: 
There is, on the one hand, what holds us captive in language—the striking 
image embedded in its net—and on the other what we put there when we 
discover a new connection. We are thus affected by a change through the 
effect of a different comparison. But the more the comparison is stretched, 
the more language holds unexpected analogies in reserve, the more 
chance there is that the method will lead us to this pacified view of the 
whole.   406
Like Baker, then, Soulez connects the conscious use of different analogies 
(connections, comparisons, images) with a clarity of vision, i.e. a ‘pacified view of 
the whole’. For Soulez, change—what in Wittgenstein’s vernacular she calls 
‘conversion’—to a new, hopefully more perspicuous, way of looking at things is 
 E.g. the kind of theoretical solution sought by Kai Nielsen et. al. 404
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affected by the very thing which captivates us, viz. the forcefulness of the images 
themselves.  
 It might be objected that this interpretation is still question-begging since it 
presupposes that we have sufficient freedom of the will not to will. That is, the same 
difficulties present in connection with a contraction of the will as present in 
connection with the will to will.  However, it can be responded that the kind of 407
freedom required to stop ourselves from doing something we are committed 
(primitively) to doing is unlike the will to will, unassuming. As Baker puts it: ‘it 
makes sense to ask somebody to look at things differently’ or to say that somebody 
‘has refused to see an aspect which is perfectly visible to others’; one must therefore 
‘surrender what one has always wanted to see’.  This is because that person is 408
already looking at things a particular way. For the same reason, Soulez insists that, 
for Wittgenstein, there is ‘no originary will, but a will which emerges out of a 
conquered inhibition’.  This is not to say this requirement is easy, far from it, but it 409
is not question-begging. 
 The real difficulty we have is also captured by Bouwsma. In the previously 
cited passage, Bouwsma expresses his own difficulty in understanding Wittgenstein 
as a need for illustrations. The image from Culture and Value of life as ‘a path along a 
mountain ridge’, or the image from the LFW of being ‘damned if I shall do such and 
such’, are by no means exhaustive of the available images. Bouwsma’s offers his own 
apt illustration, namely Ivan Karamazov. To begin with, the illustration confirms my 
 Cf. Wittgenstein’s remarks concerning Bishop Barnes in Chapter One, Part Two, p. 44 of this thesis; 407
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claim that, in responding to our ‘agony of spirit’ by deciding to take responsibility, 
this needn’t involve taking personal responsibility only; an individual can be just as 
intimately connected with taking responsibility for others. One of the key themes 
explored in The Brothers Karamazov concerns whether or not, and to what extent, I 
am to consider myself “my brother's keeper”. Like Matthew 7:1, whatever response is 
given to this question, it cannot fail to be intimately related to the responsibility we 
feel for ourselves and others. 
 In Ivan’s case, I think, there can be said to be a progression towards an 
appreciation of the problem under discussion. It is true that, to begin with, Ivan resists 
any imputation that he might be responsible for the actions of another; he thinks only 
of the responsibility that each of us, himself included, have for our own actions. This 
viewpoint is most vividly captured in Ivan’s recitation of the parable of The Grand 
Inquisitor, but the same viewpoint is in evidence when Ivan is confronted with his 
brother Dmitri’s alleged guilt.  410
‘You are always harping upon it! What have I to do with it? Am I my 
brother Dmitri’s keeper?’ Ivan snapped irritably, but then he suddenly 
smiled bitterly. ‘Cain’s answer about his murdered brother, wasn’t it?’  411
Ivan’s viewpoint above is contrasted pointedly and repeatedly with his younger 
brother Alyosha’s beliefs, represented by the teachings of Father Zossima, viz. that 
‘every one of us is undoubtedly responsible for all men—and everything on earth’.  412
What Father Zossima is describing, it seems to me, is a way of treating others that at 
 Dostoevsky, F. The Brothers Karamazov. Book V, Chapter V. Garnett, C. (trans).410
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once recognises people as both all innocent and all sinful. It is arguably the fatalistic 
aspect of this teaching that Ivan, in the preceding passage, is closed to, i.e. he denies 
that responsibility can be meted out to all and for everything. Instead Ivan can be said 
to in the grip of an entirely non-fatalistic idea that each is responsible for his own 
actions alone. For this reason, it can hardly be said that Ivan is in the grip of an 
‘agony of spirit’ to that he takes seriously, even for a moment, the suggestion that he 
might lower his resistance to taking responsibility for his brother.  413
 However, as we know, Ivan does ultimately open his heart to the possibility 
that he is his brother’s keeper, culminating in his attempt to wrest responsibility away 
from his brother and onto himself. There is no clear indication given in the text that 
Ivan lowers his resistance to taking responsibility for his brother in light of the 
religious (and largely fatalistic) picture presented by Father Zossima; although it 
might be said that the picture is given just this significance by the author. In any case, 
the important aspect of the illustration is that, in opening his heart to the 
responsibility that he has for his brother’s actions, Ivan can now be said to engage 
with the problem as a problem; i.e. that ‘Ivan doesn’t know whether he is guilty or 
not. He decides.’  
 It may still be felt that, in responding to this ‘agony of spirit’, it is still unclear 
whether Ivan is more or less fortunate than he was before, i.e. prior to lowering the 
‘resistances of the will’. It can be argued that this development in Ivan’s character is 
instrumental (or at least influential) in bringing about his descent into madness.  414
Those who wish to know what it is that Wittgenstein promises, beyond a mere 
 The irritability and bitterness with which Ivan expresses his initial viewpoint might be taken to 413
indicate that he is at least aware of this possibility, and that he resists it. 
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description of the tensions in our attitudes, are liable to be put off, rather than 
comforted, by the illustration. Such a judgement would be overly hasty, however, 
since, on an alternative reading of The Brothers Karamazov, it could be said that Ivan 
is indeed worse off for being, as it were, ‘superficially certain’ of his lack of 
responsibility. On this reading, Ivan’s ethical enlightenment can be considered his 
most vital undertaking.  Nevertheless, it might be objected further that the 415
illustration only has this significance if the reader too is open to both Ivan’s original 
position (as represented by the Parable of the Grand Inquisitor) as well as the 
alternative point of view he embraces later (as represented by the teachings of Father 
Zossima). That is, a reader who is, in their own self, resistant to either image is liable 
to think that Ivan is mistaken—either for resisting taking responsibility for his 
brother’s actions or else for lowering that resistance. To this it can be responded that, 
whether or not one continues to resist, it remains a possibility that one will, like Ivan, 
come to ‘surrender what one has always wanted to see’.  For this reason, 416
Bouwsma’s illustration can, at the very least, serve as a warning: that failing to take 
up the tensions that could one day manifest themselves in our own lives, might well 
lead us to the same impasse as Ivan.  
 Bouwsma’s illustration helps therefore to clarify why it is that the problem is 
‘crucial’ for Wittgenstein; and why it cannot simply be ‘suspended’.  That is, when 417
Bouwsma supposes ‘that in respect to the universe or in respect to another human 
being this question may be left in suspense’, he means that as a speculative question, 
 The novel also ends on a hopeful note, suggesting that, through Alyosha’s administrations Ivan will 415
recover—symbolic, perhaps, of the healing power of faith.
 Baker 2004, p. 46.416
 Bouwsma 1986, p. 17.417
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i.e. as a matter of idle curiosity, the question of whether or not I am responsible 
ceases to have any pull. At least for Wittgenstein, whatever significance the problem 
has must be accounted for by the potential gains or loses to one’s self-understanding. 
That the problem should ‘invade one’s own personality’ is not what Wittgenstein 
hopes for, i.e. it is not a risk one takes in seeking the potential benefits. On the 
contrary, it is a threat one perpetually faces whether or not one is conscious of the 
fact, and which we would be wise, therefore, to respond to. 
 To that end, I can now turn to the question of how the above method—of 
making conscious use of certain images as images—can help us to tackle the problem 
of the freedom of the will against this background of his perception of the ultimately 
ethical character of the problem. As we shall see, a continued resistance to certain 
images is one possible method whilst seeking to lower one’s resistance to those same 
images is yet another. 
Part Three: Exposing the false dichotomy: 
finding intermediate cases 
The notions of perspicuity, aspect-seeing and of the requirement to recognise images 
as images all speak to the way in which Wittgenstein seeks to expose the images that 
‘captivate’ our thinking. As we shall see, at least one aspect of this disclosure 
involves exposing the false dichotomy being drawn between unqualifiedly fatalistic 
pictures and unqualifiedly non-fatalistic pictures. That is, one of the reasons 
Wittgenstein has for ‘finding and inventing intermediate cases’ is that they can be 
interposed between these unqualified, and perhaps more obvious, examples, thereby 
exposing other qualified, but equally valid, images. This process of moderation, if not 
an intentional side-effect of ‘finding and inventing intermediate cases’, is nonetheless 
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useful in mitigating the tensions inherent within an ethical life that incorporates both 
reactive and non-reactive elements—which is to say, a life that is lived in accordance 
with both fatalistic and non-fatalistic images. 
 One initial obstacle to interposing a suitable alternative between fatalistic and 
non-fatalistic images is that, in the LFW, Wittgenstein describes the debates 
surrounding freedom of the will as owing to extreme, polarised points of view.  418
That is, the ‘agony of spirit’ Bouwsma refers to is experienced as a primitive 
commitment to two, equally meaningful, and yet diametrically opposed, images, e.g. 
of life as ‘a path along a mountain ridge’ or of my being, what Bouwsma calls, ‘a 
living horror’. This is what makes it possible for one person to say “All are 
responsible” whilst another person might say “None are responsible”; this is what it 
means for either view to be unqualified. However, it can be objected that there is no 
basis for the assumption that adopting a fatalistic or non-fatalistic attitude must be 
done unqualifiedly.  
 In an analogous way, Wittgenstein introduces, in the LFW, the intermediate 
case of ‘the difference (in greatness) between [himself] and Kant’ as being ‘one of 
degree’; the aim here is to dispel thinking of things only in terms of ‘the difference 
between black and white’.  It is not unreasonable to seek now to contrast the ‘black 419
and white’ difference between unqualifiedly fatalistic and unqualifiedly non-fatalistic 
attitudes with a difference between fatalistic and non-fatalistic attitudes that is ‘only 
one of degree’. In deference to the pictorial representation of the colour octahedron, 
and to Wittgenstein’s mention of a black-and-white difference, an alternative colour-
 LFW, p. 437.418
 the LFW p. 432.419
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analogue for the difference between the use of fatalistic and non-fatalistic images 
might be a ‘grey area’ in which my uncertainty is diffused and a matter of ‘degree’. 
For this reason, it may be that Wittgenstein opposes the initial inclination to think 
only in terms of unqualified images of freedom and fatalism. That is, our attitudes 
need not change ‘just like that’, and there may be suitable room in-between the 
unqualified images associated with freedom and fatalism to interpose a different 
image.  
 One such ‘intermediate case’ is used by Wittgenstein in conjunction with the 
Downstairs Crank example, namely the image of the Law Court. As we saw in my 
first chapter, Wittgenstein initially concedes that someone who was compelled to act 
against his will would not be held responsible and he supports this conclusion by 
appealing to the image of the Law Court. 
What would they say in a Law Court? Would they say I was responsible 
or not? Would the people downstairs be punished or would I; or both? The 
Law Court gives us some idea of what we call ‘free’, ‘responsible’.  420
In the second Downstairs Crank example—where an individual is forced to do what 
he would have done anyway—the image of the Law Court still resonates. In this case, 
however, there is no clear answer to the question of whether the man, who would 
have acted in exactly the same way, is responsible in this sense. That this is a ‘very 
special case’ is relevant to why Wittgenstein thinks that it undermines the 
incompatibilist’s supposition that we might all be so compelled. Nevertheless, this 
does little to clarify what they would say in a Law Court concerning just such a ‘very 
special case’. This should not to be taken to imply a deficiency in how the image of 
 LFW, pp. 434-5.420
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the Law Court represents ‘what we call ‘free’ and ‘responsible’’.  On the contrary, it 421
indicates very clearly that Wittgenstein remains alive to, what P. F. Strawson called, 
‘penumbral areas’, i.e. cases where we look at and judge someone but not in terms 
that are ‘black and white’. Such cases are common in a Law Court, for instance, 
where someone is judged to be guilty or not guilty and yet is punished in a more or 
less quantifiable manner. For these reasons, the kind of responsibility one has in a 
Law Court might serve as a suitable alternative to, so-called, ‘heaven-and-hell’ 
responsibility.  
 ‘Heaven-and-hell’ responsibility is one side of a ‘black and white’ conception 
of responsibility that is arguably a necessary requirement for being judged morally 
responsible. Famously, Galen Strawson defends this necessity, adding that a lack of 
belief in ‘the story of heaven and hell’ does not mean the kind of responsibility 
required in order for someone to be thought worthy of eternal damnation or reward is 
not of fundamental importance to the expression of the reactive attitudes. However, 
by associating ‘true’ responsibility with an image of heaven-and-hell responsibility, 
and then by arguing that any such responsibility is an ‘impossibility’, Galen Strawson 
concludes that all feeling of responsibility (personal or otherwise) is misplaced; it is 
necessary, therefore, to deny freedom of the will and refuse to hold people 
responsible.   422
 As a proponent of the ‘black and white’ dichotomy I am seeking to expose as 
false, Galen Strawson is representative of a large number of commentators who 
 Ibid.421
 Strawson, G. 1994, p. 5; In line with his ‘Basic Argument’—that since nothing is a causa sui, 422
nothing can be truly responsible—Galen Strawson argues that any optimistic defence of freedom of the 
will, and therefore of the reactive attitudes, falls short of a defence of this, heaven-and-hell 
responsibility.
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defend or deny a freedom of the will unqualifiedly. Wittgenstein’s claim—to be 
neither defending nor denying freedom of the will—is, in large part, a rejection of 
this dichotomy between an unqualified freedom or an unqualified fatalism. One way 
to avoid this dichotomy, as I have said, is to interpose a more moderate, or 
‘intermediate’, image in-between these two unqualified images. It may be that 
Wittgenstein has in mind the same sort of cases that P. F. Strawson refers to as a 
‘penumbral area’ in which the reactive attitudes, whilst not obviated by the objective 
attitude, are mitigated.  As was discussed in Chapter II of this thesis, the penumbral 423
areas P. F. Strawson identifies play an important role in his criticism of the pessimist’s 
claim that we might all be equally incapacitated if determinism is true. I maintain that 
these same cases might also be used to demonstrate a willingness to compromise that, 
in Galen Strawson’s case at least, is too readily dismissed. Galen Strawson recognises 
that there are those who defend a freedom of the will that, in his eyes, is over 
qualified; e.g. an account that concedes the impossibility of an eternal reward or 
punishment, but nevertheless defends a freedom of the will premised on temporal 
rewards and punishments. Galen Strawson’s real target is any compatibilistic account 
of freedom and responsibility that is premised on a familiar picture of responsibility, 
e.g. the Law Courts. For instance, a compatibilist account is able to account for why, 
in the first Downstairs Crank example, the Law Court would say W is not 
responsible, viz. W was pushed. The sticking point for Galen Strawson remains the 
Law Court’s inability to determine guilt in the second example, i.e. where W is forced 
to do what he would have done anyway. On anyone’s definition of determinism, this 
 Strawson, P. F. 2008, p. 21; ‘Whatever sense of ‘determined’ is required for stating the thesis of 423
determinism, it can scarcely be such as to allow of compromise, border-line style answers to the 
question, ‘is this bit of behaviour determined or isn’t it?’ But in this matter of young children, it is 
essentially a border-line, penumbral area that we move in.’
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second example comes closer to what we understand to be the influence of 
determinism, and yet the Law Court is, on this occasion, no guide at all to what we 
should say concerning W’s actions. We might think, therefore, that Galen Strawson is 
right to stick with the ‘black and white’ dichotomy between unqualified images of 
freedom and fatalism. 
 However, the strongest reason for thinking that Galen Strawson too quickly 
dismisses qualified images, such as the Law Court, is one that he gives himself. At 
the same time as arguing that a ‘true’, i.e. heaven-and-hell, responsibility is a 
necessary requirement for our existing practices of praising and blaming, etc., he 
nonetheless concedes that the image is not always present in cultures where people 
hold themselves and others responsible.  Assuming this to be true, why must we 424
assume that our attitudes to freedom of the will are dependent upon an idea of 
heaven-and-hell responsibility at all? Might it not even be the other way around? 
Wittgenstein suggests as much when he argues that unqualified images of 
responsibility and punishment are rightly derivative of more general, everyday 
concepts.  
Could you explain the concept of the punishments of hell without using 
the concept of punishment? Or that of God’s goodness without using the 
concept of goodness?  
If you want the right effect with your words, certainly not.  425
 For instance, Galen Strawson speaks of a difference between ‘guilt cultures’ and ‘shame cultures’. 424
Firstly, it can be suggested that the existence of different cultures, one preoccupied with guilt and the 
other with shame, evinces just the opportunity I am seeking to take advantage of, i.e. a subtle alteration 
of how we internalise reactive/non-reactive feelings. Crucially, Galen Strawson states explicitly that 
neither culture ‘presupposes a conception of oneself as truly morally responsible for what one has 
done’. Strawson, G. 1994, p. 9. 
 CV, p. 80.425
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The effect Wittgenstein wishes to avoid is any understanding of the concepts of 
divine justice or divine goodness that are categorically distinct from how we 
understand the concepts of justice and goodness. He does not deny that one could 
explain the punishments of hell without using the concept of punishment, yet the 
effect this would have on those we were explaining it to would be ethically 
dubious.  I shall later clarify why Wittgenstein considers this explanation of 426
religious beliefs ethically dubious. For now, however, I am interested in his assertion 
that the communication of religious concepts is dependent upon our understanding of 
everyday concepts; i.e. that the priority runs in the other direction to that which is 
indicated by Galen Strawson.  
 This priority indicates one way of extricating ourselves from a false 
dichotomy between unqualified, perhaps religious, images of freedom and fatalism. 
That is, it can be argued that Galen Strawson is wrong to associate everyday 
concepts, such as are employed in the Law Courts, with the concepts associated with 
‘true’ responsibility, e.g. that we might be worthy of eternal punishment. He is right to 
insist that not all these images are religious, and yet the move from the eternal to the 
everyday is, for Wittgenstein at least, unnecessary. For this reason, the decline in the 
use of unqualified images of freedom and fatalism need not demonstrate a decline in 
the frequency with which the reactive attitudes are expressed. Rather, the decline may 
simply indicate a change in the feelings themselves. Perhaps this decline is the result 
of our being more greatly influenced by other images, e.g. the Law Court. 
 Rhees 1997, p. 36. ‘Is the reason for not worshipping the devil instead of God that God is stronger 426
than the devil? God will get you in the end, the devil will not be able to save you from his fury, and 
then you will be for it. ‘Think of your future, boy, and don’t throw away your chances.’ What a 
creeping and vile sort of thing religion must be.’
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 It is worth noting that, for Galen Strawson et. al., such a decline is not 
unwelcome. What gets in the way of their welcoming it, however, is their assumption 
that one is either free and responsible or not. By interposing the image of a 
responsibility that is ‘one of degree’, Wittgenstein is able to anticipate and 
accommodate the objections of those who insist that our everyday concepts of 
punishment and reward are misplaced. Nevertheless, what Wittgenstein shows is that 
space exists for such concepts in a more nuanced, moderate understanding of 
responsibility. 
 This initial strategy demonstrates that we can do without unqualifiedly 
fatalistic or non-fatalistic images. For this reason, the image of the Law Court helps 
expose a false dichotomy in just the way that Wittgenstein intended, i.e. it is a 
suitably perspicuous representation of what it means to be more-or-less responsible. 
The image is therefore part of a more general strategy aimed at avoiding our thinking 
only in ‘black and white’ terms. This position is further supported by Wittgenstein’s 
insistence that we ought not to start with unqualified images, e.g. there is good reason 
not to explain the concept of the punishments of hell without first using the concept 
of punishment.  
 However, this proposal is not the only alternative to a ‘black and white’ 
dichotomy indicated by the LFW. A second, complementary proposal can be put 
forward on the strength of Wittgenstein’s analysis of another image, one that 
maintains the unqualifiedly fatalistic and non-fatalistic aspects of a broader 
framework of attitudes; specifically, St. Paul’s doctrine of election by grace.  
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Part Four: preserving a practical use for both 
unqualifiedly fatalistic and non-fatalistic images 
As I shall now show, a second strategy can be put forward to complement the above 
strategy, but which takes an altogether different approach to the ethical tensions. That 
is, rather than seek to interpose a more moderate image in-between unqualifiedly 
fatalistic and unqualifiedly non-fatalistic images, we might consider a strategy that 
preserves a practical use for both. It is precisely in this connection, I want to suggest, 
that Wittgenstein begins to develop an account, both in the LFW and elsewhere, of 
the tensions as they are represented within a religious form of life, more specifically 
with reference to a certain picture offered by St. Paul.  Wittgenstein epitomises the 427
view, as it appears to be put forward by St. Paul (Romans 9, 21:23), as saying that 
‘God has made you a vessel of wrath or a vessel of grace, and yet that you are 
responsible’.  By preserving a practical use for this picture, not as a means of 428
expressing the problem but as a potential response to it, Wittgenstein indicates a 
second potential strategy for taking up the tensions first-personally. To demonstrate 
this, I shall argue that the picture offered by St. Paul, like St. Paul himself, seeks to be 
‘all things to all people’ so that via mutual correction of one’s attitude one can avoid 
thinking in terms of only one image. 
 What is promised by St. Paul connects with something Wittgenstein says is 
distinctive about a religious form of life, namely that it encompasses a sense in which 
human beings are, as described earlier, ‘all wicked and all innocent’. Elsewhere, 
 Wittgenstein refers to Romans 9 frequently. E.g. CV (1998), pp. 34, 37, 87-88; LFW, p. 437; see 427
also, Bouwsma 1986, pp. 12, 15-16.
 LFW, p. 437.428
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Wittgenstein incorporates this image of mankind, as ‘all wicked and all innocent’ into 
an account of the advantages of a religious attitude to life. 
The whole planet can suffer no greater torment than a single soul. The 
Christian faith—as I see it—is a man’s refuge in this ultimate torment. 
Anyone in such torment who has the gift of opening his heart, rather than 
contracting it, accepts the means of salvation in his heart. Someone who 
in this way penitently opens his heart to God in confession lays it open for 
other men too. In doing this he loses the dignity that goes with his 
personal prestige and becomes like a child. … A man can bare himself 
before others only out of a particular kind of love. A love which 
acknowledges, as it were, that we are all wicked children.  429
The above is taken, by Wittgenstein, not as a fatalistic denial of responsibility, but as 
a way of responding to both an unqualifiedly fatalistic and unqualifiedly non-fatalistic 
understanding of human beings. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s words echo those of 
Father Zossima, who teaches not only that we can take responsibility for all and for 
everything, but that in doing so we must openly confess our sins to ourselves (or to 
God).  For both Wittgenstein and Zossima, someone who opens his heart in 430
confession to God does so, not in pride or in pity for oneself, but by holding oneself 
responsible.  Once again, this is not to say that the self-reactive attitudes take 431
precedence over inter-personal attitudes since it is by opening one’s heart to oneself 
 CV, p. 46.429
 Monk 1991, p. 136. Ray Monk writes that in 1916 ‘Wittgenstein read [The Brothers Karamazov] so 430
often he knew whole passages of it by heart, particularly the speeches of the elder Zossima, who 
represented for him a powerful Christian ideal, a holy man who could “see directly into the souls of 
other people”. 
 Dostoevsky, F. The Brothers Karamazov, Book IV, Chapter I. Garnett, C. (trans).431
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or God that one opens it to others. For Wittgenstein, as for Father Zossima, this is the 
purpose of confessing our sins, i.e. to prevent us from ‘hardening our heart’ towards 
others and so isolating ourselves. This is why Wittgenstein continues the above series 
of remarks by adding that ‘hate between men comes from our cutting ourselves off 
from each other.’   432
 Whilst Wittgenstein is not himself a believer, the interest he shows in the 
struggle to ‘stay within the religious sphere’ is therefore intimately connected with, 
what Brenner calls, the practice of ‘sizing ourselves up morally’, i.e. distinguishing 
what we ‘freely caused to happen’ from what ‘just happens to us’. Brenner identifies 
further that Wittgenstein’s interest in a religious point of view derives, to no small 
degree, from his wish to understand just how this practice, and the ‘judgemental 
attitude naturally animating it’, comes to be altered by embracing ‘this and every 
form of common life and practice from a contemplative distance’. Brenner concludes 
that through this contemplation of different forms of life, the believers in question are 
granted ‘the grace to return to active participation in life with a less ruthless attitude 
towards themselves and others’.  Brenner’s notion of ‘contemplative distance’ has a 433
bearing on both parts of the strategic response in question, but with regards the first 
part, it shows how hatred can indeed turn to understanding by placing alongside the 
unqualifiedly non-fatalistic picture of people as wicked or sinful, the unqualifiedly 
fatalistic picture of human beings as children. The upshot is that we will thereby 
avoid subscribing to only one of these images, i.e. wickedness or innocence, and 
implement both in such a way as to counteract too strong feelings of hatred.  
 CV, p. 46.432
 Brenner 2001a, pp. 62-3.433
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 At least one way of implementing this strategy is relayed autobiographically 
by Wittgenstein himself. Writing of his experience in the trenches, where he 
experienced pronounced hostility from his fellow soldiers, Wittgenstein writes: 
The people around me are not so much mean as appallingly limited. This 
makes it almost impossible to work with them, because they forever 
misunderstand one. These people are not stupid but limited. Within their 
circle they are smart enough. But they lack character, and thereby breadth. 
‘A heart of true faith will understand all.’  434
It is important to stress that the strategic advantage of fatalistic images is here granted 
only if they are applied to counteract the distressing aspects of ‘hardening one’s 
heart’. Wittgenstein does not think that understanding all necessarily leads to 
forgiveness. Certainly, he is not defending a claim, i.e. that we ought to understand 
rather than hate. In the LFW, Wittgenstein dispels the illusion brought about by 
thinking that, because understanding often counteracts hate, that ‘this is how it must 
be!’ He therefore opposes the fatalist’s dogmatic claim that ‘To understand all is to 
excuse all’ by asking, rhetorically yet significantly, ‘How do you know?’  Contra 435
the fatalist’s interpretation of the phrase, the true significance of the saying ‘a heart of 
true faith will understand all’ is more closely related to this strategic development, 
viz. through the broadening of one’s character. This, then, is the ethical bedrock of a 
fatalism that is used to dispel hatred. 
 MS 103, 8 May, 1916 as cited in Rhees, 1984, p. 198.434
 LFW, p. 436; Wittgenstein compares the statement with an advert claiming that “There are over 100 435
miles of kidney to clean”, the intention of the advert being to make it seem as though cleaning kidneys 
is particularly difficult when this needn’t be the case at all. 
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 The way in which Wittgenstein applies fatalistic imagery in his own life—i.e. 
not as an out-and-out fatalist would do, but in order to quell the expression of only 
one unqualified attitude—relates back to his idea that ‘the rules of life are dressed up 
in pictures’ but not in such a way that they justify behaving a certain way. It is by 
seeking to understand what it is that limits others’ attitude(s) towards him, that 
Wittgenstein identifies the trait that he most wants to exemplify in his own attitude(s) 
towards them, viz. to understand rather than hate. By saying that his fellow soldiers’ 
misunderstood him, not out of stupidity, but out of a limitation of character, 
Wittgenstein once again reiterates that what is lacking here is a sufficiently broad 
response to the range of attitudes available.  
 The above clarifies further what I mean by saying that expressing both 
unqualified attitude(s) can serve a practical function, as mutually corrective of one 
another. When overtaken by a particular strong feeling one way, the tensions need no 
longer be seen as the cause of my anxiety. On the contrary, the tensions are what pull 
me back from attempting to justify my strength of feeling as though it were a claim, 
or from expressing only one unqualified attitude. Therefore, what prevents the above 
from being just another expression of fatalism is that it is made more, not less, 
meaningful by its serving as a counterpoint to the expression of an equally primitive, 
and perhaps unqualified, tendency to hate.  
 Nevertheless, in order for this to hold true, and in order for us to appreciate 
the full scope of the strategic response to the tensions a further manoeuvre must also 
be possible, i.e. the move to hate rather than understand. This, admittedly less natural 
tendency, is perhaps harder to make intelligible, although it must be possible at least 
to conceive of the above strategy being used ‘backwards’. During my analysis of the 
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LFW, the closest I have come to an example of this strategy being implemented, 
however, is when someone, who can understand all too well the action of another, 
says, “Yes, he is a rascal and so am I. I am to blame and so is he”.  In such a case, 436
the individual in question is beholden to the same picture as Wittgenstein—that we 
are all ‘wicked children’—and yet this level of understanding does not serve as an 
excuse. However, this says only that the images associated with fatalism can serve a 
non-fatalistic purpose; just as, prima facie, the command, ‘Judge not!’ is non-reactive 
and yet can only be made use of non-fatalistically (i.e. reactively).  
 A stronger case might be built around the penumbral areas spoken of by P. F. 
Strawson, i.e. cases where denying a person’s responsibility is implemented in order 
that that person should be reintegrated into reactive engagement with others. What I 
am suggesting is that, in similar cases, someone might make conscious use of the 
analogy—that we are all wicked children—to overcome a primitive desire to 
understand, rather than rebuke. For instance, a parent who sees their child 
misbehaving might instinctively think back to the exuberances of their own youth and 
say, “I was a child once too” and, in order to counteract this thought, make conscious 
use of another image, i.e. that they too were a rascal. As a result, the initial thought, 
i.e. to understand rather than rebuke, might be replaced by a desire to blame the child 
as they too should have been blamed; which is as if to say, “Yes, he is a rascal and so 
am I. I am to blame and so is he”. Again, however, this is limited to cases of actual 
children and can, at best, serve to explain the analogy we are looking to make 
conscious use of. 
 LFW, p. 437.436
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 Nevertheless, this kind of case gives us some clue at least as to a potential 
answer to the question of when we might be inclined to hate rather than understand a 
person’s actions. For instance, in taking the command, ‘Judge not!’ to heart, one 
might be inclined to rebuke one’s own actions even as one commands oneself not to 
be resentful. In saying this, I am not insinuating that one’s feelings of personal 
responsibility are the primary or only source of angst. Rather, it is to say that an 
individual can be critical of his own actions, to the point at which no fatalistic 
imagery will prevent that person from holding themselves accountable (even if they 
have an entirely fatalistic attitude with regards to others). As Wittgenstein attests 
above, acknowledging that we are all ‘wicked children’ is done through confession of 
one’s own sins; or, as Father Zossima puts it, in recognition that ‘I am lower than all 
men’.  437
 It is for similar reasons that Wittgenstein reflects in the LFW that ‘when [St. 
Paul] says the words he does say he seems to take the responsibility on himself.’  438
Although St. Paul is not thought by Wittgenstein to limit the non-fatalistic image to 
his own case; at least, Wittgenstein’s paraphrase of St. Paul ends by saying ‘that you 
are responsible’.  In any case, when St. Paul invokes God’s will he is doing so in 439
neither of the ways described in the preceding chapter, i.e. in order to explain events 
or as the expression of a fatalistic attitude.  That is not to say that St. Paul and the 440
fatalist contradict each other—as Wittgenstein attests, the two might ‘disagree greatly, 
 Dostoevsky, F. The Brothers Karamazov, Book IV, Chapter I. Garnett, C. (trans).437
 LFW, p. 439.438
 LFW, p. 437. Emphasis added.439
 See Chapter III, Part Four of this thesis. 440
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little [sic.] or hardly at all. It depends.’  What it depends on is the manner in which 441
the words are said—it is by reading the manner of his words, and by not taking him to 
be advancing a theory, that Wittgenstein is able to connect St. Paul’s words with a 
non-fatalistic attitude.  
 For this reason, the picture offered by St. Paul might be thought to provide, 
not just a perspicuous representation of the tensions, but also a potential way of 
taking responsibility despite or even because of an essential human weakness, i.e. that 
we are wicked despite, and because, we are like children.  That is, the picture 442
presented by St. Paul can be connected with a strategic response to the tensions 
because it involves overcoming all opposition to taking responsibility for one’s 
actions; i.e. one is asked (or commanded), on the strength of an image more 
commonly associated with pity, to take the uncommon step of holding oneself 
responsible. This might help to explain why Wittgenstein refers to both the religious 
and ethical demands of this picture as a ‘struggle’.  443
 An initial obstacle to making use of this picture is therefore that we might be 
unequal to the task St. Paul is placing on us. It is worth considering that, only a few 
years prior to the LFW, Wittgenstein admits his difficulty applying the picture in his 
own life. 
At my level the Pauline doctrine of predestination is ugly nonsense, 
irreligiousness. Hence it is not suitable for me, since the only use I could 
 LFW, p. 439. Cf. LFW, p. 441; ‘propositions of which one is inclined to say that they express 441
feeling are generally said with feeling.’
 My interpretation of Wittgenstein’s words is similar to the interpretation put on Simone Weil’s 442
words by Diogenes Allen, i.e. that we experience the love of God, not just despite suffering, but 
because of it. This is offered ‘not as a theory but as what actually happens.’ E.g. Allen 1980 in Adams 
& Adams (eds.) 1990, p. 189-208.
 CV, p. 86.443
!  of !228 240
make of the picture I am offered would be a wrong one. If it is a good and 
godly picture, then it is for someone at a quite different level, who must 
use it in his life in a way completely different from anything that would 
be possible for me.  444
What Wittgenstein finds repellent about the picture being offered by St. Paul is 
perhaps most understandable since the picture represents, in unqualified terms, the 
fatalistic idea, put forward in the LFW, that ‘He hasn’t given himself weakness and 
strength’ which, Wittgenstein goes on to say, is ‘generally, though not always, the 
beginning of a plea of not guilty.’  The picture offered by St. Paul is introduced in 445
the LFW, not as an intermediate case, but as an exception to this general use of an 
unqualifiedly fatalistic image. In saying this, however, Wittgenstein does not 
condemn the picture being presented by St. Paul any more than he condemns the 
picture of natural laws as laid down in a book.  As potential theories, neither stands 446
up to prolonged scrutiny and yet, as images, both have the potential to be made use 
of; even if both are thought, by Wittgenstein, to be ‘peculiar’ in some way.  
 Furthermore, Wittgenstein gives us several other reasons for thinking that he 
is, not so much critical of the picture offered by St. Paul, as he is cut off from it.  To 447
begin with, that Wittgenstein takes an interest in St. Paul’s doctrine is evidenced by 
his repeated references to it; it is not implausible to suggest that his interest derives 
from a wish to be able to apply the image ‘correctly’ in his own life, i.e. as St. Paul 
 CV, p. 32.444
 LFW, p. 437.445
 See fn. 336 of this thesis.446
 Bouwsma 1986, p. 16; Bouwsma records that, during their conversation in 1947, the question of 447
God’s responsibility is also raised but that ‘[Wittgenstein] would not judge.’
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intended. That is, the image is, to him, ‘ugly nonsense’ due his tendency to think 
fatalistically; e.g. to think about life in terms of ‘a path along a mountain ridge’. That 
is not to say that he advocates fatalism, merely that his resistance to the picture 
offered by St. Paul prevents him from making conscious use of the image as a means 
of holding others responsible. This is evidenced by the way in which Wittgenstein 
describes his difficulty concerning the picture offered by St. Paul, in the same terms 
as, for example, his ‘lack of faith’ (felt as an absence) in Christ as redeemer.  It can 448
therefore be suggested that the level at which Wittgenstein envisages applying the 
picture offered by St. Paul, is at the same level at which he envisages refuge being 
given to those in, what he calls, ‘ultimate torment’.  449
 As was mentioned previously, one way in which religion might be said to 
serve as a refuge, particularly in the case of feelings of hatred, is by offering, what 
Brenner calls, ‘contemplative distance’.  That is, by embracing multiple different 450
ways in which to live. As Soulez puts it, it is by ‘surmounting’ our resistance to 
seeing and making ‘new connections’ (comparisons, analogies, images, etc.) that we 
can gain a ‘pacified view of the whole’ of human nature.  Wittgenstein demonstrates 451
in his own life too that it is not enough to recognise the ethical tensions that exist in 
our attitudes towards others, one must hold each in abeyance of the other. This, I 
 In Culture and Value Wittgenstein admits that he cannot ‘utter the word “Lord” with meaning’, 448
since, in order to do so, he would have to live ‘completely differently’. Crucially, this does not prevent 
him from recognising the value of the image, e.g. of Christ as redeemer, as a way of regulating one’s 
life; merely he lacks the certitude, the faith, to regulate his life in the requisite manner. CV, p. 33.
 Ibid. As I mentioned in my discussion of fatalism in the preceding chapter, we might also consider 449
Winch’s suggestion: that one’s fatalistic attitude might be subsumed within ‘an attitude of gratitude for 
life’; Winch, P. in Malcolm 2002, p. 113.
 Brenner 2001a, pp. 62-3.450
 Soulez 2000, pp. 136.451
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maintain, is what it means to live ‘completely differently’—i.e. not in accordance 
with one or another image but in accordance with all at once.  
 It might be objected that, if the picture offered by St. Paul is relevant only if 
you live ‘completely differently’, then this would appear to entail a complete loss of 
self. However, an inability to surmount one’s resistance to another picture is not, on 
Wittgenstein’s account, to be associated with an expression of self. Wittgenstein’s 
confessed difficulty in applying the picture correctly in his own life is intended to 
undermine whatever authority the pictures we currently live by might be thought to 
have. For this reason, the response is not restricted to a religious view of things, but 
rather to a view that is, in a sense unrestricted; or, as Wittgenstein puts it in 
continuation of the above cited passage, ‘if you no longer support yourself on this 
earth but suspend yourself from heaven’: 
Then everything is different and it is ‘no wonder’ if you can then do what 
now you cannot do. (It is true that someone who is suspended looks like 
someone who is standing but the interplay of forces within him is 
nevertheless a quite different one & hence he is able to do quite different 
things than can one who stands.)  452
What Wittgenstein knows he cannot do is attain a truly contemplative distance from 
the ethical tensions in his own life—far too strong is the tendency to say ‘How could 
a man help himself in such a situation!’  For this reason, the above indicates, not 453
only what Wittgenstein lacks, but also what it is he is looking for—hoping for, rather
—vis-à-vis a potential response to the tensions. That is, despite his own difficulty in 
 CV, p. 33.452
 CV, p. 63.453
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applying correctly the picture offered by St. Paul, Wittgenstein does not think that it 
is impossible to envisage making either move I have been considering. More 
importantly, both moves can be seen as part of a wider methodology; firstly, to dispel 
the illusion that freedom of the will must be this (or that) way; and secondly, to 
provide a way of taking up, first-personally, the tensions inhering within a broader 
framework of attitudes. This, then, is what a ‘heart of true faith’ understands, namely 
all the different ways in which it is possible to understand. More importantly, we can 
see how these strategic moves each involve the implementation of the strategy of 
making conscious use of different (and multiple) images. The thought expressed is 
one not so much one of self-effacement, but of self-understanding or self-control.  
 Our discussion of Wittgenstein’s interest in the picture offered by St. Paul 
therefore exemplifies one possible way in which his therapeutic strategy can be 
implemented, around ‘the axis of our real need’.  That is to say, in the same way 454
that St. Paul claimed to have ‘become all things to all people so that by all possible 
means I might save some’ (Corinthians 9:22), so too might we consider the picture he 
offers to be ‘all things to all people’, depending on their need. That is, we might 
employ the picture offered by St. Paul as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to our distress. 
In this way, our attitudes can be mutually corrective to each other without 
compromising the unqualifiedly fatalistic or unqualifiedly non-fatalistic images 
associated with them. That is, when I am overtaken by a particular strong feeling one 
way, the tensions need no longer be seen as the cause of my anxiety. On the contrary, 
 ‘Our consideration must be rotated but around the axis of our real need.’ PI, §108. The phrasing of 454
this remark was altered in the 1958 edition of Philosophical Investigations: ‘The axis of reference of 
our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.’
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the tensions are what pull me back, say, from attempting to justify my strength of 
feeling.  
 Against the account I have offered here—of two different, yet complementary, 
strategies for implementing pictures of freedom and fatalism—it might be objected 
that a strategy which maintains a dichotomy between unqualifiedly fatalistic and 
unqualifiedly non-fatalistic images is inconsistent with a strategy seeking to expose 
that dichotomy as false. That is, one could not envisage taking up both strategies at 
once. The whole point of the image of the Law Court is to obviate the need for any 
talk of ‘heaven-and-hell responsibility’. In order to respond to this objection, and to 
illuminate the complementary elements of the two strategies, it is necessary to first 
understand the conditional aspects of the first strategy—that we ought not begin with, 
or limit ourselves to, unqualifiedly fatalistic or non-fatalistic images. Therefore, 
whilst we cannot take up both strategies at once, this does not mean that a strategy 
advocating the use of neither unqualified image is incompatible with the existence of 
a second strategy advocating the use of both images. A comparison might be drawn 
here with two incompatible, but equally effective, diets—the first consisting of no 
excess proteins or fats and a second comprising nothing but these food groups. 
 In addition, the two strategies complement each other in so far as anyone who 
is not helped by the one will likely find a ‘refuge’ in the other. For instance, the first 
strategy is of use to anyone who can find no practical use for either an unqualifiedly 
fatalistic or unqualifiedly non-fatalistic images. Wittgenstein arguably does not 
himself fall into this category since, unlike P. F. Strawson, he makes conscious use of 
unqualifiedly fatalistic images and, unlike Galen Strawson, he also makes conscious 
use of unqualifiedly non-fatalistic images. The second strategy is therefore of use to 
!  of !233 240
anyone who, like Wittgenstein, takes up the tensions first-personally. Certainly, the 
image described in Section 2, of human beings as ‘all wicked and all innocent’, is not 
catered for by a ‘diet’ of purely fatalistic images. At the same time, fatalistic images 
are most nourishing when they are part of a more complete ‘diet’. For these reasons, 
there need be no inconsistency in my putting forward, on Wittgenstein’s behalf, two 
different, if complementary, strategies, because a practical use can be found for both. 
 That Wittgenstein himself is open to either strategy can be shown by attending 
to his comments in the revised edition of Culture and Value concerning the 
appearance, on the Pauline account, that ‘nothing—in human terms—is right.’  In 455
saying this, Wittgenstein acknowledges that images of heaven-and-hell responsibility 
conflict with everyday ideas of punishment and reward—the specific objection being 
that God punishes where punishment would not be allowed by human beings.  This 456
coincides with the objection I am now responding to, viz. that the ambivalence 
between a sense that human beings must have the ability to do what’s right and a 
sense that human beings radically lack this ability goes to the heart of St Paul’s 
perspective but is altogether lacking from the perspective of the Law Court, for 
instance. This is why Wittgenstein concedes that although, according to the picture 
offered by St. Paul, ‘nothing—in human terms—is right’ it can nonetheless be 
responded “But isn’t it right all the same?” In this way, Wittgenstein argues that, in a 
religious point of view, ‘the whole concept of ‘punishment’ changes’. For this reason, 
he accepts that ‘some will be far more confused than helped’ by the images (similes, 
metaphors, etc.) that are part of a religious form of life. Yet his response in these 
 CV (1998), p. 87. MS 137 130a: 22.12.1948.455
 Ibid.456
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cases is to ‘apply [the image] differently or don’t bother with it!’  That is, failing to 457
be nourished by a particular diet of images need serve only to encourage one to look 
for alternatives images; perhaps even unqualified images that, whilst challenging, 
promise a deeper understanding of what it is one finds unsatisfying about the 
qualified images. 
* * * 
 This thesis has shown that the question with which Wittgenstein begins the 
LFW—‘Could one say that the decision of a person was not free because it was 
determined by natural laws?’—ultimately ought not to be understood as posing a 
purely theoretical question; so that ‘Could one say that…’ is taken to mean merely ‘Is 
it conceivable that…’ Neither is it purely a practical question, i.e. of means; so that 
‘Could one say that…’ comes to mean ‘Could one act according to the belief that…’ 
For Wittgenstein, not all the problems we face in relation to freedom and 
responsibility can be resolved by answering these kinds of questions. I hope to have 
made it clear that his express aim in the LFW—to impress on us that ‘it is one of the 
most important facts of human life’ that certain images force themselves on you —458
and the closing words of the LFW—‘you can call it a different game or not call it a 
different game’ —reflect the fundamental aim to disclose the essential fragility of 459
our freedom, both in light of scientific discoveries and in our ethical existence as 
human beings. 
 For Wittgenstein, then, the role philosophy plays in disputes concerning 
freedom of the will is, firstly, to dispel any illusion that, because an image is firmly 
 CV (1998), p. 87. MS 137 130a: 22.12.1948.457
 LFW, p. 435.458
 LFW, p. 444.459
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rooted in our ways of thinking, that we must think according to that image.  I have 460
shown that Wittgenstein’s principal aim in the LFW is to make plain that, in any case, 
certain images are deeply rooted in our ways of thinking about freedom of the will. 
However, this only means that it is up to us to overcome our resistance to making 
conscious use of other images. For this reason, the second role of the philosopher is 
to disclose other ways of thinking/acting; not necessarily as a way out from a 
particular way of acting, e.g. holding or refusing to hold people responsible, but to 
prevent us from thinking that it is the only way of acting. In Culture and Value, this 
sentiment is conveyed by Wittgenstein as follows: 
If it is asked: How could a man, the ethical in a man, be coerced by his 
environment?—the answer is that even though he may say “No human 
being has to give way to compulsion”, yet under such circumstances he 
will as a matter of fact act in such and such a way.  
‘You don’t HAVE to, I can show you a (different) way out,—but you 
won’t take it.'  461
As we have also seen in this final chapter, Wittgenstein offers us an account of 
philosophy’s therapeutic role, with respect to the mainstream debates about freedom 
of the will, as showing us a (different) way out—whether or not we choose to take it.  
 LFW, p. 435.460
 CV, p. 84.461
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